This is a domain for the MediaProvider mainline module. The
MediaProvider process is responsible for managing external storage, and
as such should be able to have full read/write access to it. It also
hosts a FUSE filesystem that allows other apps to access said storage in
a safe way. Finally, it needs to call some ioctl's to set project quota
on the lower filesystem correctly.
Bug: 141595441
Test: builds, mediaprovider module gets the correct domain
Change-Id: I0d705148774a1bbb59c927e267a484cb5c44f548
Enforce new requirements on app with targetSdkVersion=30 including:
- No RTM_GETLINK on netlink route sockets.
Remove some of the repetitive descriptions in each untrusted_app_N.te
file, and instead refer to the description in
public/untrusted_app.te.
Bug: 141455849
Test: CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Test: libcore.java.net.NetworkInterfaceTest#testGetNetworkInterfaces
Change-Id: I89553e48db3bc71f229c71fafeee9005703e5c0b
This reverts commit a1aa2210a9.
Reason for revert: Potential culprit for Bug b/148049462 - verifying through Forrest before revert submission
Change-Id: Ibe4fa1dee84defde324deca87d9de24a1cc2911a
Enforce new requirements on app with targetSdkVersion=30 including:
- No bind() on netlink route sockets.
- No RTM_GETLINK on netlink route sockets.
Remove some of the repetitive descriptions in each untrusted_app_N.te
file, and instead refer to the description in
public/untrusted_app.te.
Bug: 141455849
Test: CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Change-Id: Iad4d142c0c13615b4710d378bc1feca4d125b6cc
Only allow apps targetting < Q and ephemeral apps to open /dev/ashmem.
Ephemeral apps are not distinguishable based on target API. So allow
ephemeral_app to open /dev/ashmem for compatibility reasons.
For sake of simplicity, allow all domains /dev/ashmem permissions other
than "open". Reason being that once we can remove "open" access
everywhere, we can remove the device altogether along with other
permission.
Bug: 134434505
Test: boot crosshatch; browse internet, take picture;
no ashmem_device denials
Change-Id: Ie2464c23d799550722580a21b4f6f344983b43ba
Only allow apps targetting < Q and ephemeral apps to open /dev/ashmem.
Ephemeral apps are not distinguishable based on target API. So allow
ephemeral_app to open /dev/ashmem for compatibility reasons.
For sake of simplicity, allow all domains /dev/ashmem permissions other
than "open". Reason being that once we can remove "open" access
everywhere, we can remove the device altogether along with other
permission.
Bug: 134434505
Test: boot crosshatch; browse internet, take picture;
no ashmem_device denials
Change-Id: Ib4dddc47fcafb2697795538cdf055f305fa77799
Before this change, access to HALs from untrusted apps was prohibited
except for the whitelisted ones like the gralloc HAL, the renderscript
HAL, etc. As a result, any HAL that is added by partners can't be
accessed from apps. This sometimes is a big restriction for them when
they want to access their own HALs in the same-process HALs running in
apps. Although this is a vendor-to-vendor communication and thus is not
a Treble violation, that was not allowed because their HALs are not in
the whitelist in AOSP.
This change fixes the problem by doing the access control in the
opposite way; access to HALs are restricted only for the blacklisted
ones.
All the hwservice context that were not in the whitelist are now put
to blacklist.
This change also removes the neverallow rule for the binder access to
the halserverdomain types. This is not needed as the protected
hwservices living in the HAL processes are already not accessible; we
have a neverallow rule for preventing hwservice_manager from finding
those protected hwservices from untrusted apps.
Bug: 139645938
Test: m
Merged-In: I1e63c11143f56217eeec05e2288ae7c91e5fe585
(cherry picked from commit 580375c923)
Change-Id: I4e611091a315ca90e3c181f77dd6a5f61d3a6468
The only distinction that matters for security is if a service is
served by vendor or not AND which process is allowed to talk to which.
coredomain is allowed to talk to vintf_service OR vendor_service, it's
just that for a non-@VintfStability service user-defined APIs (as
opposed to pingBinder/dump) are restricted.
Bug: 136027762
Test: N/A
Change-Id: If3b047d65ed65e9ee7f9dc69a21b7e23813a7789
This reverts commit 6b2eaade82.
Reason for revert: reland original CL
Separate runtime infrastructure now makes sure that only Stable AIDL
interfaces are used system<->vendor.
Bug: 136027762
Change-Id: Id5ba44c36a724e2721617de721f7cffbd3b1d7b6
Test: boot device, use /dev/binder from vendor
Separate runtime infrastructure now makes sure that only Stable AIDL
interfaces are used system<->vendor.
Bug: 136027762
Test: boot device, use /dev/binder from vendor
Change-Id: Icdf207c5d5a4ef769c0ca6582dc58306f65be67e
This change is part of enabling upcoming platform changes that are
described in the bug linked below.
Bug: 135341433
Test: m
Change-Id: I6ef499b0d5aa403f8eb6699649a201d8cc004bc5
Media component update service is removed, so selinux
permissions for it are no longer needed.
Bug: 123250010
Test: boot, play video
Change-Id: I0fec6839f5caf53d16399cb72dcdd6df327efc95
There were three separate neverallows here. Simplifying it to one
with only a small number of exceptions.
Bug: 131177459
Bug: 37226359
Test: m sepolicy (checks neverallows)
Change-Id: I93045c9f698f28675c634643a827a1cd513f215e
"This symlink was suppose to have been removed in the Gingerbread
time frame, but lives on."
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/d2f0a2c%5E!/
Apps targeting R+ must NOT use that symlink.
For older apps we allow core init.rc to create
/mnt/sdcard -> /storage/self/primary symlink.
Bug: 129497117
Test: boot device, /mnt/sdcard still around.
Change-Id: I6ecd1928c0f598792d9badbf6616e3acc0450b0d
Apps are no longer allowed open access to /dev/ashmem, unless they
target API level < Q.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, Chrome, instant apps work
Change-Id: I1cff08f26159fbf48a42afa7cfa08eafa1936f42
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
There are multiple trusted system components which may be responsible
for creating executable code within an application's home directory.
Renderscript is just one of those trusted components.
Generalize rs_data_file to app_exec_data_file. This label is intended to
be used for any executable code created by trusted components placed
into an application's home directory.
Introduce a typealias statement to ensure files with the previous label
continue to be understood by policy.
This change is effectively a no-op, as it just renames a type, but
neither adds or removes any rules.
Bug: 121375718
Bug: 112357170
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases
Change-Id: I17dca5e3e8a1237eb236761862174744fb2196c0
Add the required permissions for the InputClassifier HAL.
Bug: 62940136
Test: no selinux denials in logcat when HAL is used inside input flinger.
Change-Id: Ibc9b115a83719421d56ecb4bca2fd196ec71fd76
Remove the ability for applications to dlopen() executable code from
their home directory for newer API versions. API versions <= 28 are
uneffected by this change.
Bug: 112357170
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases
Change-Id: I1d7f3a1015d54b8610d1c561f38a1a3c2bcf79e4
When an app uses renderscript to compile a Script instance,
renderscript compiles and links the script using /system/bin/bcc and
/system/bin/ld.mc, then places the resulting shared library into the
application's code_cache directory. The application then dlopen()s the
resulting shared library.
Currently, this executable code is writable to the application. This
violates the W^X property (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX), which
requires any executable code be immutable.
This change introduces a new label "rs_data_file". Files created by
/system/bin/bcc and /system/bin/ld.mc in the application's home
directory assume this label. This allows us to differentiate in
security policy between app created files, and files created by
renderscript on behalf of the application.
Apps are allowed to delete these files, but cannot create or write these
files. This is enforced through a neverallow compile time assertion.
Several exceptions are added to Treble neverallow assertions to support
this functionality. However, because renderscript was previously invoked
from an application context, this is not a Treble separation regression.
This change is needed to support blocking dlopen() for non-renderscript
/data/data files, which will be submitted in a followup change.
Bug: 112357170
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases
Change-Id: Ie38bbd94d26db8a418c2a049c24500a5463698a3
Also giving statsd permission to access it. This change copies the internal sepolicy to AOSP.
Bug: 111185513
Bug: 120551881
Test: make
Change-Id: I7e0386777e05580299caf9b97cb7804459f1a9d0
This includes the SELinux policy changes to allow for
kcov access in userdebug builds for coverage-guided
kernel fuzzing.
Bug: 117990869
Test: Ran syzkaller with Android untrusted_app sandbox with coverage.
Change-Id: I1fcaad447c7cdc2a3360383b5dcd76e8a0f93f09
Remove the permission to execute dex2oat from apps targetSdkVersion>28.
This has been historically used by ART to compile secondary dex files
but that functionality has been removed in Q and the permission is
therefore not needed.
Some legacy apps do invoke dex2oat directly. Hence allow (with audit) for
targetSdkVersion<= 28.
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk25TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdk27TestCases
Test: atest CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Bug: 117606664
Change-Id: I2ea9cd56861fcf280cab388a251aa53e618160e5
1b1d133be5 added the process2 class but
forgot to suppress SELinux denials associated with these permissions
for the su domain. Suppress them.
Ensure xdp_socket is in socket_class_set, so the existing dontaudit rule
in su.te is relevant. Inspired by
66a337eec6
Add xdp_socket to various other neverallow rules.
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: If5422ecfa0cc864a51dd69559a51d759e078c8e7
