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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tri Vo
73d0a67b06 sepolicy for ashmemd
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.

Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.

Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
2019-02-05 21:38:14 +00:00
Martijn Coenen
e0bbb9f85a Add more neverallows to app_zygote policy.
The app_zygote should never use any unix sockets, except the
logd socket and some sockets only available on userdebug/eng.

Prevent it from using ptrace.

Bug: 111434506
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic47cfca51fba0b150a136194ba0e4a8a488c9996
2019-01-24 20:27:54 +00:00
Martijn Coenen
1bbda7e662 Initial sepolicy for app_zygote.
The application zygote is a new sort of zygote process that is a
child of the regular zygote. Each application zygote is tied to the
application for which it's launched. Once it's started, it will
pre-load some of the code for that specific application, much like
the regular zygote does for framework code.

Once the application zygote is up and running, it can spawn
isolated service processes that run in the isolated_app domain. These
services can then benefit from already having the relevant
application code and data pre-loaded.

The policy is largely the same as the webview_zygote domain,
however there are a few crucial points where the policy is different.

1) The app_zygote runs under the UID of the application that spawned
   it.
2) During app_zygote launch, it will call a callback that is
   controlled by the application, that allows the application to
   pre-load code and data that it thinks is relevant.

Especially point 2 is imporant: it means that untrusted code can run
in the app_zygote context. This context is severely limited, and the
main concern is around the setgid/setuid capabilities. Those conerns
are mitigated by installing a seccomp filter that only allows
setgid/setuid to be called in a safe range.

Bug: 111434506
Test: app_zygote can start and fork children without denials.
Change-Id: I1cc49ee0042d41e5ac6eb81d8f8a10ba448d4832
2019-01-21 08:24:41 +00:00