Currently BetterBug (privileged app) cannot access the details form
/data/misc/wmtrace.
Test: access a trace from /data/misc/wmtrace/ in betterbug
Change-Id: I4cf864ab4729e85f05df8f9e601a75ff8b92bdc8
Every process needs to be able to determine the IncFS features
to choose the most efficient APIs to call
Bug: 184357957
Test: build + atest PackageManagerShellCommandTest
Change-Id: Ia84e3fecfd7be1209af076452cc27cc68aefd80d
Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes
This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.
Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
We made the equivalent change to untrusted_app_all in
9ea8c0701d but webview also runs in
priv_app contexts.
Bug: http://b/112050209
Test: treehugger
Change-Id: I19bbadc7f9c9e668e2c6d932c7da24f18e7731bd
a54bed6907
Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery
Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
IncFS in S adds a bunch of new ioctls, and requires the users
to read its features in sysfs directory. This change adds
all the features, maps them into the processes that need to
call into them, and allows any incfs user to query the features
Bug: 170231230
Test: incremental unit tests
Change-Id: Ieea6dca38ae9829230bc17d0c73f50c93c407d35
This is a follow-up to r.android.com/1542764.
1. In order to allow priv_app to
stat(/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/*) we need
also the `search` permission to traverse the parent
directory /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
2. Allow shell to read the new bugreport/ directory.
shell can read bugreports anyways and this is needed
for CTS tests.
Bug: 177761174
Bug: 177684571
Test: manual (changpa@)
Change-Id: I39d6a1c7941bcdcdc314a7538c0accfd37c52ca2
Feature description: if a background trace is happening at the
time dumpstate is invoked, the tracing daemon will snapshot
the trace into a fixed path (/data/misc/perfetto-traces/bugreport/).
Dumpstate will attach the trace, if present, to the bugreport.
From a SELinux viewpoint this involves the following permissions:
- Allow dumpstate to exec+trans perfetto --save-for-bugreport
(this will just send an IPC to traced, which will save the trace).
- Allow dumpstate to list, read and unlink the trace file.
- Create a dedicated label for bugreport traces, to prevent that
dumpstate gets access to other traces not meant for bug reporting.
Note that this does NOT allow dumpstate to serialze arbitary traces.
Traces must be marked as "eligible for bugreport" upfront in the
trace config (which is not under dumpstate control), by
setting bugreport_score > 0.
Design doc: go/perfetto-betterbug
Bug: 170334305
Test: manual:
1. start a perfetto trace with bugreport_score > 0
2. adb shell dumpstate
3. check that the bugreport zip contains the trace
Change-Id: I259c3ee9d5be08d6b22c796b32875d7de703a230
During staged installation, we no longer create duplicate sessions for
verification purpose. Instead, we send the original files in
/data/app-staging folder to package verifiers for verification. That
means, Phonesky needs access to /data/app-staging folder to be able to
verify the apks inside it.
Bug: 175163376
Test: atest StagedInstallTest#testPlayStoreCanReadAppStagingDir
Test: atest StagedInstallTest#testAppStagingFolderCannotBeReadByNonPrivApps
Change-Id: I5cbb4c8b7dceb63954c747180b39b4a21d2463af
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.
Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files
Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
Few domains are granted access to this, but they should have access
from any user.
Also add some neverallows to prevent misuse.
Bug: 170622707
Test: presubmits
Change-Id: Iacbe7b0525604f2339f8bf31c105af738bc3cd75
Denial when not listed in priv_app.te:
E SELinux : avc: denied { find } for pid=3213 uid=10170 name=music_recognition scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:music_recognition_service:s0 tclass=service_manager permissive=0
Bug: 158194857
Test: patched and tested on internal master
Change-Id: I30e9ea79a57d9c353b732b629bd5a829c89bbcb0
To remove bad context names "exported*_prop"
Bug: 155844385
Test: boot and see no denials
Change-Id: Icd30be64355699618735d4012461835eca8cd651
Merged-In: Icd30be64355699618735d4012461835eca8cd651
(cherry picked from commit 37c2d4d0c9)
(cherry picked from commit 3b66e9b9f8)
For ContentProvider case, private app can not access system app data. So we added this rule to solve this issue.
Bug: 157448040
Test: <Before modifying the rules, when the private app accesses files in the app-specific directory shared by the system app through the ContentProvider, the system will report selinux permission issue.
After modifying the rules and compiling the new version, the private app can access the files in the app-specific directory shared by the system app through the ContentProvider without any permission issues.>
Change-Id: I2433a6808d899c3729c6aa37c6c2d955e91e54a3
This changes are necessary to make files under /data/apex/active
be readable by Phonesky.
Test: builds
Bug: 154635217
Merged-In: I14116f02f3d3f0a8390f1d968a3971f15bd4b3f2
Change-Id: I14116f02f3d3f0a8390f1d968a3971f15bd4b3f2
(cherry picked from commit 89d43a51ba)
This is a domain for the MediaProvider mainline module. The
MediaProvider process is responsible for managing external storage, and
as such should be able to have full read/write access to it. It also
hosts a FUSE filesystem that allows other apps to access said storage in
a safe way. Finally, it needs to call some ioctl's to set project quota
on the lower filesystem correctly.
Bug: 141595441
Test: builds, mediaprovider module gets the correct domain
Change-Id: I0d705148774a1bbb59c927e267a484cb5c44f548
/mnt/pass_through was introduced to allow the FUSE daemon unrestricted
access to the lower filesystem (or sdcardfs).
At zygote fork time, the FUSE daemon will have /mnt/pass_through/0
bind mounted to /storage instead of /mnt/user/0. To keep /sdcard
(symlink to /storage/self/primary) paths working, we create a
'self' directory with an additional 'primary' symlink to
/mnt/pass_through/0/emulated/0 which is a FUSE mount point.
The following components need varying sepolicy privileges:
Vold: Creates the self/primary symlink and mounts the lower filesystem
on /mnt/pass_through/0/emulated. So needs create_dir and mount access
+ create_file access for the symlink
zygote: In case zygote starts an app before vold sets up the paths.
This is unlikely but can happen if the FUSE daemon (a zygote forked app)
is started before system_server completes vold mounts.
Same sepolicy requirements as vold
installd: Needs to clear/destroy app data using lower filesystem
mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to walk
/mnt/pass_through
priv_app (FUSE daemon): Needs to server content from the lower
filesystem mounted on /mnt/pass_through so needs read_dir access to
walk /mnt/pass_through
Bug: 135341433
Test: adb shell ls /mnt/pass_through/0/self/primary
Change-Id: I16e35b9007c2143282600c56adbc9468a1b7f240
Looking at go/sedenials, we see this permission being used by
MediaProvider once like so:
type=1400 audit(0.0:569759): avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202331 path="/proc/config.gz" dev="proc" ino=4026532157 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:config_gz:s0 tclass=file app=com.google.android.providers.media.module
This permission should not be granted to all priv-apps now that GMS core
has been split out into its own domain. This change removes the
permission for the priv_app domain and the corresponding auditallow.
Bug: 147833123
Test: TH
Change-Id: I4f60daefcbdd4991c5d2c32330e907a03bfe6fe5
The steps involved in setting up profiling and stack unwinding are
described in detail at go/perfetto-perf-android.
To summarize the interesting case: the daemon uses cpu-wide
perf_event_open, with userspace stack and register sampling on. For each
sample, it identifies whether the process is profileable, and obtains
the FDs for /proc/[pid]/{maps,mem} using a dedicated RT signal (with the
bionic signal handler handing over the FDs over a dedicated socket). It
then uses libunwindstack to unwind & symbolize the stacks, sending the
results to the central tracing daemon (traced).
This patch covers the app profiling use-cases. Splitting out the
"profile most things on debug builds" into a separate patch for easier
review.
Most of the exceptions in domain.te & coredomain.te come from the
"vendor_file_type" allow-rule. We want a subset of that (effectively all
libraries/executables), but I believe that in practice it's hard to use
just the specific subtypes, and we're better off allowing access to all
vendor_file_type files.
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I4aa482cfb3f9fb2fabf02e1dff92e2b5ce121a47
Looking at go/sedenials, we see this permission being used by
MediaProvider like so:
type=1400 audit(0.0:3651): avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202331 path="/sys/fs/selinux/class/tipc_socket/perms/recvfrom" dev="selinuxfs" ino=67111391 scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:selinuxfs:s0 tclass=file app=com.google.android.providers.media.module
... and numerous other directories, apparently from a filesystem walk.
It appears that this permission should not be granted to all priv-apps
now that GMS core has been split out into its own domain. This change
removes the permission for the priv_app domain and the corresponding
auditallow.
Bug: 147833123
Test: TH
Change-Id: I88146785c7ac3a8c15fe9b5f34f05d936f08ea48
We added an auditallow for this permission on 12/17/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 147833123
Test: TH
Change-Id: I96f810a55e0eb8f3778aea9598f6437de0f65c7f
We added auditallows for these permissions on 12/16/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 147833123
Test: TH
Change-Id: I4789b29462ef561288aeaabbdb1e57271d5fcd2a
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: Ic2f68b3af861e0c00e2dea731c4d6b3255ab5175
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 12/11/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: Iaeaef560883b61644625b21e5c7095d4d9c68da9
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I18f99f54385b7c4e7c2ae923eff4c76800323a73
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I2a59cac8041646b548ba1a73fcd5fddabb4d1429
We added an auditallow for these permissions on 11/26/2019, and have not
seen any recent logs for this in go/sedenials. No other priv-app should
rely on this now that gmscore is running in its own domain.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I554ace42852023521e94017b1e782b6a09129fdf
Looking at go/sedenials, we have learnt that other priv-apps rely on
this permission. The auditallow has served its purpose and can now be
removed.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I9ba1cbfa9ae90ae64e78276e5c1a699aa2a7f864
More historical context in http://b/18504118
This also adds an auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can
delete it once no logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule
triggering.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I5729b89af83090e6e31c012c8acb0f0114c87d3d
This also adds an auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can
delete it once no logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule
triggerring.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I554e0cb00a53fd254c450c20e6c632e58472c3c8
