Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:
avc: granted { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: granted { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.
Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef
All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
mediaserver and drmserver both have permission to read oemfs
related files. However, there are no search permissions on the
directory, so the files would be unreachable.
Grant search permissions on the oemfs directory, so that the files
within that directory can be read.
Bug: 17954291
Change-Id: I9e36dc7b940bd46774753c1fa07b0f47c36ff0db
A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
when handling AOSP contributions.
Resolve those conflicts.
This is essentially a revert of bf69632724
for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.
Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c
Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.
Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e
Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.
Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9
Further refined auditallow statements associated with
service_manager and added dumpstate to the
service_manager_local_audit_domain.
(cherry picked from commit 603bc20509)
Change-Id: Ib8894aa70aa300c14182a6c934dd56c08c82b05f
Further refined auditallow statements associated with
service_manager and added dumpstate to the
service_manager_local_audit_domain.
Change-Id: I2ecc42c8660de6a91f3b4e56268344fbd069ccc0
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d98)
Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15
Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.
Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
Required to support passing resources via open apk files over Binder.
Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { read } for pid=31457 comm="SoundPoolThread" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for pid=31439 comm="Binder_2" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file
We do not allow open as it is not required (i.e. the files
are passed as open files over Binder or local socket and opened by the
client).
Change-Id: Ib0941df1e9aac8d20621a356d2d212b98471abbc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps. But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket. So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.
Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.
Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.
Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.
For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.
Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.
This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.
Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.
Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
This doesn't compile on non-manta devices because of a
missing drmserver_socket declaration.
external/sepolicy/mediaserver.te":68:ERROR 'unknown type drmserver_socket' at token ';' on line 6764:
#line 68
allow mediaserver drmserver_socket:sock_file write;
checkpolicy: error(s) encountered while parsing configuration
make: *** [out/target/product/flo/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1
make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
This reverts commit 8cd400d3c4.
Change-Id: Ib8f07b57008b9ed1165b945057502779e806f0f8
We can read any efs_files, but can't look in the directory
containing them. Allow it.
Without this patch, high resolution movie playback is broken.
Addresses the following denial:
[ 276.780046] type=1400 audit(1391105234.431:5): avc: denied { search } for pid=125 comm="drmserver" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p1" ino=2 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:efs_file:s0 tclass=dir
Bug: 12819852
Change-Id: Ie9d13a224cef5e229de1bdb78d605841ed387a21
Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.
This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.
Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
Two new types are introduced:
sdcard_internal
sdcard_external
The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute
sdcard_type is introduced.
The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for
controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external
sdcards.
Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
