The networking stack app hosts services that used to be in the system
server (IpClient, NetworkMonitor for now), but in a different process to
be packaged as a mainline module.
Test: booted, verified networking stack working when in app
Change-Id: I300a556f51b35c17378af961cea1ec937444e597
When daemonizing perfetto, SIGINT should be sent to ensure clean
shutdown.
Denial:
12-06 11:12:16.566 3099 3099 I sh : type=1400 audit(0.0:462): avc: denied { signal } for scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:r:perfetto:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
Test: m
Test: flash walleye
Test: SIGINT perfetto from shell
Change-Id: I8d34b447ea90c315faf88f020f1dfc49e4abbcce
Move rules / neverallow assertions from public to private policy. This
change, by itself, is a no-op, but will make future patches easier to
read. The only downside of this change is that it will make git blame
less effective.
Motivation: When rules are placed into the public directory, they cannot
reference a private type. A future change will modify these rules to
reference a private type.
Test: compiles
Bug: 112357170
Change-Id: I56003409b3a23370ddab31ec01d69ff45c80d7e5
Remove the permission to execute dex2oat from apps targetSdkVersion>28.
This has been historically used by ART to compile secondary dex files
but that functionality has been removed in Q and the permission is
therefore not needed.
Some legacy apps do invoke dex2oat directly. Hence allow (with audit) for
targetSdkVersion<= 28.
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk25TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk27TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Bug: 117606664
Change-Id: I2ea9cd56861fcf280cab388a251aa53e618160e5
Commit 619c1ef2ac ("tun_device: enforce
ioctl restrictions") completely removed the ability of untrusted apps to
issue ioctl calls to tun_device. It turns out that this was too
aggressive. Wireshark apparently uses the TUNGETIFF ioctl.
Fixes the following denial:
audit(0.0:384744): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=19560 ioctlcmd=54d2 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c51,c257,c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 app=com.wireguard.android
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I71bb494036ea692781c00af37580748ab39d1332
We are moving AppFuse mount from system_server's mount namespace to
vold. Hence, we could reduce the SELinux permissions given to
system_server, in the expense of adding allow rules to vold and
letting appdomain have access to vold's fd.
Bug: 110379912
Test: testOpenProxyFileDescriptor passes (after vold and
system_server code changes)
Change-Id: I827a108bd118090542354360a8c90b295e6a0fef
Require all SELinux domains which have permission to perform ioctls on
/dev/tun explicitly specify what ioctls they perform. Only allow the
safe defaults FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX, which are alternate, uncommon ways
to set and unset the O_CLOEXEC flag.
Remove app's ability to issue *any* ioctls on /dev/tun, period. Add
neverallow assertions (compile time assertion + CTS test) to prevent
regressions.
Limit system_server's ability to perform ioctls on /dev/tun to FIOCLEX,
FIONCLEX, TUNGETIFF, and TUNSETIFF. Testing and source code examination
shows that only TUNGETIFF and TUNSETIFF are used by system_server.
The goal of this change is to put SELinux ioctl controls in place for
/dev/tun, so we don't have to maintain the custom kernel patch at
11cee2be0c%5E%21
Delete the neverallow assertion in isolated_app.te. This is already
covered by the assertion present in app_neverallows.te.
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsHostsideNetworkTests -t com.android.cts.net.HostsideVpnTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsHostsideNetworkTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
Bug: 111560739
Bug: 111560570
Change-Id: Ibe1c3a9e880db0bee438535554abdbc6d84eec45
We are moving AppFuse mount from system_server's mount namespace to
vold. Hence, we could reduce the SELinux permissions given to
system_server, in the expense of adding allow rules to vold and
letting appdomain have access to vold's fd.
Bug: 110379912
Test: testOpenProxyFileDescriptor passes (after vold and
system_server code changes)
Change-Id: I4731a8ec846c5cb84ec4b680d51938494e8ddd75
Remove blanket coredomain access to same_process_hal_file in favor of
granular access. This change takes into account audits from go/sedenials
(our internal dogfood program)
Bug: 37211678
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I5634fb65c72d13007e40c131a600585a05b8c4b5
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Changes from original aosp/692189 which was reverted:
- There seem to be spurious denials from vendor-specific apps. So added
back access from { appdomain -all_untrusted_apps -priv_app } to cgroup.
Audit this access with intent to write explicit per-domain rules for it.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
This reverts commit cacea25ed0.
Change-Id: I05ab404f348a864e8409d811346c8a0bf49bc47a
This reverts commit 9899568f6c.
Reason for revert: Reports of high numbers of SELinux denials
showing up on the SELinux dashboard.
Bug: 110043362
Change-Id: Id8fc260c47ffd269ac2f15ff7dab668c959e3ab0
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
Change-Id: I9e441b26792f1edb1663c660bcff422ec7a6332b
Remove these files from proc_net_type. Domains that need access must
have permission explicitly granted. Neverallow app access except the
shell domain.
Bug: 114475727
Test: atest CtsLibcoreOjTestCases
Test: netstat, lsof
Test: adb bugreport
Change-Id: I2304e3e98c0d637af78a361569466aa2fbe79fa0
DropboxManager may pass FDs to any app with the READ_LOGS
permission which is available to all apps as a development
permission.
Test: atest CtsIncidentHostTestCases
Fixes: 111856304
Change-Id: I329e3125dab83de948b860061df9d232e31cb23e
llkd needs the ptrace capabilities and dac override to monitor for
live lock conditions on the stack dumps.
Test: compile
Bug: 33808187
Change-Id: Ibc1e4cc10395fa9685c4ef0ca214daf212a5e126
Linux kernel 4.14+ SELinux starts explicit map
permission check for file mmap operations. For backards
compat, add mmap in more places where we explicitly
list out individual file permissions.
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: Idc4ca53769f2e7aa12ed93ab27191ed92da37a3e
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
produce stack traces.
Bug: 111317528
Test: code compiles
Change-Id: I883df49d3e9bca62952c3b33d1c691786dd7df4d
Cut down on logspam during kernel_net_tests
Test: /data/nativetest64/kernel_net_tests/kernel_net_tests
Change-Id: Id19f50caebc09711f80b7d5f9d87be103898dd9a
Before, it was possible to access a hwservice without declaring
that you were a client.
This introduces the following macro:
hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_foo, hal_foo_hwservice)
which makes sure the above implication holds using a neverallow rule.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot + sanity
Change-Id: Iededae68f14f0f3bd412c1205aa3b650a54d55c6
(breaks vendor blobs, will have to be regenerated
after this CL)
This moves mediacodec to vendor so it is replaced with
hal_omx_server. The main benefit of this is that someone
can create their own implementation of mediacodec without
having to alter the one in the tree. mediacodec is still
seccomp enforced by CTS tests.
Fixes: 36375899
Test: (sanity) YouTube
Test: (sanity) camera pics + video
Test: check for denials
Change-Id: I31f91b7ad6cd0a891a1681ff3b9af82ab400ce5e
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
Vendor public libs are exposed to apps (not system), and their ABI
stability is guaranteed by vendor. Introducing new selinux type so that
we don't conflate concepts of same-process HAL and vendor public lib.
The former is exposed to all domains, while the latter should only be
acessible by apps.
Bug: 76413554
Test: build-only change, policy builds
Change-Id: I89dad351374f46c7fe2726991eb4c05064c37ed5
The /dev/ion driver's file operations structure does not specify a
write operation. Granting write is meaningless. This audit statement
has been around since Android Oreo and logs collected from dogfooders
shows that no apps are attempting to open the file with write
permissions.
Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Test: verify no "granted" messages from dogfood devices.
Change-Id: Id4f3540bba8c9f30f9d912f7a7473933be779cbb
We're adding support for OEMs to ship exFAT, which behaves identical
to vfat. Some rules have been manually enumerating labels related
to these "public" volumes, so unify them all behind "sdcard_type".
Test: atest
Bug: 67822822
Change-Id: I09157fd1fc666ec5d98082c6e2cefce7c8d3ae56
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
System components should use the public tagSocket() API, not direct
file access to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/* and /dev/xt_qtaguid.
Test: build/boot taimen-userdebug. Use youtube, browse chrome,
navigate maps on both cellular and wifi.
Bug: 68774956
Change-Id: Id895395de100d8f9a09886aceb0d6061fef832ef
The file under /proc/net/xt_qtaguid is going away in future release.
Apps should use the provided public api instead of directly reading the
proc file. This change will block apps that based on SDK 28 or above to
directly read that file and we will delete that file after apps move
away from it.
Test: Flashed with master branch on marlin, verified phone boot, can
browse web, watch youtube video, make phone call and use google
map for navigation with wifi on and off.
run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Change-Id: I4c4d6c9ab28b426acef23db53f171de8f20be1dc
(cherry picked from commit 5ec8f8432b)
This reverts commit fad0b04de1.
Reason for revert: This change crashed facebook App on dogfood build.
Bug: 72977484
Change-Id: I4f35b00c11afbd4914f572d3cc0378d740403ed2
Remove the untrusted apps and priviledged apps from the group that can
directly access xt_qtaguid module related file. All apps that need to
access app network usage data need to use the public API provided in
framework.
Test: Flashed with master branch on marlin, verified phone boot, can
browse web, watch youtube video, make phone call and use google
map for navigation with either wifi is on or off.
run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
run cts -m CtsNativeNetTestCases
Bug: 68774956 30950746
Change-Id: I9b3db819d6622611d5b512ef821abb4c28d6c9eb
Do not let apps read /proc/uid_cpupower/time_in_state,
/proc/uid_cpupower/concurrent_active_time,
/proc/uid_cpupower/concurrent_policy_time.
b/71718257
Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
without root permissions and system_server was able
to read them
Change-Id: I812694adfbb4630f7b56aa7096dc2e6dfb148b15
/proc/net/xt_qtaguid is used by apps to track their network data
use. Limit access to just zygote spawned processes - apps and
system_server, omitting access to isolated_app which is not allowed
to create network sockets.
As Android moves to eBPF for app's network data stats, access to
/proc/net/xt_qtaguid will be removed entirely. Segmenting access off
is the first step.
Bug: 68774956
This change also helps further segment and whitelist access to
files in /proc/net and is a step in the lockdown of /proc/net.
Bug: 9496886
Test: boot Taimen. Walk through setup-wizard. Make phone call and
video call. Browse web. Watch youtube. Navigate in maps.
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsIncidentHostTestCases -t \
com.android.server.cts.NetstatsIncidentTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsOsTestCases -t \
android.os.cts.StrictModeTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t \
android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsUsageStatsTestCases -t \
android.app.usage.cts.NetworkUsageStatsTest
Test: vts-tradefed run vts -m VtsQtaguidTest
Change-Id: Idddd318c56b84564142d37b11dcc225a2f2800ea
Vendor-specific app domains depend on the rules in app.te so they
must reside in public policy.
Bug: 70517907
Test: build
Change-Id: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
Merged-In: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
(cherry picked from commit 1f4cab8bd4)
This leaves only the existence of appdomain attribute as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this attribute's policy
and are thus now private.
Test: Device boot, apps (untrusted_app, system_app, platform_app,
priv_app) work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Ie22e35bad3307bb9918318c3d034f1433d51677f
Ephemeral apps cannot open files from external storage, but can be given
access to files via the file picker.
Test: ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENTS from an ephemeral app returns a readable fd.
Change-Id: Ie21b64a9633eff258be254b9cd86f282db1509e8
Ephemeral apps are still apps with very similar capabilities, it makes
more sense to have them under appdomain and benefit from the shared
state (and all the neverallow rules) than to try and dupplicate them and
keep them in sync.
This is an initial move, there are parts of ephemeral_app that still
need to be locked down further and some parts of appdomain that should
be pushed down into the various app domains.
Test: Builds, ephemeral apps work without denials.
Change-Id: I1526b2c2aa783a91fbf6543ac7f6d0d9906d70af
Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.
Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed
Previously we published appfuse mount points to apps and apps open
appfuse file by themselves. We changed the design and we don't allow
apps to access appfuse mount point. Instead system server opens a file
on appfuse mount points and passes FD to apps.
The change updates apps and system server policies to adopt new design.
Bug: 29970149
Test: None
Change-Id: I0b35fee9816f61565705eecb88a472754ccffdca
This removes access to Bluetooth system properties from arbitrary
SELinux domains. Access remains granted to init, bluetooth, and
system_app domains. neverallow rules / CTS enforce that access is not
granted to Zygote and processes spawned from Zygote expcept for
system_app and bluetooth.
The reason is that some of these properties may leak persistent
identifiers not resettable by the user.
Test: Bluetooth pairing and data transfer works
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: Icdcb3927a423c4011a62942340a498cc1b302472
After a series of recent commits, installd has fully migrated over
to Binder, and all socket-based communication has been removed.
Test: builds, boots, apps install fine, pre-OTA dexopt works
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: Ia67b6260de58240d057c99b1bbd782b44376dfb5
