This enables access to gatekeeperd for anybody who invokes Android
framework APIs. This is necessary because the AndroidKeyStore
abstraction offered by the framework API occasionally communicates
with gatekeeperd from the calling process.
Bug: 20526234
Change-Id: I3362ba07d1a7e5f1c47fe7e9ba6aec5ac3fec747
The current neverallow rule (compile time assertion)
neverallow { domain -gatekeeperd -system_server } gatekeeper_service:service_manager find;
asserts that no rule is present which allows processes other than
system_server from asking servicemanager for a gatekeeperd token.
However, if system_server leaks the token to other processes, it may
be possible for those processes to access gatekeeperd directly, bypassing
servicemanager.
Add a neverallow rule to assert that no process other than system_server
are allowed to make binder calls to gatekeeperd. Even if another process
was to manage to get a binder token to gatekeeperd, it would be useless.
Remove binder_service() from gatekeeperd. The original use of the
binder_service() macro was to widely publish a binder service.
If this macro is present and the calling process has a gatekeeperd
binder token, it's implicitly possible for the following processes
to make a binder call to gatekeeperd:
* all app processes
* dumpstate
* system_server
* mediaserver
* surfaceflinger
Removing binder_service revokes this implicit access.
Add explicit access for system_server to make binder calls to
gatekeeperd.
Add explicit access for gatekeeperd to make calls to keystore.
This was implicitly granted via binder_service() before, but now
needs to be explicit.
Change-Id: I23c1573d04ab670a42660d5922b39eecf4265b66