It is unnecessary to use get_prop() rules for the su domain. The
su domain is always in permissive mode [1] and not subject to SELinux
enforcement. It's also possible these rules were added to avoid SELinux
denial log spam from showing up, however, there are already dontaudit
rules in place [2] to prevent this.
Delete the unnecessary rules.
[1] 96b62a60c2/private/su.te (19)
[2] 96b62a60c2/public/su.te (42)
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I5913f360738725bf915f0606d381029b9ba4318f
We lose git history with this, but imo the rules being moved don't have
much reference material. Also, as we write more neverallow rules for
CKI, I'd like to consolidate them in private/coredomain.te
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I6d0c3d2af0c4dfe7dd3cb1d8836b4b5e00db37a4
Commit 619c1ef2ac ("tun_device: enforce
ioctl restrictions") completely removed the ability of untrusted apps to
issue ioctl calls to tun_device. It turns out that this was too
aggressive. Wireshark apparently uses the TUNGETIFF ioctl.
Fixes the following denial:
audit(0.0:384744): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332 path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=19560 ioctlcmd=54d2 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c51,c257,c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1 app=com.wireguard.android
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I71bb494036ea692781c00af37580748ab39d1332
These ioctls are similar to BLKGETSIZE64; they return benign information
about the partition's alignment, and are used by liblp to optimally
align dynamic partition extents.
The system_block_device is included here because on retrofit devices,
the "super" partition is mapped to the system partition.
Test: manual OTA on retrofit device
Bug: 118506262
Change-Id: I3dd3c99d86d63f97bcd393cff374e27f5ed2da2e
BLKDISCARD is used by vold while wiping block devices
b2455747a9/Utils.cpp (619)
BLKGETSIZE is used to determine the size of the block device. Ideally
code should not be using this ioctl, as it fails for devices >= 2T in
size. Vold indirectly uses this when executing /system/bin/newfs_msdos.
Arguably this is a bug in newfs_msdos, as BLKGETSIZE64 should be used
instead.
Code: 0c7e133c7f/mkfs_msdos.c (845)
Addresses the following denials:
audit(0.0:24): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="Binder:588_2" path="/dev/block/vold/public:7,9" dev="tmpfs" ino=106407 ioctlcmd=1277 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0
audit(0.0:25): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="newfs_msdos" path="/dev/block/vold/public:7,9" dev="tmpfs" ino=106407 ioctlcmd=1260 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0
Test: policy compiles.
Bug: 119562530
Change-Id: Ib7198daf150d6f2578545a6a402e0313069ea2b4
It will not end when other words appeared because of the wrong bound and variable,
rule_map->length will exceed the actual length in the rule_map_new function,
it will lead to crash in the rule_map_validate function because of strcmp(NULL, str).
Test: 1.add "user=shell doman=system_app" to private/seapp_contexts
2.exec "checkseapp private/seapp_contexts" and it will not be crashed
Change-Id: I600206448b38cf2c9b61f9141b40f920b05696c8
Signed-off-by: liwugang <liwugang@xiaomi.com>
It was <name>_file_context before. Changing for better readability.
Bug: 119034475
Test: m apex.test com.android.tzdata com.android.runtime
Change-Id: Ic9d6479dfed56ac474c574343a38b5f73dde3c05
We are moving AppFuse mount from system_server's mount namespace to
vold. Hence, we could reduce the SELinux permissions given to
system_server, in the expense of adding allow rules to vold and
letting appdomain have access to vold's fd.
Bug: 110379912
Test: testOpenProxyFileDescriptor passes (after vold and
system_server code changes)
Change-Id: I827a108bd118090542354360a8c90b295e6a0fef
For centralized development of sepolices, file_contexts files for APEXes
are all moved to under /system/seplicy.
Bug: 119034475
Bug: 113373927
Test: m apex.test com.android.tzdata com.android.runtime com.android.media
Change-Id: I9bf4874793db4dbdb75cbd759ae95f72d7281007
This prevents denials while taking a bugreport.
Bug: 116711254
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoBugreportDenials
Change-Id: I65dffda9806e0d627978ffdd392e3deb625149b7
There is now an incident section for statsd output data. These selinux
changes must be made for incident to call dump on statsd to get the
data.
Bug: 115678461
Test: adb shell incident -b 3023
and confirm that a valid statsd section is obtained
Change-Id: I761389c160ab3ab6c24556813a1a31088c0f5137
mtd_device does not label any /dev node present on walleye, and the only
permission to that type is:
allow hal_telephony_server mtd_device:dir search;
I suspect there is no need to keep mtd_device around.
Bug: 110962171
Test: boot aosp_walleye
Change-Id: If74b1258b21edeca38c8b7dc07a3a10b751a7e85
Test: ensure no build failures;
add RoleManagerService as a boot phase
ensure no SecurityException in logcat on boot
Change-Id: Ia0803c0fb084fe2b12f5c20f5e46354d0dd1aedf
system/sepolicy commit 619c1ef2ac started
enforcing ioctl whitelisting requirements for /dev/tun. Bluetooth needs
the ability to issue TUNSETIFF on /dev/tun, so allow access. We also
allow access to TUNGETIFF for good measure.
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { ioctl } for comm=425420536572766963652043616C6C path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs" ino=20047 ioctlcmd=0x54ca scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: Ie4c138fc774373cec266c59de6663db147d60423
No coredomain domain has access to these types and corresponding /dev
nodes don't exist on the device:
audio_seq_device
audio_timer_device
full_device
i2c_device
vcs_device
Bug: 110962171
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: boot walleye
Change-Id: I89ad4755e6760aa166cb22e2655567e5905dc672
These rules mirror those for /vendor/overlay and /odm/overlay, including
the possilibity of a symlink like /system/vendor -> /vendor.
Test: builds, boots
Change-Id: I323e48fcc13c4ac7779902506539c2600708cc88
Historically GPU service lives in SurfaceFlinger as a convenient hack.
Howerver, SurfaceFlinger doesn't need to know about anything specific about GPU
capability, and shouldn't know about anything about GPU. This patch moves GPU
service out of SurfaceFlinger.
GPU service is a service that accesses to GPU driver, queries GPU capabilities
and reports back. Currently we use this information in CTS and some benchmarks.
BUG: 118347356
Test: Build, flash and boot, use `adb shell cmd gpu vkjson` to verify
Change-Id: I007989e0f3f73b5caf80277979986820dd127c32
This is useful to test how it would behave on devices with user builds.
Bug: 117980186
Test: adb shell setprop dumpstate.unroot true && \
adb shell cmd activity bug-report --progress
Change-Id: If9094bbe0c29e8180f1b35d2b4ac95343a1bd0eb
In earlier kernel versions (<4.0), the loopback driver issues
requests from a kernel thread. Therefore, the kernel needs access
to APEX file descriptors and data files (which are loopback
mounted).
Bug: 119220815
Test: mounting works on sailfish
Change-Id: I75b2bade41c64cf6fa6040d9c2f5489a206e04c6
