Allow the use of debug.db.uid on userdebug / eng builds.
Setting this property allows debuggerd to suspend a process
if it detects a crash.
Make debug.db.uid only accessible to the su domain. This should
not be used on a user build.
Only support reading user input on userdebug / eng builds.
Steps to reproduce with the "crasher" program:
adb root
adb shell setprop debug.db.uid 20000
mmm system/core/debuggerd
adb sync
adb shell crasher
Addresses the following denials:
<5>[ 580.637442] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:149): avc: denied { read } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 580.637589] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:150): avc: denied { open } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="input" dev="tmpfs" ino=5665 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=dir
<5>[ 580.637706] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:151): avc: denied { read write } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[ 580.637823] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:152): avc: denied { open } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" name="event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[ 580.637958] type=1400 audit(1392412124.612:153): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=182 comm="debuggerd" path="/dev/input/event5" dev="tmpfs" ino=6723 scontext=u:r:debuggerd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:input_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
Bug: 12532622
Change-Id: I63486edb73efb1ca12e9eb1994ac9e389251a3f1
This change enables SELinux security enforcement on vold.
For the vold.te file ONLY, this change is conceptually a revert of
77d4731e9d and
50e37b93ac, with the following
additional changes:
1) Removal of "allow vold proc:file write;" and
"allow vold self:capability { sys_boot };". As of system/vold
change adfba3626e76c1931649634275d241b226cd1b9a, vold no longer
performs it's own reboots, so these capabilities are no longer
needed.
2) Addition of the powerctl property, which vold contacts to
tell init to reboot.
3) Removal of "allow vold kernel:system module_request;". As of
CTS commit f2cfdf5c057140d9442fcfeb4e4a648e8258b659, Android
devices no longer ship with loadable modules, hence we don't
require this rule.
4) Removal of "fsetid" from "self:capability". Any setuid / setgid
bits SHOULD be cleared if vold is able to change the permissions
of files. IMHO, it was a mistake to ever include this capability in
the first place.
Testing: As much as possible, I've tested filesystem related
functionality, including factory reset and device encryption.
I wasn't able to test fstrim functionality, which is a fairly
new feature. I didn't see any policy denials in dmesg. It's quite
possible I've missed something. If we experience problems, I
happy to roll back this change.
Bug: 9629920
Change-Id: I683afa0dffe9f28952287bfdb7ee4e0423c2e97a
Properties under bluetooth. and persist.service.bdroid. are
considered Bluetooth-related properties.
Change-Id: Iee937d9a1184c2494deec46f9ed7090c643acda7
Update the file_contexts for the new location of
the policy files, as well as update the policy
for the management of these types.
Change-Id: Idc475901ed437efb325807897e620904f4ff03e9
New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.
