The space between 2K and 16K in /misc is currently reserved for vendor's
use (as claimed in bootloader_message.h), but we don't allow vendor
module to access misc_block_device other than vendor_init.
The change in the topic adds a `misc_writer` tool as a vendor module,
which allows writing data to the vendor space to bridge the gap in the
short term. This CL adds matching labels to grant access.
Long term goal is to move /misc as vendor owned, then to provide HAL
access from core domain (b/132906936).
Bug: 132906936
Test: Build crosshatch that includes misc_writer module. Invoke
/vendor/bin/misc_writer to write data to /misc.
Change-Id: I4c18d78171a839ae5497b3a61800193ef9e51b3b
Merged-In: I4c18d78171a839ae5497b3a61800193ef9e51b3b
(cherry picked from commit 42c05cfcc1)
The space between 2K and 16K in /misc is currently reserved for vendor's
use (as claimed in bootloader_message.h), but we don't allow vendor
module to access misc_block_device other than vendor_init.
The change in the topic adds a `misc_writer` tool as a vendor module,
which allows writing data to the vendor space to bridge the gap in the
short term. This CL adds matching labels to grant access.
Long term goal is to move /misc as vendor owned, then to provide HAL
access from core domain (b/132906936).
Bug: 132906936
Test: Build crosshatch that includes misc_writer module. Invoke
/vendor/bin/misc_writer to write data to /misc.
Change-Id: I4c18d78171a839ae5497b3a61800193ef9e51b3b
It doesn't make sense to write neverallow assertions where an attribute
negation exists allowing the operation. When such a negation exists,
domains can "opt-out" of the neverallow assertion by declaring their
use of the attribute. Such trivially bypassable assertions provide
no security nor architectural guarantees.
"netdomain" is such an attribute. This attribute is used by processes to
indicate that they communicate with the network, for example, using
TCP/UDP sockets. Vendor code is freely allowed to use network
communication by declaring their use of the attribute.
Because the attribute is usable to any vendor domain, the "no socket
connections to netd" restriction is pointless and provides a false sense
of security. Any process can opt-out of these restrictions by just
declaring their use of networking functionality. This also results in
ineffective policy bloat, making it difficult to reason about the policy
and make changes.
Delete the ineffective, misleading neverallow assertion.
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ia72d9660a337ef811e56c9227af29b17d043b99f
Media component update service is removed, so selinux
permissions for it are no longer needed.
Bug: 123250010
Test: boot, play video
Change-Id: I0fec6839f5caf53d16399cb72dcdd6df327efc95
apexd needs to read /vendor/apex dir and files in it.
Bug: 131190070
Bug: 123378252
Test: 1. Add apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if boot succeeds with new policy
2. Add flattened apex to /vendor/apex
-> see if only root files are labelled as vendor_apex_file
Change-Id: I37795ab6d659ac82639ba5e34d628fe1b5cdb350
To install GSIs on external storage (such as sdcards), gsid needs some
additional privileges:
- proc_cmdline and device-tree access to call ReadDefaultFstab().
This is ultimately used to check whether system's dm-verity has
check_at_most_once enabled, which is disallowed with sdcards.
- vfat read/write access to write files to the sdcard. Note that
adopted sdcards are not supported here.
- read access to the sdcard block device. To enable this without
providing access to vold_block_device, a new sdcard_block_device
label was added. Devices must apply this label appropriately to
enable gsid access.
- FIBMAP access for VFAT filesystems, as they do not support FIEMAP.
This only appears to work by granting SYS_RAWIO.
Bug: 126230649
Test: adb shell su root gsi_tool install --install_dir=/mnt/media_rw/...
works without setenforce 0
Change-Id: I88d8d83e5f61d4c0490f912f226fe1fe38cd60ab
Without VNDK, libcutils has to probe for /dev/binder access before
reaching to ashmemd via binder. Ignore denials generated when probing
/dev/binder.
Bug: 129073672
Test: boot sailfish without denials to /dev/binder
Change-Id: I07ba2e094586df353d54507458e891a3d14c1ca6
Move complete domain to private/. Move referencing parts in domain
and kernel to private.
Bug: 128840749
Test: m
Change-Id: I5572c3b04e41141c8f4db62b1361e2b392a5e2da
Bug: 128037879
Test: Camera HAL is able to read ro.serialno
Change-Id: I904c852a7100bc65456ee63ffb31d70681293d7d
Signed-off-by: Jayant Chowdhary <jchowdhary@google.com>
If kernel is built with CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE optimization,
libjemalloc5 will attempt to read
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled and hit an SELinux denial.
Various denials similiar to the following are seen on cuttlefish:
avc: denied { open } for comm="surfaceflinger"
path="/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled" dev="sysfs" ino=776
scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
permissive=1
Bug: 28053261
Test: boot cuttlefish without above denials.
Change-Id: Ic33f12d31aacc42d662a8c5c297fbb5f84d4deea
This is for Non-AB ota update recovery partition on GMS Express 2.0 project.
recovery partition update via /vendor/bin/install-recovery.sh from /vendor/etc/recovery.img
Bug: 124277294
Test: builds and test GOTA.
Change-Id: I97521c03a881bd0427e5d02836220ee2c0db7650
The OMX comment here seems unrelated. The linker (system) uses it to
talk to tombstoned.
Fixes: 112606643
Test: N/A
Change-Id: Ib3da832f120d3cc244aa22de5d4d655b874db38b
Vendors should be able to specify additional cgroups and task profiles
without changing system files. Add access rules for /vendor/etc/cgroups.json
and /vendor/etc/task_profiles.json files which will augment cgroups and
task profiles specified in /etc/cgroups.json and /etc/task_profiles.json
system files. As with system files /vendor/etc/cgroups.json is readable
only by init process. task_profiles.json is readable by any process that
uses cgroups.
Bug: 124960615
Change-Id: I12fcff0159b4e7935ce15cc19ae36230da0524fc
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Fixes: 126604492
Test: Build userdebug and user.
Test: Test
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest#testNeverallowRules129
on userdebug.
Change-Id: I0716e566570114878842644339401331513bae22
Apps are no longer allowed open access to /dev/ashmem, unless they
target API level < Q.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, Chrome, instant apps work
Change-Id: I1cff08f26159fbf48a42afa7cfa08eafa1936f42
In preparation for moving other components to private, so that
private-only components can stay private.
Bug: 125474642
Test: m
Change-Id: Iff1ecabc4f45051d06e062b3338a117c09b39ff9
In preparation for additions that should be private-only, move
the neverallows to domain's private part.
Bug: 125474642
Test: m
Change-Id: I7def500221701500956fc0b6948afc58aba5234e
On legacy devices system_<other> partition is blocked from
becoming the backing store under certain circumstances.
Test: system/core/fs_mgr/tests/adb-remount-test.sh
Bug: 120448575
Bug: 123079041
Change-Id: I1803f072ca21bc116554eee1d01a1dbd2c9ed0c9
VtsHalBootV1_0Target test cases fail on a platform when executing boot control operation.
The cases fail because of hal_bootctl has no sys_rawio permission to do storage IOCTL to
switch boot slot.
Bug: 118011561
Test: VtsHalBootV1_0Target can pass
Change-Id: Idbbb9ea8b76fe62b2d4b71356cef7a07ad4de890
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
cgroups.json file contains cgroup information required to mount
cgroup controllers and is readable only by init process.
cgroup.rc contains cgroup map information consisting of the list of
cgroups available in the system and their mounting locations. It is
created by init process and should be readable by any processes that
uses cgroups and should be writable only by init process.
task_profiles.json file contains task profiles used to operate on
cgroups. This information should be readable by any process that uses
cgroups and should be writable only by init process.
Bug: 111307099
Test: builds, boots
Change-Id: Ib2c87c0fc3663c7fc69628f05c846519b65948b5
Merged-In: Ib2c87c0fc3663c7fc69628f05c846519b65948b5
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Bootstap linker has been moved from /system/bin/linker[64] to
/system/bin/bootstrap/linker[64]. Reflect the change in file_contexts.
Existing paths are not removed since the bootstrap linker (or the
linker from the rumtime APEX) will be bind-mounted to the old path by
init.
Also label the files under /bionic which serve as mount points for
either of the bootstrap bionic or the bionic from the runtime APEX.
In addition, read access for the symlinks in /system/lib/*.so and
/system/bin/linker is granted. This is because Bionic files in the paths
are now symlinks to the corresponding mountpoints at /bionic.
Bug: 120266448
Test: device boots to the UI
Change-Id: Iea4d76eb46754b435b6c5428481cd177da8d2ee1
Bug: 118835348
Test: build and boot blueline user device.
Test: test simpleperf_app_runner manually.
Change-Id: I022d7f10f6164e6980f55badd4edcdc76a73c004
This is being done in preparation for the migration from ashmem to
memfd. In order for tmpfs objects to be usable across the Treble
boundary, they need to be declared in public policy whereas, they're
currently all declared in private policy as part of the
tmpfs_domain() macro. Remove the type declaration from the
macro, and remove tmpfs_domain() from the init_daemon_domain() macro
to avoid having to declare the *_tmpfs types for all init launched
domains. tmpfs is mostly used by apps and the media frameworks.
Bug: 122854450
Test: Boot Taimen and blueline. Watch videos, make phone calls, browse
internet, send text, install angry birds...play angry birds, keep
playing angry birds...
Change-Id: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
Merged-In: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
(cherry picked from commit e16fb9109c)
The dynamic linker always calls access(2) on the path. Don't generate SElinux
denials since the linker does not actually access the path in case the path
does not exist or isn't accessible for the process.
Bug: 120996057
Test: copy ping to /data/local/tmp, run it, no selinux denials
Test: bionic unit tests
Change-Id: Idf33ba7bc6c0d657b6ab0abde6bd078e4bb024e5
The application zygote is a new sort of zygote process that is a
child of the regular zygote. Each application zygote is tied to the
application for which it's launched. Once it's started, it will
pre-load some of the code for that specific application, much like
the regular zygote does for framework code.
Once the application zygote is up and running, it can spawn
isolated service processes that run in the isolated_app domain. These
services can then benefit from already having the relevant
application code and data pre-loaded.
The policy is largely the same as the webview_zygote domain,
however there are a few crucial points where the policy is different.
1) The app_zygote runs under the UID of the application that spawned
it.
2) During app_zygote launch, it will call a callback that is
controlled by the application, that allows the application to
pre-load code and data that it thinks is relevant.
Especially point 2 is imporant: it means that untrusted code can run
in the app_zygote context. This context is severely limited, and the
main concern is around the setgid/setuid capabilities. Those conerns
are mitigated by installing a seccomp filter that only allows
setgid/setuid to be called in a safe range.
Bug: 111434506
Test: app_zygote can start and fork children without denials.
Change-Id: I1cc49ee0042d41e5ac6eb81d8f8a10ba448d4832
This was a regression in Q, and the file is an implementation of
liblog.
Bug: 113083310
Test: use tags from vendor and see no denials
Change-Id: I726cc1fcfad39afc197b21e431a687a3e4c8ee4a
rss_hwm_reset is binary that reset RSS high-water mark counters for all
currently running processes. It runs in a separate process because it
needs dac_override capability.
Bug: 119603799
Test: no errors in logcat
Change-Id: I6221a5eca3427bf532830575d8fba98eb3e65c29
After b/28357356 /dev/alarm is no longer used by android platform.
Also, Pixel devices don't have /dev/alarm.
Bug: 110962171
Test: boot aosp_walleye
Change-Id: Id9723996104a2548ddf366489890c098d1ea87be
Move rules / neverallow assertions from public to private policy. This
change, by itself, is a no-op, but will make future patches easier to
read. The only downside of this change is that it will make git blame
less effective.
Motivation: When rules are placed into the public directory, they cannot
reference a private type. A future change will modify these rules to
reference a private type.
Test: compiles
Bug: 112357170
Change-Id: I56003409b3a23370ddab31ec01d69ff45c80d7e5
I added ro.bionic.(2nd_)?_(arch|cpu_variant) to vendor system
properties. And have init to write them to files under dev/.
This change set SELinux rules for these properties and files.
For the system properties: vendor/default.prop will set them. init will
read them.
For the files /dev/cpu_variant:.*: init will write them. bionic libc
will read them. (Basically world readable).
This is to allow libc select the right optimized routine at runtime.
Like memcpy / strcmp etc.
Test: getprop to make sure the properties are set.
Test: ls -laZ to make sure /dev/cpu_variant:.* are correctly labeled.
Change-Id: I41662493dce30eae6d41bf0985709045c44247d3
The dynamic linker calls realpath(3) on paths found in the linker config
script. Since realpath() calls lstat() on the parent paths, not allowing
getattr on /apex and its subdirectories will cause selinux denial spam
whenever something is executed from APEXes.
Silence the spam by allowing getattr on apex_mnt_dir.
Bug: 117403679
Bug: 115787633
Test: m apex.test; m; device is bootable
Change-Id: Ic659582760a3ae146e73770266bc64332b36a97c
Auditallow added in commit 72edbb3e83 ("Audit generic debugfs access for
removal", May 01 2018) has not triggered. Remove allow rule and tighten
up neverallow rule.
Test: policy compiles
Test: no collected SELinux denials.
Change-Id: I9a90463575f9eab4711b72d6f444fa9d526b80e1
It is unnecessary to use get_prop() rules for the su domain. The
su domain is always in permissive mode [1] and not subject to SELinux
enforcement. It's also possible these rules were added to avoid SELinux
denial log spam from showing up, however, there are already dontaudit
rules in place [2] to prevent this.
Delete the unnecessary rules.
[1] 96b62a60c2/private/su.te (19)
[2] 96b62a60c2/public/su.te (42)
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I5913f360738725bf915f0606d381029b9ba4318f
Require all SELinux domains which have permission to perform ioctls on
/dev/tun explicitly specify what ioctls they perform. Only allow the
safe defaults FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX, which are alternate, uncommon ways
to set and unset the O_CLOEXEC flag.
Remove app's ability to issue *any* ioctls on /dev/tun, period. Add
neverallow assertions (compile time assertion + CTS test) to prevent
regressions.
Limit system_server's ability to perform ioctls on /dev/tun to FIOCLEX,
FIONCLEX, TUNGETIFF, and TUNSETIFF. Testing and source code examination
shows that only TUNGETIFF and TUNSETIFF are used by system_server.
The goal of this change is to put SELinux ioctl controls in place for
/dev/tun, so we don't have to maintain the custom kernel patch at
11cee2be0c%5E%21
Delete the neverallow assertion in isolated_app.te. This is already
covered by the assertion present in app_neverallows.te.
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsHostsideNetworkTests -t com.android.cts.net.HostsideVpnTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsHostsideNetworkTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
Bug: 111560739
Bug: 111560570
Change-Id: Ibe1c3a9e880db0bee438535554abdbc6d84eec45
Already has permissions to remove the scratch partition, but to allow
more refined cleansing (eg: just remove vendor override), need the
ability to mount and scrub overlay directories.
Test: manual
Bug: 117605276
Change-Id: Ibc272c0aa7ce207280023912f5f119ccf5079a7f
Create a transient SELinux domain where system_server can perform
certain JIT setup. The idea is that system_server will start in the
system_server_startup domain, setup certain JIT pages, then perform a
one-way transition into the system_server domain. From that point,
further JITing operations are disallowed.
Bug: 62356545
Test: device boots, no permission errors
Change-Id: Ic55b2cc5aba420ebcf62736622e08881a4779004
Remove blanket coredomain access to same_process_hal_file in favor of
granular access. This change takes into account audits from go/sedenials
(our internal dogfood program)
Bug: 37211678
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I5634fb65c72d13007e40c131a600585a05b8c4b5
What changed:
- Tightening neverallow forbidding vendor execution access in /system.
In it's current form the neverallow is loose because not all executables
have exec_type attribute, e.g. almost everything in /system/bin/. This
change tightens up the neverallow by instead targeting system_file_type
attribute, which must be applied to all files in /system.
- Adding a general neverallow forbidding all access to files in /system
(bar exceptions)
TODOs:
- Remove loopholes once Treble violations are fixed across all internal
build targets.
Bug: 111243627
Test: m selinux_policy; build-only change
Change-Id: I150195756c0c3258904c3da0812bbd942ea2f229
Start enforcing the use of ioctl restrictions on all Android block
devices. Domains which perform ioctls on block devices must be explicit
about what ioctls they issue. The only ioctls allowed by default are
BLKGETSIZE64, BLKSSZGET, FIOCLEX, and FIONCLEX.
Test: device boots and no problems.
Change-Id: I1195756b20cf2b50bede1eb04a48145a97a35867
Allow a process to determine if a fifo_file (aka pipe, created from the
pipe() or pipe2() syscall) is a tty.
Addresses the following denials:
type=1400 audit(0.0:1307): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="ls" path="pipe:[213117]" dev="pipefs" ino=213117 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:hal_dumpstate_impl:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_dumpstate_impl:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0
type=1400 audit(0.0:22): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="sh" path="pipe:[54971]" dev="pipefs" ino=54971 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0 app=com.zhihu.android
type=1400 audit(0.0:237): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="sh" path="pipe:[56997]" dev="pipefs" ino=56997 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0 app=fm.qingting.qtradio
Test: policy compiles and device builds.
Change-Id: Ic4c6441d0ec33de8cda3f13ff529e98374897364
What changed:
- Tightening neverallow forbidding vendor execution access in /system.
In it's current form the neverallow is loose because not all executables
have exec_type attribute, e.g. almost everything in /system/bin/. This
change tightens up the neverallow by instead targeting system_file_type
attribute, which must be applied to all files in /system.
- Adding a general neverallow forbidding all access to files in /system
(bar exceptions)
TODOs:
- Remove loopholes once Treble violations are fixed across all internal
build targets.
Bug: 111243627
Test: m selinux_policy; build-only change
Change-Id: Ic8d71c8d139cad687ad7d7c9db7111240475f175
Add a neverallow rule requiring fine-grain ioctl filtering for most file
and socket object classes. Only chr_file and blk_file are excluded. The
goal is to ensure that any file descriptor which supports ioctl commands
uses a whitelist.
Further refine the list of file / socket objects which require ioctl
filtering. The previous ioctl filtering did not cover the following:
1) ioctls on /proc/PID files
2) ioctls on directories in /dev
3) PDX unix domain sockets
Add FIONCLEX to the list of globally safe ioctls. FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX
are alternate, uncommon ways to set the O_CLOEXEC flag on a file
descriptor, which is a harmless operation.
Test: device boots and no problems.
Change-Id: I6ba31fbe2f21935243a344d33d67238d72a8e618
Add a service in mediaswcodec to load updated codecs,
and restrict it to userdebug/eng. Reuse existing
mediaextractor_update_service since the codec update
service is identical, this avoids adding a new one
for now as we may not need the service anymore
after switching to APEX.
Bug: 111407413
Bug: 117290290
Change-Id: Ia75256f47433bd13ed819c70c1fb34ecd5d507b4
Policy w.r.t to apps:
- cgroup access from untrusted apps and priv app is neverallow'ed.
- other apps (e.g. vendor apps) need to explicitly declare appropriate
access rules to cgroups.
Policy w.r.t native domains:
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API is used
abundantly in native vendor code. So we are not going to limit non-app
access to cgroup.
Bug: 110043362
Bug: 117666318
Test: m selinux_policy, boot device
Change-Id: I83aee21ca3e8941725c70706769ea9dbdc76b9c5
same_process_hal_file is exempted from many Treble neverallows. We want
to know which processes access this type to eventually constrain access
to it.
Bug: 37211678
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I61c0df21250eb1b1ae2d9c5fa9c801a828539813
By convention, auditallow statements are typically put into
userdebug_or_eng blocks, to ensure we don't accidentally ship
unnecessary audit rules. Let's do the same here.
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ib3eac94284eea3c1ae2f3dacddcb2eaeca95230e
Set up a new service for sw media codec services.
Bug: 111407413
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev --module CtsMediaTestCases --compatibility:module-arg CtsMediaTestCases:include-annotation:android.platform.test.annotations.RequiresDevice
Change-Id: Ia1c6a9ef3f0c1d84b2be8756eb1853ffa0597f8e
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Changes from original aosp/692189 which was reverted:
- There seem to be spurious denials from vendor-specific apps. So added
back access from { appdomain -all_untrusted_apps -priv_app } to cgroup.
Audit this access with intent to write explicit per-domain rules for it.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
This reverts commit cacea25ed0.
Change-Id: I05ab404f348a864e8409d811346c8a0bf49bc47a
ebc3a1a34c enabled ioctl filtering on
normal files and directories. However, no per-ioctl permissions were
enforced for symbolic links, named pipes ("mkfifo"), or
named sockets.
Start enforcing fine-grain ioctl restrictions for symbolic links, named
pipes, and named sockets.
Motivation: Prevent FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERIFY and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY from
being usable on nonsensical filesystem objects and provide a layer of
defense for kernel bugs.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problem.
Change-Id: Id81b496ab64f37a0918f3dfd8fa9aaa3227009cc
Remove kernel attack surface associated with ioctls on plain files. In
particular, we want to ensure that the ioctls FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY and
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY are not exposed outside a whitelisted set of
entities. However, it's straight forward enough to turn on ioctl
whitelisting for everything, so we choose to do so.
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Test: device boots with data wipe
Test: device boots without data wipe
Change-Id: I545ae76dddaa2193890eeb1d404db79d1ffa13c2
This reverts commit 9899568f6c.
Reason for revert: Reports of high numbers of SELinux denials
showing up on the SELinux dashboard.
Bug: 110043362
Change-Id: Id8fc260c47ffd269ac2f15ff7dab668c959e3ab0
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
Change-Id: I9e441b26792f1edb1663c660bcff422ec7a6332b
apexd is a new daemon for managing APEX packages installed
on the device. It hosts a single binder service, "apexservice".
Bug: 112455435
Test: builds, binder service can be registered,
apexes can be accessed, verified and mounted
Change-Id: I634ad100f10b2edcd9a9c0df0d33896fa5d4ed97
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
/system/usr/share/zoneinfo is currently labeled zoneinfo_data_file,
a label shared with /data/misc/zoneinfo. However, each of these
directory locations has different security characteristics. In
particular, the files in /system/usr/share/zoneinfo must never be
writable, whereas /data/misc/zoneinfo may be written to by system_server.
Reusing the same label hides these different security characteristics.
Create a separate label for /system/usr/share/zoneinfo.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: I8cf16ff038b06b38f77388e546d9b7a6865f7879
Assert that only apps and installd may open private app files.
Remove "open" permission for mediaserver/vold and remove their
neverallow exemption.
Test: verify no related audit messages in the logs.
Test: build
Fixes: 80300620
Fixes: 80418809
Bug: 80190017
Change-Id: If0c1862a273af1fedd8898f334c9b0aa6b9be728
This change limits global access to /system files down to:
/system/bin/linker*
/system/lib[64]/*
/system/etc/ld.config*
/system/etc/seccomp_policy/*
/system/etc/security/cacerts/*
/system/usr/share/zoneinfo/*
Bug: 111243627
Test: boot device, browse internet without denials to system_* types.
Test: VtsHalDrmV1_{1, 0}TargetTest without denials
Change-Id: I69894b29733979c2bc944ac80229e84de5d519f4
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.
Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
In cases when a device upgrades to system-as-root from O to P, it needs a mount
point for an already existing partition that is accessed by both system and
vendor.
Devices launching with P must not have /mnt/vendor accessible to system.
Bug: 78598545
Test: m selinx_policy
Change-Id: Ia7bcde44e2b8657a7ad9e0d9bae7a7259f40936f
Add additional compile time constraints on the ability to ptrace various
sensitive domains.
llkd: remove some domains which llkd should never ptrace, even on
debuggable builds, such as kernel threads and init.
crash_dump neverallows: Remove the ptrace neverallow checks because
it duplicates other neverallow assertions spread throughout the policy.
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: Ia4240d1ce7143b983bb048e046bb4729d0af5a6e
Metadata needs to be erased as part of fastboot flashall -w.
Test: fastboot erase metadata
Bug: 113648914
Change-Id: I38a0debd9face16cad9d9a13a48549f3f58652fa
But in a very restricted form:
1) Nobody can initiate calls into init
2) Nobody can transfer binder objects into init, except servicemanager
Bug: 112684055
Test: device boots
Change-Id: Icfb218f2871e234284c74e096eccd7a2e786cf94
Not needed for modern Android versions. These rules are really, really
old.
Test: "adb bugreport" continues to work
Test: Generating a bugreport via key combo continues to work.
Change-Id: Ibc1157fb36abd7fc701db3819474f25210a3cb5f
llkd needs the ptrace capabilities and dac override to monitor for
live lock conditions on the stack dumps.
Test: compile
Bug: 33808187
Change-Id: Ibc1e4cc10395fa9685c4ef0ca214daf212a5e126
commit 9b2e0cbeea added a new
self:global_capability_class_set macro that covers both self:capability
and self:cap_userns. Apply the new macro to various self:capability
references that have cropped up since then.
Bug: 112307595
Test: policy diff shows new rules are all cap_userns
Change-Id: I3eb38ef07532a8e693fd549dfdbc4a6df5329609
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I80c54d4eaf3b94a1fe26d2280af4e57cb1593790
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I1f97659736429fe961319c642f458c80f199ffb4
This rule prevents adding further fwk->vendor access.
Left a TODO to clean up already existing access.
Bug: 37168747
Test: build sailfish, walleye policies
Change-Id: I5e61d0b94b81df228628dba5746e084f291a7904
Text relocation support was removed from the linker for apps targeting
API >= 23. See
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md#text-relocations-enforced-for-api-level-23
However, the security policy was not updated to remove the execmod
permission at that time, since we didn't have support for targeting
SELinux policies to API versions.
Remove execmod permissions for apps targeting API 26 or greater. The
linker support was removed, so it's pointless to keep around the SELinux
permissions.
Retain execmod support for apps targeting API 25 or lower. While in
theory we could remove support for API 23-25, that would involve the
introduction of a new SELinux domain (and the associated rule
explosion), which I would prefer to avoid.
This change helps protect application executable code from modification,
enforcing W^X properties on executable code pages loaded from files.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX
Test: auditallow rules were added and nothing triggered for apps
targeting API >= 26. Code compiles and device boots.
Bug: 111544476
Change-Id: Iab9a0bd297411e99699e3651c110e57eb02a3a41
/vendor/bin/bcc being a dependency of renderscript should be labeled as
same_process_hal_file. To facilitate that we relax neverallow rules for
executing same_process_hal_file from coredomain.
See details on /vendor/bin/bcc:
https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/vndk/renderscript
Bug: n/a
Test: build-time change
Change-Id: Ie996fb863090bf08b3d3ef653da827d0b22937d7
Kernels above 4.14 have a new mmap permission. However, neverallow rules
exclude the use of mmap, even when file FDs are passable across the
vendor/non-vendor boundary. Since we allow reading / writing of passed
file descriptors, also allow the use of mmap for passed file
descriptors.
Bug: 112171217
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I8176f86960bdff0cf5de770809510e9df5d62db9
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
Remove the exemptions for untrusted apps and broaden the neverallow so
they can't be reinstated. Modifying executable pages is unsafe. Text
relocations are not supported.
Bug: 111544476
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: Ibff4f34d916e000203e38574bb063513e4428bb7
vold will trim rw mount points about daily, but it is denied by SELinux:
root 603 603 W Binder:603_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:11): avc: denied {
search } for name="vendor" dev="tmpfs" ino=23935 scontext=u:r:vold:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_vendor_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Allowing vold to search /mnt/vendor/* to fix the denials.
Note that device-specific sepolicy needs to be extended to allow vold
to send FITRIM ioctl. e.g., for /mnt/vendor/persist, it needs:
allow vold persist_file:dir { ioctl open read };
Bug: 111409607
Test: boot a device, checks the above denial is gone
Change-Id: Ia9f22d973e5a2e295678781de49a0f61fccd9dad
Grant access to icmp_socket to netdomain. This was previously
labeled as rawip_socket which apps are allowed to use. Neverallow
all other new socket types for apps.
Kernels versions > 4.9 redefine ICMP sockets from rawip_socket
to icmp_socket. To pass neverallow tests, we need to define
which IOCTLs are allowed (and disallowed).
Note that this does not change behavior on devices with
kernel versions <=4.9. However, it is necessary (although not
sufficient) to pass CTS on kernel version 4.14.
Bug: 110520616
Test: Grant icmp_socket in net.te and build.
Change-Id: I5c7cb6867d1a4cd1554a8da0d55daa8e06daf803
For 4.14+ kernels, we need map permissions for vendor_config_files,
for things like kernel loaded firmware blobs, etc.
Change-Id: I8144c50b0239aedf4124569003187cc50c963080
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Legacy hardware and code still depends on the ueventd helpers to
locate the firmware supported files which are on new mount path
labeled with mnt_vendot_file. For ueventd helper to work we need dir search
and read permission on this new label so moving ueventd to exempted list.
Already ueventd has the vendor_file_type read access.
Bug:110083808
Change-Id: Ia15cc39ecef9e29b4f1f684efdddbeb78b427988
(breaks vendor blobs, will have to be regenerated
after this CL)
This moves mediacodec to vendor so it is replaced with
hal_omx_server. The main benefit of this is that someone
can create their own implementation of mediacodec without
having to alter the one in the tree. mediacodec is still
seccomp enforced by CTS tests.
Fixes: 36375899
Test: (sanity) YouTube
Test: (sanity) camera pics + video
Test: check for denials
Change-Id: I31f91b7ad6cd0a891a1681ff3b9af82ab400ce5e
In particular, add assertions limiting which processes may
directly open files owned by apps. Reduce this to just apps, init,
and installd. App data is protected by a combination of selinux
permissions and Unix permissions, so limiting the open permission to
just apps (which are not allowed to have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) ensures that only installd and init have
complete access an app's private directory.
In addition to apps/init/installd, other processes currently granted
open are mediaserver, uncrypt, and vold. Uncrypt's access appears to
be deprecated (b/80299612). Uncrypt now uses /data/ota_package
instead. b/80418809 and b/80300620 track removal for vold and
mediaserver.
Test: build/boot aosp_taimen-userdebug. Verify no "granted" audit
messages in the logs.
Bug: 80190017
Bug: 80300620
Bug: 80418809
Fixes: 80299612
Change-Id: I153bc7b62294b36ccd596254a5976dd887fed046
shipping API version:
For devices shipped on O-MR1 nothing changes, data is stored
under /data/system/users/<user-id>/fpdata/...
Devices shipped from now on will instead store fingerprint data under
/data/vendor_de/<user-id>/fpdata.
Support for /data/vendor_de and /data/vendor_ce has been added to vold.
Bug: 36997597
Change-Id: Ibc7cc33b756f64abe68a749c0ada0ca4f6d92514
Merged-In: Ibc7cc33b756f64abe68a749c0ada0ca4f6d92514
Test: manually
(cherry picked from commit 6116daa71a)
to workaround some VTS VtsKernelLtp failures introduced by
change on vfs_iter_write here:
abbb65899a%5E%21/#F3
for discussion please check threads here:
https://www.mail-archive.com/seandroid-list@tycho.nsa.gov/msg03348.html
Sandeep suggest to re-order the events in that thread,
that should be the right solution,
this change is only a tempory workaround before that change.
Test: manually with -m VtsKernelLtp -t VtsKernelLtp#fs.fs_fill_64bit
Change-Id: I3f46ff874d3dbcc556cfbeb27be21878574877d1
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
Vendor public libs are exposed to apps (not system), and their ABI
stability is guaranteed by vendor. Introducing new selinux type so that
we don't conflate concepts of same-process HAL and vendor public lib.
The former is exposed to all domains, while the latter should only be
acessible by apps.
Bug: 76413554
Test: build-only change, policy builds
Change-Id: I89dad351374f46c7fe2726991eb4c05064c37ed5
Currently, when vendor APK try to use MediaPlayer to play its audio
resource, it would fail due to this neverallow rules.
avc: denied { read } for path="/vendor/app/TicFitness/TicFitness.apk" dev="dm-1" ino=183 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 78436043
Change-Id: Id910184c16955f9e4e4c8d3bb6eca2253ab59063
FBE needs to access these files to set up or verify encryption for
directories during mkdir.
Bug: 77850279
Test: walleye + more restrictions continues to have FBE work
Change-Id: I84e201436ce4531d36d1257d932c3e2e772ea05e
(cherry picked from commit 18a284405f)
The out-of-tree keychord driver is only intended for use by init.
Test: build
Bug: 64114943
Bug: 78174219
Change-Id: I96a7fbcd9a54a38625063606f5c4ab6d40d701f6
After adding a new user, deleting it, and rebooting, some of the user's data still remained. This adds the SELinux permissions necessary to remove all of the data. It fixes the followign denials:
avc: denied { rmdir } for scontext=u:r:vold_prepare_subdirs:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { unlink } for scontext=u:r:vold_prepare_subdirs:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 74866238
Test: Create user, delete user, reboot user, see no denials or
leftover data.
Change-Id: Ibc43bd2552b388a9708bf781b5ad206f21df62dc
dumpstate needs to read all the system properties for debugging.
Bug: 77277669
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: I3603854b3be67d4fc55d74f7925a21bfa59c81ee
Vendors may use this to write custom messages to their bootloader, and
as the bootloader is under vendor control, this makes sense to allow.
Bug: 77881566
Test: build
Change-Id: I78f80400e5f386cad1327a9209ee1afc8e334e56
cgroupfs doesn't allow files to be created, so this can't be needed.
Also remove redundant neverallow and dontaudit rules. These are now
more broadly handled by domain.te.
Bug: 74182216
Test: Denials remain silenced.
Change-Id: If7eb0e59f567695d987272a2fd36dbc251516e9f
(cherry picked from commit 8e8c109350)
See also go/perfetto-io-tracing-security.
* Grant CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to traced_probes.
* Allow traced_probes to list selected labels.
* Change ext4 and f2fs events to be available on user builds.
Bug: 74584014
Change-Id: I891a0209be981d760a828a69e4831e238248ebad
The kernel generates file creation audits when O_CREAT is passed even
if the file already exists - which it always does in the cgroup cases.
We add neverallow rules to prevent mistakenly allowing unnecessary
create access. We also suppress these denials, which just add noise to
the log, for the more common culprits.
Bug: 72643420
Bug: 74182216
Test: Ran build_policies.sh and checked failures were unrelated.
Test: Device still boots, denials gone.
Change-Id: I034b41ca70da1e73b81fe90090e656f4a3b542dc
(cherry picked from commit 92c149d077)
In permissive mode we get more spurious denials when O_CREAT is used
with an already-existing file. They're harmless so we don't need to
audit them.
Example denials:
denied { add_name } for name="trigger" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
denied { create } for name="trigger" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_leds:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Bug: 72643420
Bug: 74182216
Test: Device boots, denials gone.
Change-Id: I54b1a0c138ff5167f1d1d12c4b0b9e9afaa5bca0
(cherry picked from commit 7d4294cb4f)
A default value of persist.radio.multisim.config can be set by SoC
vendors, and so vendor-init-settable should be allowed to it.
Bug: 73871799
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: Ie62b91e7e3d7e05425b742838417f1cab7b3fed4
This reverts commit 016f0a58a9.
Reason for revert: Was temporarily reverted, merging back in with fix.
Test: Basic telephony sanity, treehugger
Bug: 74486619
Bug: 36427227
Merged-in: Ide68726a90d5485c2758673079427407aee1e4f2
Change-Id: Ide68726a90d5485c2758673079427407aee1e4f2
(cherry picked from commit 312248ff72)
/odm partition isn't mandatory and the following symlinks will exist on
a device without /odm partition.
/odm/app ->/vendor/odm/app
/odm/bin ->/vendor/odm/bin
/odm/etc ->/vendor/odm/etc
/odm/firmware ->/vendor/odm/firmware
/odm/framework ->/vendor/odm/framework
/odm/lib -> /vendor/odm/lib
/odm/lib64 -> /vendor/odm/lib64
/odm/overlay -> /vendor/odm/overlay
/odm/priv-app -> /vendor/odm/priv-app
This CL allows all domains to access the symlinks, also removes the
Treble compliance neverallows on them because the actual restrictions
should apply to the real path directly.
Bug: 70678783
Test: boot a device
Change-Id: If1522780a13710d8a592272dc688685cbae29f52
The kernel is unusual in that it's both a core process, but vendor
provided. Exempt it from the restriction against accessing files from
on /vendor. Also, rework the neverallow rule so that it disallows
opening/modifying files, but allows reading files passed over IPC.
Bug: 68213100
Test: build (this is a build-time test)
Change-Id: I2f6b2698ec45d2e8480dc1de47bf12b9b53c4446
The webview_zygote is now launched as a child-zygote process from the
main zygote process.
Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I9c948b58a969d35d5a5add4b6ab62b8f990645d1
Change-Id: I153476642cf14883b0dfea0d9f5b3b5e30ac1c08
Neverallow errors include the file name and line number of the
violated rule. However, if multiple neverallow rules are included
within a single macro, then the line number is for the entire macro,
not the individual neverallow rule that is violated. To fix this,
only include one neverallow rule per macro.
This changes nothing on device, nor does it change the results of
compilation, it only makes the printed errors more useful.
Bug: 69139821
Test: build aosp_taimen-userdebug (neverallow rules are build time
tests)
Change-Id: Id0fc5906431db20e71265c7e9d55fbee4bdf53db
This required for kernel to do loopback mounts on filesystem
images created by the kernel system call tests in LTP.
Add a corresponding neverallow to stop all domains from accessing
the location at /data/local/tmp/ltp.
Bug: 73220071
Test: Boot sailfish successfully
Test: run vts-kernel -m VtsKernelLtp -t syscalls.fchown04
Change-Id: I73f5f14017e22971fc246a05751ba67be4653bca
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
In this architecture, the system_server instructs the zygote to fork a
child-zygote to be the webview_zygote. The system_server tells this new
zygote to listen for fork requests on a random abstract unix socket of
its choosing.
A follow-up CL will remove the rules for starting webview_zygote via
init.
Bug: 63749735
Test: m
Test: Launch "Third-party licenses" activity from Settings, and it
renders correctly via the WebView.
Merged-In: I864743943c11c18de386010ecd4b616721cb9954
Change-Id: I1c352e47b66eca3a3fa641daa6ecc3e7a889b54e
Restrictions introduced in vendor init mean that new devices
may not no longer exempt vendor init from writing to system_data_file.
This means we must introduce a new label for /data/vendor which
vendor_init may write to.
Bug: 73087047
Test: build and boot Taimen and Marlin. Complete SUW, enroll fingerprint
No new denials.
Change-Id: I65f904bb28952d4776aab947515947e14befbe34
And grant explicit exemption from system_executes_vendor_violators
neverallow rules.
This does not change the policy, but is needed to test the violator
attribute for emptiness.
Bug: 72662597
Test: build sepolicy
Change-Id: Iba79bb42e1381b221fe0dc53470f62f8267a4791
This changes tracefs files to be default-enabled in debug mode, but
default-disabled with specific files enabled in user mode.
Bug: 64762598
Test: Successfully took traces in user mode.
Change-Id: I572ea22253e0c1e42065fbd1d2fd7845de06fceb
Instead of getting these permissions, it is better to add the process
to a group or change the permissions of the files it tries to access.
Test: Built the policy for many devices.
Change-Id: If023d98bcc479bebbedeedf525965ffb17a0e331
Data outside of /data/vendor should have the core_data_file_type.
Exempt data_between_core_and_vendor for some types.
Ensure core_data_file_type and coredomain_socket do not get expanded
to their underlying types.
Test: build sepolicy for all targets in master (this is a build time
test)
Bug: 34980020
Change-Id: I59387a87875f4603a001fb03f22fa31cae84bf5a
(cherry picked from commit bdd454792d)
vendor_init exists on the system partition, but it is meant to be an
extention of init that runs with vendor permissions for executing
vendor scripts, therefore it is not meant to be in coredomain.
Bug: 62875318
Test: boot walleye
Merged-In: I01af5c9f8b198674b15b90620d02725a6e7c1da6
Change-Id: I01af5c9f8b198674b15b90620d02725a6e7c1da6
This is an experimental feature only on userdebug and eng build.
Test: play MP4 file. install & uninstall media update apk.
Bug: 67908547
Change-Id: I513cdbfda962f00079e886b7a42f9928e81f6474
These property sets will be long term restricted with
compatible_property but allowing them now eases the transition.
Bug: 62875318
Test: boot marlin without audits for setprop in vendor_init
Change-Id: I25ab565bbf137e382c1dfc3b905b38403645f1d2
Duplicate property names are supported now for prefix and exact
matching.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: Ifd9d32eaece7370d69f121e88d5541f7a2e34458
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
Perfetto is a performance instrumentation and logging framework,
living in AOSP's /external/pefetto.
Perfetto introduces in the system one binary and two daemons
(the binary can specialize in either depending on the cmdline).
1) traced: unprivileged daemon. This is architecturally similar to logd.
It exposes two UNIX sockets:
- /dev/socket/traced_producer : world-accessible, allows to stream
tracing data. A tmpfs file descriptor is sent via SCM_RIGHTS
from traced to each client process, which needs to be able to
mmap it R/W (but not X)
- /dev/socket/traced_consumer : privilege-accessible (only from:
shell, statsd). It allows to configure tracing and read the trace
buffer.
2) traced_probes: privileged daemon. This needs to:
- access tracingfs (/d/tracing) to turn tracing on and off.
- exec atrace
- connect to traced_producer to stream data to traced.
init.rc file:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/external/perfetto/+/575382/14/perfetto.rc
Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ia3b5fdacbd5a8e6e23b82f1d6fabfa07e4abc405
This fixes an incorrect exception in the neverallow rule.
Test: Built policy for all lunch targets.
Change-Id: I283833131c6f1fd741e934de24c838594ac38a18
After offline discussions, we decided that this was the proper
exception to the neverallow rule.
Test: Built policy.
Change-Id: Ic1603bfdd803151ccfb79f90195b83b616acc873
Allow init to create a serialized property_info file and allow all
processes to read it.
Bug: 36001741
Test: boot bullhead, walleye using property_info
Change-Id: Ie51d4c0f0221b128dd087029c811fda15b4d7093
Commit b8b4f5d6 'Clean up old file-based OTA SELinux rules' removed
many permissions from recovery, a few of which are still required.
Restore these.
[ 2918.409108] type=1400 audit(2327427.540:159): avc: denied
{ search } for pid=339 comm="recovery" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p38"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0
[ 2586.563071] E:Failed to mount / create /cache/recovery: Permission
denied
[ 2586.780320] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/log: Permission denied
[ 2586.850399] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/last_log: Permission
denied
[ 2586.918979] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/last_install: Permission
denied
[ 54.035867] type=1400 audit(59206654.526:12): avc: denied { chown }
for pid=330 comm="recovery" capability=0 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0
tcontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0a
Bug: 70350029
Test: xunchang to test
Change-Id: I46ab049b8eb600b44c84a61777fade150cadd197
Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Bug: 69664758
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I22aa208859b8478a2a90e1ed1c0f0d6b62a6664e
Self sideload OTA installation is aborted in #PPR1.171122.001.
Likely cause is the removal of the file-based OTA rules. Revert
the change while I investigate.
This reverts commit 7388575591.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 69664758
Bug: 15575013
Change-Id: I65ca3bad7251f06df33eae8b2d4bcfada93ae9b8
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Test: build taimen-user/userdebug
Change-Id: I619e71529e078235ed30dc06c60e6e448310fdbc
Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I4238d17808bed6a81f47e14eb1797496c07642e2
This reverts commit ed876a5e96.
Fixes user builds.
libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 513 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 9149 of policy.conf) violated by allow update_verifier misc_block_device:blk_file { ioctl read write lock append open };
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
Error while expanding policy
Bug: 69566734
Test: build taimen-user
Change-Id: I969b7539dce547f020918ddc3e17208fc98385c4
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Change-Id: I83dcb33c3a057f126428f88a90b95f3f129d9f0e
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Similar to the way we handle /dev/random and /dev/urandom, make
/proc/sys/kernel/random available to everyone.
hostname:/proc/sys/kernel/random # ls -laZ
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 .
dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root u:object_r:proc:s0 0 2017-11-20 18:32 ..
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 boot_id
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 entropy_avail
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 poolsize
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 read_wakeup_threshold
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 urandom_min_reseed_secs
-r--r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 uuid
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root u:object_r:proc_random:s0 0 2017-11-20 19:02 write_wakeup_threshold
boot_id (unique random number per boot) is commonly used by
applications, as is "uuid". As these are random numbers, no sensitive
data is leaked. The other files are useful to allow processes to
understand the state of the entropy pool, and should be fairly benign.
Addresses the following denial:
type=1400 audit(0.0:207): avc: denied { read } for name="boot_id"
dev="proc" ino=76194 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 69294418
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ieeca1c654ec755123e19b4693555990325bd58cf
Sharing data folders by path will be disallowed because it violates
the approved API between platform and vendor components tested by
VTS. Move all violating permissions from core selinux policy to
device specific policy so that we can exempt existing devices from
the ban and enforce it on new devices.
Bug: 34980020
Test: Move permissions. Build and test wifi, wifi AP, nfc, fingerprint
and Play movies on Marlin and Taimen.
Test: build on Angler, Bullhead, Dragon, Fugu, Marlin, Walleye
Change-Id: Ib6fc9cf1403e74058aaae5a7b0784922f3172b4e
Vendor apps may only use servicemanager provided services
marked as app_api_service. surfaceflinger_service should be
available to vendor apps, so add this attribute and clean up
duplicate grants.
Addresses:
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qtelephony:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:ssr_detector:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qcneservice:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 69064190
Test: build
Change-Id: I00fcf43b0a8bde232709aac1040a5d7f4792fa0f
1. remove some duplicate permissions.
2. Grant permissions to su for dgram sockets in a way that is
consistent to how we grant permissions to stream_sockets.
Bug: 34980020
Test: build
Change-Id: I50e01d51444a70ead3ef40b52eda8eb29732b46c
The use of SIOCATMARK is not recommended per rfc6093.
This ioctl is not currently allowed on Android. Add a neverallowxperm
statement (compile time assertion + CTS test) to ensure this never
regresses.
Bug: 68014825
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I41272a0cb157ac9aa38c8e67aabb8385403815f9
Iot would like to allow bootanim to load libraries from /oem but in order for
device-specfic sepolicies to grant exec this global restriction needs to
be relaxed.
Bug: 37992717
Test: Tested with Iot sepolicies in effect and bootanim can exec.
Change-Id: I6462bf510562eb3fb06304e50b68fba05d37b285
This is needed to retain app's previous access to
/sys/devices/system/cpu. When these files were previously
labeled in file_contexts, symlinks were labeled as
sysfs_devices_system_cpu. When labeling was moved to genfs_contexts
symlinks all have the default sysfs label.
avc: denied { getattr } for comm="main"
path="/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq" dev="sysfs" ino=41897
scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
Change-Id: Idaa565390bca13d3819e147fcea4214956c0f589
Bug: 64270911
Test: build aosp_marlin
This patch tries to provide similar functionality as the previous
change made here:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/platform/system/sepolicy/+/432339/
Only, making sure we add the same map permissions for the vendor
directory.
Change-Id: Ia965df2881cdee8bb5d81278a1eb740def582871
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Kernel commit 3ba4bf5f1e2c ("selinux: add a map permission check for mmap")
added a map permission check on mmap so that we can
distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications
for revocation). The purpose of a separate map permission check on
mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files
for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly
useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime
in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured
pipeline without data copying). The kernel commit is anticipated to
be included in Linux 4.13.
This change defines map permission for the Android policy. It mirrors
the definition in the kernel classmap by adding it to the common
definitions for files and sockets. This will break compatibility for
kernels that predate the dynamic class/perm mapping support (< 2.6.33);
on such kernels, one would instead need to add map permission
to the end of each file and socket access vector.
This change also adds map permission to the global macro definitions for
file permissions, thereby allowing it in any allow rule that uses these
macros, and to specific rules allowing mapping of files from /system
and executable types. This should cover most cases where it is needed,
although it may still need to be added to specific allow rules when the
global macros are not used.
Test: Policy builds
Change-Id: Iab3ccd2b6587618e68ecab58218838749fe5e7f5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Due to the massively increased number of attributes in SELinux policy
as part of the treble changes, we have had to remove attributes from
policy for performance reasons. Unfortunately, some attributes are
required to be in policy to ensure that our neverallow rules are being
properly enforced. Usually this is not a problem, since neverallow rules
indicate that an attribute should be kept, but this is not currently the
case when the attribute is part of a negation in a group.
This is particularly problematic with treble since some attributes may
exist for HALs that have no implementation, and thus no types. In
particular, this has caused an issue with the neverallows added in our
macros. Add an extraneous neverallow rule to each of those auto-generated
neverallow rules to make sure that they are not removed from policy, until
the policy compiler is fixed to avoid this. Also add corresponding rules
for other types which have been removed due to no corresponding rules.
Bug: 62591065
Bug: 62658302
Test: Attributes present in policy and CTS passes. sepolicy-analyze also
works on platform-only policy.
Change-Id: Ic3fc034cdbd04a94167f8240cf562297e8d7c762
Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.
Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.
Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual
(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)
(cherry picked from commit 11bfcc1e96)
Change-Id: Icc60d227331c8eee70a9389ff1e7e78772f37e6f
Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.
Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.
Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual
Merged-In: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f
Change-Id: Ib4b73fc130f4993c44d96c8d68f61b6d9bb2c7d5
Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.
Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).
Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
Adding the default label/mapping is important because:
1. Lookups of services without an selinux label should generate
a denial.
2. In permissive mode, lookups of a service without a label should be
be allowed, without the default label service manager disallows
access.
3. We can neverallow use of the default label.
Bug: 37762790
Test: Build and flash policy onto Marlin with unlabeled vendor services.
Add/find of unlabeled vendor services generate a denial.
Change-Id: I66531deedc3f9b79616f5d0681c87ed66aca5b80
(cherry picked from commit 639a2b842c)
The fuse_device neverallow rules are too aggressive and are inhibiting
certain vendor customizations. Relax the /dev/fuse neverallow rules so
that they better reflect the security invariants we want to uphold.
Bug: 37496487
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie73b0ba7c76446afc2a7a23ebed1275c977d932d
This adds neverallow rules which enforce the prohibition on
communication between framework and vendor components over VendorBinder.
This prohibition is similar in spirit to the one for Binder
communications.
Most changes consist of adding neverallow rules, which do not affect
runtime behavior. The only change which does affect runtime behavior
is the change which takes away the right of servicemanager domain to
transfer Binder tokens to hwservicemanager and vndservicemanager. This
grant was there by accident (because it was overly broad) and is not
expected to be needed: servicemanager, hwservicemanager, and
vndservicemanager are not supposed to be communicating with each
other.
P. S. The new neverallow rules in app_neverallows.te are covered by
the new rules in domain.te. The rules were nevertheless added to
app_neverallows.te for consistency with other *Binder rules there.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 37663632
Change-Id: I7c2ae23924bf0f2fed3f1e3a8d4d603129286329
App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to
arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the
attack surface. The reason is twofold:
1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it
did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of
apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for
authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that
a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to
perform operations offered by the service.
2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with
higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core
components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way
down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the
Android security model.
HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor
components) are considered safer because of point #2 above.
Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are
considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs
by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its
client already as, because these services run in the process of the
client.
This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services
in neverallow rules.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d
This adds fine-grained policy about who can register and find which
HwBinder services in hwservicemanager.
Test: Play movie in Netflix and Google Play Movies
Test: Play video in YouTube app and YouTube web page
Test: In Google Camera app, take photo (HDR+ and conventional),
record video (slow motion and normal), and check that photos
look fine and videos play back with sound.
Test: Cast screen to a Google Cast device
Test: Get location fix in Google Maps
Test: Make and receive a phone call, check that sound works both ways
and that disconnecting the call frome either end works fine.
Test: Run RsHelloCompute RenderScript demo app
Test: Run fast subset of media CTS tests:
make and install CtsMediaTestCases.apk
adb shell am instrument -e size small \
-w 'android.media.cts/android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner'
Test: Play music using Google Play music
Test: Adjust screen brightness via the slider in Quick Settings
Test: adb bugreport
Test: Enroll in fingerprint screen unlock, unlock screen using
fingerprint
Test: Apply OTA update:
Make some visible change, e.g., rename Settings app.
make otatools && \
make dist
Ensure device has network connectivity
ota_call.py -s <serial here> --file out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Confirm the change is now live on the device
Bug: 34454312
(cherry picked from commit 632bc494f1)
Merged-In: Iecf74000e6c68f01299667486f3c767912c076d3
Change-Id: I7a9a487beaf6f30c52ce08e04d415624da49dd31
installd needs to check whether idmap is outdated or not compared to
vendor overlay file.
Test: building succeeded and tested on sailfish.
Bug: 37179531
Change-Id: I934c1ae39e3f806bca1e3d68cf8190addeebb499
Remove neverallow exemption allowing other processes to run in
the bluetooth app's selinux domain.
The bluetooth domain is intended to host the zygote spawned
bluetooth app. It is not intended to host other bluetooth related
processes. Please define new domains for these processes.
Test: build Marlin
Change-Id: I1fd3dd0fe85f73457d77b63a65b4307821cbd41c
vndservicemanager is a copy of servicemanager, and so has the exact
same properties. This should be reflected in the sharing of an object
manager in SELinux policy, rather than creating a second one, which is
effectively an attempt at namespacing based on object rather than type
labels. hwservicemanager, however, provides different and additional
functionality that may be reflected in changed permissions, though they
currently map to the existing servicemanager permissions. Keep the new
hwservice_manager object manager but remove the vndservice_manager one.
Bug: 34454312
Bug: 36052864
Test: policy builds and device boots.
Change-Id: I9e0c2757be4026101e32ba780f1fa67130cfa14e
Temporary attribute (checked against in CTS) to point out vendor
processes that run /system executables. These are currently only down to
2-3 of them that are related to telephony on sailfish
Bug: 36463595
Test: Build succeeds for sailfish
Test: ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForVendorExecutingCore \
--skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a
Change-Id: I9eb40ad259aefba73869d6a1b40186d33fa475dd
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish, make wifi call, internet over data and wifi
Change-Id: I81259b6412d7197725afe2fe4976aa0a03b8df6e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
* changes:
suppress audit logs from rild's access to core domain through system()
sepolicy: auditallow vendor components to execute files from /system
vendor_shell: add sepolicy for vendor shell
toolbox: add sepolicy for vendor toybox
Do not allow priv_apps to scan all exec files
Adds a rule to audit vendor domains from executing programs from /system
with the exception of domains whitelisted in the rule.
Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish
Test: Run SELinuxHostTests with the tests that checks for new violators
(without the API check) to ensure it fails for sailfish. The API
check will allow the test to skip the check.
Change-Id: Id19f32141bceba4db4bd939394ff3ee0b3c4b437
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish and make sure all vendor services that are shell scripts
work. (Checke exited status)
Change-Id: I3d1d564114a914dec8179fb93a9e94493c2808da
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This unbreaks user builds broken by recently landed changes to secilc
which is now aggressively removing attributes which aren't used in
allow rules, even when they are used in other places, such as being
referenced from *_contexts files.
User builds are broken by vndservice_manager_type not being found when
checkfc is run for *vndservice_contexts targets.
Test: On a clean user build: mmma system/sepolicy
Bug: 37319524
Bug: 36508258
Change-Id: I4a1727a74122ecd9020c3831462d56a65ee6d304
hwservicemanager can check hwservice_contexts files
both from the framework and vendor partitions.
Initially, have a wildcard '*' in hwservice_contexts
that maps to a label that can be added/found from
domain. This needs to be removed when the proper policy
is in place.
Also, grant su/shell access to hwservicemanager list
operations, so tools like 'lshal' continue to work.
Bug: 34454312
Test: Marlin boots
Change-Id: I3a02d97a82458692b528d85c1b8e78b6f82ea1bc
Follow-up to commit 1b5f81a2d2.
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 37158297
Test: lunch sailfish-userdebug && m
Test: Manually run OTA
Change-Id: Ifb4808c9255842a51a660c07ffd924cef52024c5
The kernel modules under /vendor partition has been relabeled to vendor_file.
This CL allows for the modprobe to load modules labeled vendor_file.
Kernel modules are loaded in init.rc with following commands:
exec u:r:modprobe:s0 -- /system/bin/modprobe -d /vendor/lib/modules MODULE
Bug: 35653245
Test: tested on sailfish
Change-Id: I2132ca4de01c5c60476dad8496e98266de5a1bb7
Renderscript drivers are loaded from /vendor/lib64 by following the
/system/vendor symlink. This change fixes a couple of things.
- Allows all domains access to follow the symlink
- Restores app domain permissions for /vendor for non-treble devices
- Allow app domains to peek into /vendor/lib64, but NOT grant 'execute'
permissions for everything. Since RS drivers can be loaded into any
process, their vendor implementation and dependencies have been
marked as 'same process HALs' already.
Bug: 37169158
Test: Tested on sailfish (Treble) & Angler (non-treble)
./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsRenderscriptTestCases \
--skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a
Result: Tests Passed: 743 Tests Failed: 0
Change-Id: I36f5523381428629126fc196f615063fc7a50b8e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The concept of VNDK-stable set is gone because they no longer need to be
stable across several Android releases. Instead, they are just small set
of system libraries (other than Low-Level NDK) that can be used by
same-process HALs. They need to be stable only during an Android release
as other VNDK libraries. However, since they are eligible for double
loading, we still need to distinguish those libs from other VNDK
libraries. So we give them a name vndk-sp, which means VNDK designed for
same-process HALs.
Bug: 37139956
Test: booting successful with vndk-sp libs in /vendor/lib(64)?/vndk-sp
Change-Id: I892c4514deb3c6c8006e3659bed1ad3363420732
Vndk-stable libs are system libs that are used by same process HALs.
Since same process HALs can be loaded to any process, so are vndk-stable
libs.
Bug: 37138502
Test: none, because the directory is currently empty and thus this is
no-op. sailfish builds and boots.
Change-Id: I67a2c8c2e4c3517aa30b4a97dc80dc2800e47b5a
Effectively removes TODOs and finalizes the initial solution to allow
all domains access to 'vendor_file'.
Bug: 36681074
Test: Build and boot sailfish (no policy changes in the CL)
Change-Id: I50c05e20175c5273b34901809d967dd3e48bdb0e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
All accesses to /vendor/app within platform include permissions to read
symlinks in the location. This rule is redundant now.
Bug: 36806861
Test: Boot sailfish and find no denials for 'vendor_app_file'
Change-Id: Ic17a67521cff6717d83b78bb4ad8e21e772f6d4f
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
/vendor/framework is now designated location for vendor's platform
libraries. The directory is thus only made available for 'dex2oat'
coredomain.
Bug: 36680116
Test: Boot sailfish & angler and launch gApps, dialer w/ no denials for
'vendor_framework_file'
Change-Id: I24c2ec30f836330005a972ae20d839bef9dcb8aa
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.
The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)
Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video
Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.
Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video
Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.
Following directories will remain world readable
/vendor/etc
/vendor/lib(64)/hw/
Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
/vendor/app
/vendor/framework/
/vendor/overlay
Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.
Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803
All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass
Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.
Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b74305011)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
ioctl/stat/read/write/append.
This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute
coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute
core_data_file_type.
A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on
access.
(cherry picked from commit cd97e71084)
Bug: 34980020
Test: build Marlin policy
Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc
/data/misc/zoneinfo is provided by libc and is considered to be
VNDK stable. Grant read access to all domains and exempt from
neverallow rules asserting no vendor access to core data types.
Bug: 36730929
Test: Marlin Policy builds
Change-Id: I13766a661d6314f5393639fc20f1ab55d802f35f
This futher restricts neverallows for sockets which may be exposed as
filesystem nodes. This is achieved by labelling all such sockets
created by core/non-vendor domains using the new coredomain_socket
attribute, and then adding neverallow rules targeting that attribute.
This has now effect on what domains are permitted to do. This only
changes neverallow rules.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36577153
(cherry picked from commit cf2ffdf0d8)
Change-Id: Iffeee571a2ff61fb9515fa6849d060649636524e
This tightens neverallows for looking up Binder servicemanager
services from vendor components. In particular, vendor components,
other than apps, are not permitted to look up any Binder services.
Vendor apps are permitted to look up only stable public API services
which is exactly what non-vendor apps are permitted to use as well.
If we permitted vendor apps to use non-stable/hidden Binder services,
they might break when core components get updated without updating
vendor components.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I47d40d5d42cf4205d9e4e5e5f9d0794104efc28f
