The report_off_body permission of the "keystore2" class only guarded the
Binder API IKeystoreMaintenance#onDeviceOffBody() served by keystore2.
That API is being removed because it is unused
(https://r.android.com/2974277). Therefore, stop granting the
report_off_body permission.
Don't actually remove the permission from private/access_vectors. That
would break the build because it's referenced by rules in prebuilts/.
However, document the access vectors that are known to be unused.
Bug: 289849354
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases
Change-Id: I344a1a8ad1dc12217b414899994397d5e62bd771
This is checked when getting the time of last successful authentication
from keystore2. The auth_service is the only expected caller.
Bug: 303839446
Test: manual
Change-Id: Idf222e69c0553a7be94206b519a95a4006e69507
Brings in the io_uring class and associated restrictions and adds a new
macro, `io_uring_use`, to sepolicy.
In more detail, this change:
* Adds a new macro expands to ensure the domain it is passed can undergo a
type transition to a new type, `<domain>_iouring`, when the anon_inode
being accessed is labeled `[io_uring]`. It also allows the domain to
create, read, write, and map the io_uring anon_inode.
* Adds the ability for a domain to use the `IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL` flag
during `io_uring_setup` so that a syscall to `io_uring_enter` is not
required by the caller each time it wishes to submit IO. This can be
enabled securely as long as we don't enable sharing of io_uring file
descriptors across domains. The kernel polling thread created by `SQPOLL`
will inherit the credentials of the thread that created the io_uring [1].
* Removes the selinux policy that restricted all domains that make use of
the `userfault_fd` macro from any `anon_inode` created by another domain.
This is overly restrictive, as it prohibits the use of two different
`anon_inode` use cases in a single domain e.g. userfaultfd and io_uring.
This change also replaces existing sepolicy in fastbootd and snapuserd
that enabled the use of io_uring.
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/patch/163159041500.470089.11310853524829799938.stgit@olly/
Bug: 253385258
Test: m selinux_policy
Test: cd external/liburing; mm; atest liburing_test; # requires WIP CL ag/20291423
Test: Manually deliver OTAs (built with m dist) to a recent Pixel device
and ensure snapuserd functions correctly (no io_uring failures)
Change-Id: I96f38760b3df64a1d33dcd6e5905445ccb125d3f
Contexts must have this permission to fetch remotely provisioned
attestation key blobs. It is expected that only credstore will have
this permission.
Test: manual, build and run cuttlefish
Bug: 194696876
Change-Id: Ieebd552129bc8be6b8831ec2e38eb6bda522b216
This change adds a permission migrate_any_key that will help the system
server in migrating keys for an app that wants to leave a sharedUserId.
Bug: 179284822
Test: compiles
Change-Id: I2f35a1335092e69f5b3e346e2e27284e1ec595ec
Add deleteAllKeys to IKeystoreMaintenance and allow vold to call it.
Allow vold to read the property
`ro.crypto.metadata_init_delete_all_keys.enabled`
Bug: 187105270
Test: booted twice on Cuttlefish
Change-Id: I2fb0e94db9d35c1f19ca7acb2f541cfb13c23524
Keystore2 atoms need to be rounted to statsd via a proxy.
The proxy needs to have this permission in order to pull metrics from
keystore.
Ignore-AOSP-First: No mergepath to AOSP.
Bug: 188590587
Test: Statsd Testdrive script
Change-Id: Ic94f4bb19a08b6300cfd2d3ed09b31d5b7081bfd
Merged-In: Ic94f4bb19a08b6300cfd2d3ed09b31d5b7081bfd
(cherry picked from commit 61d07e7ce0)
Enforce new requirements on app with targetSdkVersion=32 including:
- No RTM_GETNEIGH on netlink route sockets.
- No RTM_GETNEIGHTBL on netlink route sockets.
Bug: 171572148
Test: atest NetworkInterfaceTest
Test: atest bionic-unit-tests-static
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Change-Id: I32ebb407b8dde1c872f53a1bc3c1ec20b9a5cb49
Add early_boot_ended permission to the keystore2 access vector. This
permission must be checked before allowing calls to earlyBootEnded() on
Keymint devices.
Bug: 181821046
Bug: 181910578
Change-Id: I8860a4424a249455ab540b6c2896e7d836ceb8a3
This permission is required to call
IKeystoreMaintenance::onDeviceOffBody.
Test: N/A
Bug: 171305684
Change-Id: Idf2e496dce607d63497b55858652869d85529238
Introduce the convert_storage_key_to_ephemeral permission to the
keystore2_key access vector and give vold permission to use it. This
permission must be checked when a caller wants to get a per-boot
ephemeral key from a long lived wrapped storage key.
Bug: 181806377
Bug: 181910578
Change-Id: I542c084a8fab5153bc98212af64234e62e9ad032
ART runtime will be using userfaultfd for a new heap compaction
algorithm. After enabling userfaultfd in android kernels (with SELinux
support), the feature needs policy that allows { create ioctl read }
operations on userfaultfd file descriptors.
Bug: 160737021
Test: Manually tested by exercising userfaultfd ops in ART
Change-Id: I9ccb7fa9c25f91915639302715f6197d42ef988e
This CL adds a new keystore2 permission "get_auth_token"and grants this
permission to credstore which needs to call keystore2 to obtain
authtokens.
Bug: 159475191
Test: CtsVerifier
Change-Id: I1c02ea73afa6fe0b12a2d74e51fb4a8a94fd4baf
The list permission protects the ability to list arbitrary namespaces.
This is not a namespace specific permission but a Keystore specific
permission. Listing the entries of a given namsepace is covered by the
get_info permission already.
Ignore-AOSP-First: This needs to land in googleplex first to updated
prebuilt vendor images. Otherwise it breaks
aosp-with-phone builds.
Test: N/A
Change-Id: If6e79fd863a79acf8d8ab10c6362a4eeaa88a5b8
Keystore 2.0 has a different set of permission that it enforces.
We introduce keystore2_key so that we can set up policy for both
Keystore 1.0 and Keystore 2.0 for a gradual transition from one to
the other.
Bug: 158500146
Test: None
Change-Id: I3dcab06d73d242d63d21883659c304dfab8bf74f
Merged-In: I3dcab06d73d242d63d21883659c304dfab8bf74f
There are probably more cases but this one blocks presubmit
for cuttlefish with mainline kernels.
Bug: 158304247
Change-Id: I6d769b16a230a113a804df61f8de4dcbce2193b6
CAP_MAC_ADMIN was originally introduced into the kernel for use
by Smack and not used by SELinux. However, SELinux later appropriated
CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a way to control setting/getting security contexts
unknown to the currently loaded policy for use in labeling filesystems
while running a policy that differs from the one being applied to
the filesystem, in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=12b29f34558b9b45a2c6eabd4f3c6be939a3980f
circa v2.6.27.
Hence, the comment about mac_admin being unused by SELinux is inaccurate.
Remove it.
The corresponding change to refpolicy is:
5fda529636
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: Ie3637882200732e498c53a834a27284da838dfb8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The open, audit_access, execmod, and watch* permissions
are all defined in the COMMON_FILE_PERMS in the kernel
classmap and inherited by all the file-related classes;
we can do the same in the policy by putting them into the
common file declaration.
refpolicy recently similarly reorganized its definitions and added the
watch* permissions to common file, see:
e5dbe75276c656b97a283952ecb4dd
Adding new permissions to the end of the existing classes was only
required for kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping
support (< v2.6.33).
Test: policy still builds
Change-Id: I44a2c3a94c21ed23410b6f807af7f1179e2c1747
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This patch allows us to write SELinux policies for the
perf_event_open() syscall LSM hooks added to the kernel in the following
commit:
da97e18458
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I0005759eb7a487faebe94a4653e3865343eb441e
Used when mapping RTM_GETLINK messages to this new permission.
Users of netlink_route_sockets that do not use the net_domain()
macro will need to grant this permission as needed. Compatibility
with older vendor images is preserved by granting all vendor domains
access to this new permission in *.compat.cil files.
Bug: 141455849
Test: build (this change is a no-op without kernel changes)
Change-Id: I18f1c9fc958120a26b7b3bea004920d848ffb26e
Update access_vectors to support newer kernel functionality.
This change does not grant any new access.
Inspired by the following refpolicy commits:
* 25a5b24274
* 109ab3296b
* 437e48ac53
Bug: 118843234
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I7c5a8dcf288dc2321adcf368bd0c0573c5257202
af63f4193f
allows a security policy writer to determine whether transitions under
nosuid / NO_NEW_PRIVS should be allowed or not.
Define these permissions, so that they're usable to policy writers.
This change is modeled after refpolicy
1637a8b407
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Test Note: Because this requires a newer kernel, full testing on such
kernels could not be done.
Change-Id: I9866724b3b97adfc0cdef5aaba6de0ebbfbda72f
Add the new classes for eBPF map and program to limit the access to eBPF
object. Add corresponding rules to allow netd module initialize bpf
programs and maps, use the program and read/wirte to eBPF maps.
Test: no bpf sepolicy violations when device boot
Change-Id: I63c35cd60f1972d4fb36ef2408da8d5f2246f7fd
Kernel commit f9df6458218f4fe ("selinux: export validatetrans
decisions") introduced a /sys/fs/selinux/validatetrans pseudo file
for use by userspace file system servers and defined a new validatetrans
permission to control its use.
Define the new permission in the Android SELinux policy.
This change only defines the new permission; it does not allow it
to any domains by default.
This avoids a kernel message warning about the undefined permission on
the policy load, ala:
SELinux: Permission validate_trans in class security not defined in policy.
Test: Policy builds
Change-Id: Ib922a83b7d8f94905207663a72f7a1bc3db8d2c2
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap")
added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation). The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying). The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.
This change defines map permission for the Android policy. It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets. This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33);
on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.
This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for
file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these
macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system
and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed,
although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the
global macros are not used.
Test: Policy builds
Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Linux kernel commit da69a5306ab9 ("selinux: support distinctions among all
network address families") triggers a build error if a new address family
is added without defining a corresponding SELinux security class. As a
result, the smc_socket class was added to the kernel to resolve a build
failure as part of merge commit 3051bf36c25d that introduced AF_SMC circa
Linux 4.11. Define this security class and its access vector, add
it to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude it from webview_zygote
like other socket classes.
Test: Policy builds
Change-Id: Idbb8139bb09c6d1c47f1a76bd10f4ce1e9d939cb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
