camera_device didn't really offer much in terms of control considering
that most domains that need camera_device, also need video_device and
vice versa.
Thus, drop camera_device from the policy and add a temporary typealias.
Change-Id: I144c0bb49a9a68ab1bdf636c64abe656f3e677b4
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.
Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
Mediaserver no longer appears, and maybe never did, need write
permission to sysfs files.
commit: 1de9c492d1 added auditing to
make sure this is the case, and such access has not been observed.
Remove the permissions and the associated auditallow rule to further
confine the mediaserver sandbox.
Bug: 22827371
Change-Id: I44ca1521b9791db027300aa84e54c074845aa735
In Android 5.1, mediaserver couldn't execute any file on
/system. This slightly regressed due to
8a0c25efb0, which granted mediaserver
access to execute /system/bin/toolbox and /system/bin/toybox
Revoke that unneeded access and add a neverallow rule to prevent
regressions.
TODO: Remove toolbox_exec:file execute permissions from domain.te
and add it back to the specific domains that need it.
Change-Id: Ia7bc6028a9ffb723d4623d91cbe15c8c1bbb2eb9
The device-independent code only needs read access to sysfs, and this
appears to be enough for at least some devices (Nexus 5).
Bug: 22827371
Change-Id: I3b7b068e98f11f9133f0bdea8ece363e4bd89ae8
A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service
The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.
To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)
This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.
No difference in sediff is expected.
(cherrypicked from commit 625a3526f1)
Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service
The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.
To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)
This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.
No difference in sediff is expected.
Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:
network_management
network_score
notification
package
permission
persistent
power
print
processinfo
procstats
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I9dfb41fa41cde72ef0059668410a2e9eb1af491c
Assign the alarm, appwidget, assetatlas, audio, backup and batterystats services
the appropriate service access levels and move into enforcing.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: If3210bb25f3076edfdb6eec36ef6521ace1bd8d7
Move accessibility, account, appops and activity services into enforcing with
app_api_service level of access, with additional grants to mediaserver and
isolated app.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I1d5a79b9223026415f1690e8e9325ec4c270e3dd
System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this
distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly
labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service
from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:
avc: granted { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: granted { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
Revert the tightening of /proc/net access. These changes
are causing a lot of denials, and I want additional time to
figure out a better solution.
Addresses the following denials (and many more):
avc: denied { read } for comm="SyncAdapterThre" name="stats" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="facebook.katana" name="iface_stat_fmt" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="IntentService[C" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="dumpstate" name="iface_stat_all" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
This reverts commit 0f0324cc82
and commit 99940d1af5
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 19034637
Change-Id: I436a6e3638ac9ed49afbee214e752fe2b0112868
SELinux domains wanting read access to /proc/net need to
explicitly declare it.
TODO: fixup the ListeningPortsTest cts test so that it's not
broken.
Bug: 9496886
Change-Id: Ia9f1214348ac4051542daa661d35950eb271b2e4
Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.
Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef
All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
mediaserver and drmserver both have permission to read oemfs
related files. However, there are no search permissions on the
directory, so the files would be unreachable.
Grant search permissions on the oemfs directory, so that the files
within that directory can be read.
Bug: 17954291
Change-Id: I9e36dc7b940bd46774753c1fa07b0f47c36ff0db
A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
when handling AOSP contributions.
Resolve those conflicts.
This is essentially a revert of bf69632724
for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.
Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c
Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.
Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e
Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.
Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d98)
Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.
Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
Neither mediaserver nor system_server appear to require
direct access to graphics_device, i.e. the framebuffer
device. Drop it.
Change-Id: Ie9d1be3f9071584155cddf248ea85e174b7e50a6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
I didn't fix unpublished denials before switching this into enforcing. Need to revert.
This reverts commit ae50551142.
Bug: 14844424
Change-Id: I01408b77a67ad43a8fb20be213d3ffbace658616
See if we can remove these allow rules by auditing any granting
of these permissions. These rules may be a legacy of older Android
or some board where the gpu device lived under /dev/graphics too.
Change-Id: I5c5d99ca97402de5196d9b6dfd249294f4d95baa
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Required to support passing resources via open apk files over Binder.
Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { read } for pid=31457 comm="SoundPoolThread" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for pid=31439 comm="Binder_2" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file
We do not allow open as it is not required (i.e. the files
are passed as open files over Binder or local socket and opened by the
client).
Change-Id: Ib0941df1e9aac8d20621a356d2d212b98471abbc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps. But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket. So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.
Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.
Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { connectto } for pid=7028 comm="wfd_looper" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
This is a socket in the abstract namespace so no socket file is involved.
Change-Id: Ia0e384c08063466cfd0f17af3bccf294c7f9dbbd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.
Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
Addresses the following denial.
avc: denied { create } for pid=605 comm="Binder_2" name="IDM1013" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
Witnessed denial on grouper. Policy change
seems appropriate for core policy though. To
reproduce:
* erase data partition or just delete all dirs
under /data/mediadrm
* start netflix app and watch a movie
Change-Id: I515a195d45223249847fae70dc2ea9c9b216042f
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
