Apps are no longer allowed open access to /dev/ashmem, unless they
target API level < Q.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, Chrome, instant apps work
Change-Id: I1cff08f26159fbf48a42afa7cfa08eafa1936f42
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
Extend the auditing of native code loading from non-priv app home
directories to user builds. Only applies to apps targeting SDK <= 28.
Bug: 111338677
Test: Builds
Change-Id: I6fbbd80626a1c87dd7ece689f9fecd7c0a1a59d6
This was originally implemented in commit
890414725f and reverted in commit
fa3eb773ce. This effectively reverts the
revert, with minimal changes to cope with the subsequent reversion of
commit b362474374.
Auditing is only enabled for apps targeting API <= 28.
Test: Compiles, audit messages are seen.
Bug: 121333210
Bug: 111338677
Change-Id: Ie38498a2b61f4b567902117f9ef293faa0e689dd
This reverts commit 890414725f.
Unittest failures of JvmtiHostTest1906#testJvmti. To do a clean revert
of b362474374, we need to also revert this
change.
Test: compiles
Bug: 121333210
Bug: 111338677
On debug builds, introduce audit logging of apps targeting SDK <= 28
that execute native code from a non-priv app home directory via
execve() or dl_open().
Bug: 111338677
Test: Builds + boots.
Test: Launch app that uses private .so files, see granted logs.
Change-Id: I5880801d3a29cbf2c1cf4e0d72adc69a9d548952
Remove the ability for applications to dlopen() executable code from
their home directory for newer API versions. API versions <= 28 are
uneffected by this change.
Bug: 112357170
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases
Change-Id: I1d7f3a1015d54b8610d1c561f38a1a3c2bcf79e4
By convention, auditallow statements are always placed in
userdebug_or_eng() blocks. This ensures that we don't inadvertently ship
audit rules on production devices, which could result in device logspam,
and in pathological situations, impact device performance (generating
audit messages is much more expensive than a standard SELinux check).
Bug: 117606664
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I681ed73c83683e8fdbef9cf662488115f6e7a490
Remove the permission to execute dex2oat from apps targetSdkVersion>28.
This has been historically used by ART to compile secondary dex files
but that functionality has been removed in Q and the permission is
therefore not needed.
Some legacy apps do invoke dex2oat directly. Hence allow (with audit) for
targetSdkVersion<= 28.
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk25TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk27TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Bug: 117606664
Change-Id: I2ea9cd56861fcf280cab388a251aa53e618160e5
This reverts commit 0dd738d810.
Reason for revert: CtsSimpleperfTestCases CTS test case failures.
See b/118704604 for details.
Bug: 112357170
Bug: 118704604
Change-Id: Ibe921f3bbc3404694542ef695883c1a30777d68b
untrusted_app: Remove the ability to run execve() on files within an
application's home directory. Executing code from a writable /home
directory is a W^X violation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX).
Additionally, loading code from application home directories violates a
security requirement that all executable code mapped into memory must
come from signed sources, or be derived from signed sources.
Note: this change does *not* remove the ability to load executable code
through other mechanisms, such as mmap(PROT_EXEC) of a file descriptor
from the app's home directory. In particular, functionality like
dlopen() on files in an app's home directory continues to work even
after this change.
untrusted_app_25 and untrusted_app_27: For backwards compatibility,
continue to allow these domains to execve() files from the
application's home directory.
seapp_contexts: Bump the minimum API level required to enter the
untrusted_app domain. This will run API level 27-28 processes in
the API level 27 sandbox. API level 28 will continue to run with
levelFrom=all, and API level 27 will continue to run with
levelFrom=user.
Bug: 112357170
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Test: See CTS test at https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/cts/+/804228
Change-Id: Ief9ae3a227d16ab5792f43bacbb577c1e70185a0
In the next Android release, there will be devices that have no
xt_qtaguid module at all and framework and netd will decide which code
path it takes for trafficStats depending on the device setup. So all
apps and services should not depend on this device specific
implementation anymore and use public API for the data they need.
Bug: 114475331
Bug: 79938294
Test: QtaguidPermissionTest
Change-Id: I0d37b2df23782eefa2e8977c6cdbf9210db3e0d2
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
This is a partial cherry pick of commit 6231b4d9
'Enforce per-app data protections for targetSdk 28+'.
Untrusted_app_27 remains unreachable, but it's existence
prevents future merge conflicts.
Bug: 63897054
Test: build/boot aosp_walleye-userdebug
Change-Id: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
Merged-In: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
(cherry picked from commit 6231b4d9fc)
2018-04-03 12:25:51 -07:00
Renamed from public/untrusted_app_25.te (Browse further)
