Defines new device type persistent_data_block_device
This block device will allow storage of data that
will live across factory resets.
Gives rw and search access to SystemServer.
Change-Id: I298eb40f9a04c16e90dcc1ad32d240ca84df3b1e
This will be used to populate rt_tables (a mapping from routing table numbers to
table names) that's read by the iproute2 utilities.
Change-Id: I69deb1a64d5d6647470823405bf0cc55b24b22de
adb sideload depends on the ability to access the fuse
directory. Flipping recovery into enforcing started triggering
the following denial:
type=1400 audit(17964905.699:7): avc: denied { search } for pid=132 comm="recovery" name="/" dev="fuse" ino=1 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=dir
Change-Id: I27ee0295fa2e2d0449bfab4f95bfbc076e92cf59
Create a new domain for the one-shot init service flash_recovery.
This domain is initially in permissive_or_unconfined() for
testing. Any SELinux denials won't be enforced for now.
Change-Id: I7146dc154a5c78b6f3b4b6fb5d5855a05a30bfd8
Start enforcing SELinux rules for recovery. I've been monitoring
denials, and I haven't seen anything which would indicate a problem.
We can always roll this back if something goes wrong.
Change-Id: I7d3a147f8b9000bf8181d2aa32520f15f291a6f3
libsepol.check_assertion_helper: neverallow on line 166 of external/sepolicy/domain.te (or line 5056 of policy.conf) violated by allow recovery unlabeled:file { create };
Error while expanding policy
make: *** [out/target/product/generic/obj/ETC/sepolicy.recovery_intermediates/sepolicy.recovery] Error 1
Change-Id: Iddf2cb8d0de2ab445e54a727f01be0b992b45ba5
The recovery script may ask to label a file with a label not
known to the currently loaded policy. Allow it.
Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { relabelto } for pid=143 comm="update_binary" name="vdc" dev="mmcblk0p25" ino=212 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { setattr } for pid=143 comm="update_binary" name="vdc" dev="mmcblk0p25" ino=212 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 tclass=file
Change-Id: Iafcc7b0b3aaea5a272adb1264233978365648f94
Currently, ueventd only modifies the SELinux label on a file
if the entry exists in /ueventd.rc. Add policy support to enable
an independent restorecon_recursive whenever a uevent message occurs.
Change-Id: I0ccb5395ec0be9282095b844a5022e8c0d8903ac
Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes
are needed.
avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp"
dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
Bug: 14975160
Change-Id: I875cfc3538d4b098d27c7c7b756d1868a54cc976
Add a neverallow rule that prevents domain from adding a
default_android_service. Add a neverallow rule that prevents
untrusted_app from ever adding a service through
servicemanager.
Change-Id: I963671fb1224147bb49ec8f0b6be0dcc91c23156
Many of the neverallow rules have -unconfineddomain. This was
intended to allow us to support permissive_or_unconfined(), and
ensure that all domains were enforcing at least a minimal set of
rules.
Now that all the app domains are in enforcing / confined, there's
no need to allow for these exceptions. Remove them.
Change-Id: Ieb29872dad415269f7fc2fe5be5a3d536d292d4f
We had disabled the neverallow rule when system_server was
in permissive_or_unconfined(), but forgot to reenable it.
Now that system_server is in enforcing/confined, bring it
back.
Change-Id: I6f74793d4889e3da783361c4d488b25f804ac8ba
The new sideloading mechanism in recovery needs to create a fuse
filesystem and read files from it.
Change-Id: I22e1f7175baf401d2b75c4be6673ae4b75a0ccbf
Remove the auditallow statements from app.te and
binderservicedomain.te which were causing log spam.
Change-Id: If1c33d1612866df9f338e6d8c19d73950ee028eb
