The testharness service will manage Test Harness Mode and provide a
command-line interface for users to enable Test Harness Mode; however it
does not directly provide a public API.
Bug: 80137798
Test: make
Test: flash crosshatch
Change-Id: Ie396e40fcea8914b4dd2247f2314e029b66ad84e
Historically GPU service lives in SurfaceFlinger as a convenient hack.
Howerver, SurfaceFlinger doesn't need to know about anything specific about GPU
capability, and shouldn't know about anything about GPU. This patch moves GPU
service out of SurfaceFlinger.
GPU service is a service that accesses to GPU driver, queries GPU capabilities
and reports back. Currently we use this information in CTS and some benchmarks.
BUG: 118347356
Test: Build, flash and boot, use `adb shell cmd gpu vkjson` to verify
Change-Id: I007989e0f3f73b5caf80277979986820dd127c32
Remove kernel attack surface associated with ioctls on plain files. In
particular, we want to ensure that the ioctls FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY are not exposed outside a whitelisted set of
entities. However, it's straight forward enough to turn on ioctl
whitelisting for everything, so we choose to do so.
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Test: device boots with data wipe
Test: device boots without data wipe
Change-Id: I545ae76dddaa2193890eeb1d404db79d1ffa13c2
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I80c54d4eaf3b94a1fe26d2280af4e57cb1593790
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I1f97659736429fe961319c642f458c80f199ffb4
Replace more complicated logic that determines that persistent
properties are now valid with a simple check of
ro.persistent_properties.ready.
Test: manual
Bug: 109821005
Change-Id: I8c63beb294377ea9ce6eb6336b83f529deedd830
The shell is now available directly in the recovery ramdisk. We no
longer need to mount system.img to /system as the recovery ramdisk is
self-contained. However, there is a problem that every file in the
ramdisk is labeled as rootfs because the ramdisk does not support xattr.
This CL adds several recovery-only rules that are required to make the
recovery ramdisk self-contained. Most importantly, adbd is allowed to
domain_trans to shell. Also shell is allowe to execute files of type
rootfs. Finally, the recovery is allowed to mount on tmpfs since it now
mounts system.img to /mnt/system.
Bug: 63673171
Test: `adb reboot recovery; adb devices` shows the device ID
Test: `adb root && adb shell` and then
$ lsof -p `pidof adbd` shows that libm.so, libc.so, etc. are loaded from
the /lib directory.
Change-Id: If21b069aee63541344a5ca8939fb9a46ffef4d3e
Fixing denials that stopped traceur from being able to write to
debugfs_tracing. Also cleaning up general find denials for services that
traceur doesn't have permission to access.
Additionally, labeling /data/local/trace as a trace_data_file in order
to give traceur a UX friendly area to write its traces to now that it
will no longer be a shell user. It will be write/readable by traceur,
and deletable/readable by shell.
Test: Traceur functionality is not being blocked by selinux policy
Bug: 68126425
Change-Id: I201c82975a31094102e90bc81454d3c2a48fae36
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Bug: 63910933
Test: boot sailfish in normal mode, checks adbd is started
Test: boot sailfish in recovery mode, checks adbd is started
Test: boot bullhead in normal mode, checks adbd is started
Test: boot bullhead in recovery mode, checks adbd is started
Change-Id: I35ed78a15a34626fbd3c21d030e2bf51033f7b79
Merged-In: I35ed78a15a34626fbd3c21d030e2bf51033f7b79
(cherry picked from commit e2423d149b)
Test: adbd_test (with and without adb root)
Note: one test fails without root with and without this change
because of an unrelated shell selinux denial.
Test: adb screencap, pull, and verify
Test: Android Studio screenshot
Bug: 36643190
Change-Id: Ib534240bc9bb3a1f32b8865ca66db988902a0f4a
seapp_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'seapp_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospSeappContexts
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I19b3e50c6a7c292713d3e56ef0448acf6e4270f7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts
Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The label applies to all service_contexts regardless of their location.
This also lets us track the service_contexts usage and limit access to
the files for the corresponding object manager alone.
Bug: 36002427
Test: Boot sailfish and observe no denials for 'serice_contexts'
Test: cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
-t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospServiceContexts
Change-Id: I97fc8b24bc99ca5c00d010fb522cd39a35572858
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
This leaves only the existence of adbd domain as public API. All other
rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus
now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules to do with adbd_current except
those created by other domains' allow rules referencing adbd
domain from public and vendor policies.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Icdce8b89f67c70c6c4c116471aaa412e55028cd8
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
