1b1d133be5 added the process2 class but
forgot to suppress SELinux denials associated with these permissions
for the su domain. Suppress them.
Ensure xdp_socket is in socket_class_set, so the existing dontaudit rule
in su.te is relevant. Inspired by
66a337eec6
Add xdp_socket to various other neverallow rules.
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: If5422ecfa0cc864a51dd69559a51d759e078c8e7
Remove blanket coredomain access to same_process_hal_file in favor of
granular access. This change takes into account audits from go/sedenials
(our internal dogfood program)
Bug: 37211678
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I5634fb65c72d13007e40c131a600585a05b8c4b5
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
Changes 2d626fd84ea0246c963ce2c87ae62461a60f8826 and
869562e9e3 are the same
commit, but with a different comment. Fix them up to be
the same.
Test: build
Change-Id: I6311413357f457d6ba95886b729ffa53ab80e016
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
The webview_zygote is now launched as a child-zygote process from the
main zygote process.
Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I9c948b58a969d35d5a5add4b6ab62b8f990645d1
Change-Id: I153476642cf14883b0dfea0d9f5b3b5e30ac1c08
In this architecture, the system_server instructs the zygote to fork a
child-zygote to be the webview_zygote. The system_server tells this new
zygote to listen for fork requests on a random abstract unix socket of
its choosing.
A follow-up CL will remove the rules for starting webview_zygote via
init.
Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I864743943c11c18de386010ecd4b616721cb9954
Change-Id: I1c352e47b66eca3a3fa641daa6ecc3e7a889b54e
Since we now call patchoat --verify in zygote art loading code, we have
the unintended effect of webview zygote calling patchoat --verify. This
is undesireable since webview zygote doesn't need to verify the .art
files after the app_process zygote has already done so. The exec of
patchoat fails for webview zygote, and this change hides that. This
change should be reverted when b/72957399 is resolved.
Bug: 66697305
Test: Ensure no new selinux denials were introduced.
Change-Id: I4152edc920e5c436516b958b8c861dcc1c4751d8
For consistency with zygote, allow webview_zygote to list directories
in /system.
Test: Boot Taimen. Verify webiew_zygote denials during boot.
Bug: 70857705
Change-Id: I27eb18c377a5240d7430abf301c1c3af61704d59
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Linux kernel commit da69a5306ab9 ("selinux: support distinctions among all
network address families") triggers a build error if a new address family
is added without defining a corresponding SELinux security class. As a
result, the smc_socket class was added to the kernel to resolve a build
failure as part of merge commit 3051bf36c25d that introduced AF_SMC circa
Linux 4.11. Define this security class and its access vector, add
it to the socket_class_set macro, and exclude it from webview_zygote
like other socket classes.
Test: Policy builds
Change-Id: Idbb8139bb09c6d1c47f1a76bd10f4ce1e9d939cb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
seapp_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'seapp_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospSeappContexts
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I19b3e50c6a7c292713d3e56ef0448acf6e4270f7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
The implementation for NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed from the kernel in commit
d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84 ("netfilter: remove ip_queue
support") circa Linux 3.5. Unless we need to retain compatibility
for kernels < 3.5, we can drop these classes from the policy altogether.
Possibly the neverallow rule in app.te should be augmented to include
the newer netlink security classes, similar to webview_zygote, but
that can be a separate change.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: Iab9389eb59c96772e5fa87c71d0afc86fe99bb6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used
to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network
address families rather than the generic socket class. The capability
also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP
sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class. Add
definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by
this capability. Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set
macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket
classes.
Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security
classes is left to future commits. Domains previously allowed
permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the
more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support.
The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11. The
relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6
("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"),
ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6
consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f
("selinux: drop unused socket security classes").
This change requires selinux userspace commit
d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define
extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the
policy with this capability enabled. This commit is already in
AOSP master.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The rules for the two types were the same and /data/app-ephemeral is
being removed. Remove these types.
Test: Builds
Change-Id: I520c026395551ad1362dd2ced53c601d9e6f9b28
This leaves only the existence of webview_zygote domain and its
executable's webview_zygote_exec file label as public API. All other
rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus
now private.
Test: Device boots, with Multiproces WebView developer setting
enabled, apps with WebView work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: I179476c43a50863ee3b327fc5155847d992a040d
The webview_zygote is a new unprivileged zygote and has its own sockets for
listening to fork requests. However the webview_zygote does not run as root
(though it does require certain capabilities) and only allows dyntransition to
the isolated_app domain.
Test: m
Test: angler boots
Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: I89a72ffe6dcb983c4a44048518efd7efb7ed8e83
