1, /metadata/aconfig is the directory that stores aconfig storage
related protobuf files and flag value files boot copy. Grant read
access to everybody. But limit the write access only to init and
aconfig storage service process (to be created later)
2, /metadata/aconfig/flags is the sub directory that stores persistent
aconfig value files.Initially set it up to be accessible by
system_server process only . When aconfig storage service process is
created, will add another permission to storage service process.
Context to why we are hosting flag data on /metadata partition:
Android is adopting trunk stable workflow, flagging and A/B testing is
essential to every platform component. We need some place to host the
flag that are accessible to system processes that starts before /data
partition becomes available.
In addition, there has been a long discussion regarding utilizing
/metadata partition for some process data, another example is mainline
modules, we are trying to make them to be able to be mounted earlier,
but cannot due to /data availability.
Bug: 312444587
Test: m
Change-Id: I7e7dae5cf8c4268d71229c770af31b5e9f071428
Revert submission 2929484-fix-b-321651892-ihaladapter
Reason for revert: possible cause of b/323385784
Reverted changes: /q/submissionid:2929484-fix-b-321651892-ihaladapter
Change-Id: I9664f8f9dd6eec159be7fbf3b148a12d44cef582
Legacy VPNs are removed, including the usage of mtpd/pppd.
Only the type ppp and mtp remain as there are usages elsewhere.
Bug: 161776767
Test: m, presubmit
Change-Id: I556b0daa55f9ea7bf844f6a52d10dda02e324ee0
This service is used by the audio server for translating
between legacy string KV pairs and AIDL vendor parameters.
It resides on the system_ext partition.
Since it has to be implemented by every SoC vendor, provide
an example implementation. This example service is added
to CF and GSI system_ext. Vendors can use their own names
and policy labels, the only thing that the audio server
depends on is the AIDL interface.
There is no fuzzer for this service because the example
implementation only contains trivial code (interface
methods are stubbed out).
Bug: 321651892
Test: atest audiorouting_tests
Change-Id: I8ab922660a30ffd44772987204ac4a28c1007c66
On Android, unix sockets are located in /dev/socket/ and managed by
init. This commit follows the convention for ot-daemon
Bug: 320451788
Test: verified that ot-daemon can create socket
/dev/socket/ot-daemon/thread-wpan.sock
Change-Id: I6b0fe45602bb54d6d482f5be46ddb5402bea477b
This commit includes two sepolicy changes:
1. change threadnetwork data file to
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering/threadnetwork
2. use apex_tethering_data_file for files under
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering
The background is that the Thread daemon (ot_daemon) is merged into the
Tethering mainline module, which means the the Tehtering module now has
code running in both system_server and the standalone unprivileged
ot_daemon process. To prevent ot_daemon from accessing other
apex_system_server_data_file dirs, here use the specific
apex_tethering_data_file for both Tethering and Thread files (A
subdirectory threadnetwork/ will be created for Thread at runtime). This
is similar to apex_art_data_file and apex_virt_data_file.
Note that a file_contexts rule like
```
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.tethering/threadnetwork(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_threadnetwork_data_file:s0
```
won't work because the threadnetwork/ subdir doesn't exist before the
sepolicy rules are evaluated.
Bug: 309932508
Test: manually verified that Thread settings file can be written to
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.tethering/threadnetwork
Change-Id: I66539865ef388115c8e9b388b43291d8faf1f384
/tmp is a volatile temporary storage location for the shell user.
As with /data/local/tmp, it is owned by shell:shell and is chmod 771.
Bug: 311263616
Change-Id: Ice0229d937989b097971d9db434d5589ac2da99a
This reverts commit 5e1d7f1c85.
Reason for revert: retry with a fix to the failed tests
Test: atest art_standalone_oatdump_tests
Change-Id: I28872c643ba4ec07ef41b1f9be86036c592a6e4e
The changes include
- allow binder calls to ActivityManager and NativePackageManager
- allow binder calls from system server
- allow writes of statsd atoms
- allow init to start uprobestats
- permission for uprobestats config files and propery
- allow execution of oatdump so it can look up code offsets
- allow scanning /proc.
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: Id1864b7dac3a2c5dcd8736c4932778e36b658ce3
This allows AccessibilityManagerService in system_server to
interact with a HID-supported Braille Display.
Bug: 303522222
Test: ls -z /dev/hidraw0
Test: plat_file_contexts_test
Test: Open FileInputStream and FileOutputStream on this device
path from AccessibilityManagerService
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:67a63cc046769759aa43cf1653f11e57c55cd1db)
Merged-In: I2982e907bd2a70c1e4e8161647d6efd65110b99c
Change-Id: I2982e907bd2a70c1e4e8161647d6efd65110b99c
In AVF, virtualizationmanager checks the selinux label of given disk
image for proving whether the given image is edited maliciously.
Existing one(vendor_configs_file, /vendor/etc/*) was too wide to use for this purpose.
Bug: 285854379
Test: m
Change-Id: I6c966c92b238a2262d2eb7f41041ed4c359e9e0a
Remove a duplicate entry with its comment as the sorting logic is not
applied since commit dfa4a48b.
Bug: 299839280
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I4fa556c2ff8f114b56bba7ab32fac1d17373ef8b
Add test entries for property_service_for_system and virtual_camera.
Re-order file_contexts so that /data/vendor/tombstones/wifi and
/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport are labelled correctly.
Bug: 299839280
Test: checkfc -t ./private/file_contexts ./contexts/plat_file_contexts_test pass
Change-Id: Ifb4453d02327b5cf678e6a4cd927b5df0960086b
btfloader is dead. bpfloader is being split in twain.
(it will eventually get it's own context, but for now this works)
Test: TreeHugger
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I7577e777545a0fa77a6467fb425aefc99a6e68d0
This reverts commit e2bd44d48d.
Reason for revert: 2nd attempt to add the policy change
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I5b9a102879a65917d496ba2194187ddd2b4545d1
Partial revert of:
commit 3e1dc57bf4
commit 30ae427ed0
The current file contexts could break potential implementations of NTFS
by partners in future. I am not rolling back the adjoining
fuseblkd_exec andfuseblkd_untrusted_exec code, because secure
implementations of fuseblk drivers should still endeavour to use the
more compartmentalised policies.
However, as we don't support NTFS officially, we should give
implementors the choices whether to use it or not, even if it will open
the door to potentially less secure implementations.
NTFS Context: http://b/254407246,
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b5RjdhN2wFFqmLCK0P_chVyiEhiYqNlTn52TFBMNwxk
Bug: 294925212
Test: Builds and boot.
Change-Id: I6d3858517e797b3f7388f9d3f18dd4a11770d5bc
