Commit graph

37 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mark Salyzyn
3443cafa98 FrameworksServicesTests: allow access to test.sys.boot.reason property
com.android.server.power.PowerManagerServiceTest#testGetLastShutdownReasonInternal due to "RuntimeException: failed to set system property"

W/roidJUnitRunner: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { write } for name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=13178 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
W/libc    : Unable to set property "test.sys.boot.reason" to "shutdown,thermal": connection failed; errno=13 (Permission denied)

Had to use precise property definition as com.android.phone accesses
test properties as well.

Test: compile
Bug: 78245377
Change-Id: I2cc810846f8615f2a2fae8e0d4f41de585b7abd7
2018-05-04 07:33:56 -07:00
Jeffrey Vander Stoep
9c6749d772 Revert "FrameworksServicesTests: allow access to test.sys.boot.reason property"
This reverts commit 0ab13a8dff.

Reason for revert: broken presubmit tests
https://sponge.corp.google.com/target?show=FAILED&sortBy=STATUS&id=83e847b2-8e30-4417-9b15-8e66af4b2bc3&target=DeviceBootTest

Change-Id: Id173c8e7fa28ba04070f507098f301f076e4aae7
2018-05-04 06:23:42 +00:00
Mark Salyzyn
0ab13a8dff FrameworksServicesTests: allow access to test.sys.boot.reason property
com.android.server.power.PowerManagerServiceTest#testGetLastShutdownReasonInternal due to "RuntimeException: failed to set system property"

W/roidJUnitRunner: type=1400 audit(0.0:6): avc: denied { write } for name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=13178 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0
W/libc    : Unable to set property "test.sys.boot.reason" to "shutdown,thermal": connection failed; errno=13 (Permission denied)

Test: compile
Bug: 78245377
Change-Id: Id21436d281bab27823969a9f7e92318d70b5a2d6
2018-05-03 16:45:36 +00:00
Lalit Maganti
673b4db777 sepolicy: allow shell to read/write traced prop
This is to fix the CTS failures given by the bugs below where devices
where traced is not enabled by default causes test failures.

Bug: 78215159
Bug: 78347829
Change-Id: Ib0f6a1cdb770528dbbeb857368534ff5040e464e
2018-04-23 09:55:04 +00:00
Primiano Tucci
4f673cf4a9 Revert "Allow system server to set persist.traced.enable"
This reverts commit 6f2040f873.

Reason for revert: not needed anymore after ag/3773705
This was meant to allow system_server toggling the property on/off.
Later we realized that we needed a separate property for that 
(see discussion in b/76077784) and system server happens to
have already permissions to write to sys.* properties even without
this CL.
Reverting because at this point this creates just unnecessary clutter.

Change-Id: Ia73d000aad3c4288a5652047dfe10896e231b0b1
Test: perfetto_integrationtests
Bug: 76077784
2018-03-26 17:48:11 +00:00
Hector Dearman
6f2040f873 Allow system server to set persist.traced.enable
To enable/disable the traced and traced_probes deamons remotely we would
like system server to be able to set persist.traced.enable.
See also ag/3736001.

Denial:
selinux: avc: denied { set } for
property=persist.traced.enable
pid=1606 uid=1000 gid=1000
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:default_prop:s0 tclass=property_service
permissive=0\x0a

Run:
$ adb shell 'ps -A | grep traced'
Should see traced.
$ adb shell 'settings put global sys_traced 0'
$ adb shell 'ps -A | grep traced'
Should no longer see traced.

Test: See above.
Change-Id: I245b7df3853cabeb0e75db41fb4facaa178ab8f1
2018-03-19 15:48:50 +00:00
Jaekyun Seok
afca82a3bb Add default namespaces of odm properties
Since /odm is an extension of /vendor, its default property contexts
should be consistent with ones of /vendor.

Bug: 36796459
Test: tested on wahoo devices
Change-Id: Ia67ebe81e9c7102aab35a34f14738ed9a24811d3
2018-01-18 13:31:37 +09:00
Jaekyun Seok
f9d27887eb Fix TODOs of duplicate property names for prefix and exact matching
Duplicate property names are supported now for prefix and exact
matching.

Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: Ifd9d32eaece7370d69f121e88d5541f7a2e34458
2018-01-16 22:41:04 +00:00
Jaekyun Seok
e49714542e Whitelist exported platform properties
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.

Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.

Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.

Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
2018-01-10 16:15:25 +00:00
Calin Juravle
5316548f0d Revert "Revert "Put pm.* property in new pm_prop context""
This reverts commit 248b6dc644.

Reason for revert: The dashboard complains that devices don't boot after this revert.

Change-Id: I6a4648b64b096cbaa97c67aae6bc38b76d54cb48
2017-11-16 05:28:14 +00:00
Calin Juravle
248b6dc644 Revert "Put pm.* property in new pm_prop context"
This reverts commit d1cf3a4056.

Reason for revert: It breaks CTS b/69309298 and other platform tests which read pm.dexopt properties.

Change-Id: I5c7cde041113e9c19bb23218edd99f699fcf4a06
2017-11-15 22:11:35 +00:00
Victor Hsieh
d1cf3a4056 Put pm.* property in new pm_prop context
Test: system server does not crash with this change
Bug: 67415855
Bug: 63920015
Change-Id: I3d0982220743137098dbc683d5c4aded105648c2
2017-11-08 16:57:38 +00:00
Dan Cashman
91d398d802 Sync internal master and AOSP sepolicy.
Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb
2017-09-26 14:38:47 -07:00
Mark Salyzyn
006c2e9934 Switch /data/misc/reboot/last_reboot_reason to persistent property
Switch from /data/misc/reboot/last_reboot_reason to persistent
Android property persist.sys.boot.reason for indicating why the
device is rebooted or shutdown.

Introduce protection for all boot reason properties

Protect the following properties with these labels

ro.boot.bootreason      u:object_r:bootloader_boot_reason_prop:s0
sys.boot.reason         u:object_r:sys_boot_reason_prop:s0
persist.sys.boot.reason u:object_r:last_boot_reason_prop:s0

Setup the current as-need access rules for each.

ToDo: Remove u:object_r:reboot_data_file after internal fixes.

Test: system/core/bootstat/boot_reason_test.sh
Bug: 64687998
Change-Id: I3771c73933e8ae2d94aee936c7a38b6282611b80
2017-08-24 15:19:30 -07:00
Lorenzo Colitti
34bc175d4f Merge "Revert "Temporarily revert the SELinux policy for persist.netd.stable_secret.""
am: 580a0f2b98

Change-Id: Ibc29f16dac70c4c44ea4b1bfff5afcf513d2dbfa
2017-07-13 12:35:18 +00:00
Lorenzo Colitti
5b3efd3b36 Revert "Temporarily revert the SELinux policy for persist.netd.stable_secret."
This change must only be submitted when device-specific policies
have been reverted.

This reverts commit 07e631d2e0.

Bug: 17613910
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ie33e293107bf1eba2498f2422d941544c76b8cad
Merged-In: I356c39a5dc955b3d7c28d8c7baf2887a17beb272
2017-07-13 12:26:32 +00:00
Lorenzo Colitti
9822937597 Merge "Temporarily revert the SELinux policy for persist.netd.stable_secret."
am: c501c34523

Change-Id: I1b62a13240b49654fe8667909d23989d4651b37a
2017-07-12 00:19:41 +00:00
Lorenzo Colitti
07e631d2e0 Temporarily revert the SELinux policy for persist.netd.stable_secret.
This change did not make it into core sepolicy in time for O.
The revert allows devices to define these selinux policies in
vendor-specific sepolicy instead of core sepolicy. It is
necessary because:

1. It is too late to change property_contexts in O.
2. Adding the netd_stable_secret prop to vendor sepolicy results
   in a duplicate definition error at compile time.
3. Defining a new vendor-specific context (such as
   net_stable_secret_vendor_prop) and applying it to
   persist.netd.stable_secret results in the device not booting
   due to attempting to apply two different contexts to the same
   property.

Lack of the sepolicy no longer breaks wifi connectivity now that
IpManager no longer considers failure to set the stable secret to
be a fatal error.

Once all interested devices have adopted the vendor sepolicy,
this policy can safely be reinstated by reverting said vendor
sepolicies in internal master.

This reverts commit abb1ba6532.

Bug: 17613910
Test: bullhead builds, boots, connects to wifi
Change-Id: Idffcf78491171c54bca9f93cb920eab9b1c47709
2017-07-11 02:46:40 +09:00
Joel Scherpelz
14a3cb2848 SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage am: abb1ba6532
am: 5ee87b0092

Change-Id: Id2dc995f88a60fe865387453234e3630a9975381
2017-06-14 05:41:10 +00:00
Joel Scherpelz
abb1ba6532 SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage
This is used to persist RFC 7217 stable secrets across device reboots.

First submit caused a merge conflict. This revision replaces netd_prop
with a more unique name netd_stable_secret_prop.

Test: as follows
    - Manually tested that stable_secret is generated on first use and
      persists until reset of user data partition (factory reset).
    - Tested that "adb shell getprop" was denied access to
      persist.netd.stable_secret after running "adb unroot".
Bug: 17613910

Change-Id: I0a609c724799a15b1926e62534c16810d34f2275
2017-06-12 11:00:59 +09:00
Bartosz Fabianowski
0f52004b97 Revert "SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage" am: 06486796a4
am: edcfb2e10d

Change-Id: I86565448fa4d5ccd412772825decb5dc62cd6343
2017-06-08 18:53:36 +00:00
Bartosz Fabianowski
06486796a4 Revert "SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage"
This broke the build on master. See b/17613910#comment17
for details.

This reverts commit ef1fd98b6a.

Change-Id: I11f7d463061a9b6340c11827135586266e26f016
2017-06-08 10:57:55 +00:00
Joel Scherpelz
36efd0c454 SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage am: ef1fd98b6a
am: 9381cb3dce

Change-Id: I3ae9005ee76b51105ec215cefc5a81c25405c482
2017-06-08 07:51:19 +00:00
Joel Scherpelz
ef1fd98b6a SELinux policy for secure persistent netd storage
This is used to persist RFC 7217 stable secrets across device reboots.

Test: as follows
    - Manually tested that stable_secret is generated on first use and
      persists until reset of user data partition (factory reset).
    - Tested that "adb shell getprop" was denied access to
      persist.netd.stable_secret after running "adb unroot".
Bug: 17613910

Change-Id: I4dad00fb189d697aceaffae49ad63987c7e45054
2017-06-08 15:07:57 +09:00
Andreas Gampe
82071b6859 Sepolicy: Add ASAN-Extract
Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.

Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b74305011)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
2017-04-05 13:09:29 -07:00
Steven Moreland
f20c6ee7ab Remove hal_binderization_prop
Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6
2017-04-04 10:24:36 -07:00
Steven Moreland
d40474ec55 Remove hal_binderization_prop
Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6
2017-04-04 09:46:45 -07:00
Keun-young Park
f67c346af4 make ro.persistent_properties.ready accessible for hidl client
- compared to ro.boottime, this one does not pass time info

bug: 35178781
bug: 34274385
Test: reboot

Change-Id: I6a7bf636a3f201653e2890751d5fa210274c9ede
2017-03-01 12:31:04 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
4e404290e4 Move net.dns* to it's own label.
Move net.dns* from net_radio_prop to the newly created label
net_dns_prop. This allows finer grain control over this specific
property.

Prior to this change, this property was readable to all SELinux domains,
and writable by the following SELinux domains:

  * system_server
  * system_app (apps which run as UID=system)
  * netmgrd
  * radio

This change:

1) Removes read access to this property to everyone EXCEPT untrusted_app
and system_server.
2) Limit write access to system_server.

In particular, this change removes read access to priv_apps. Any
priv_app which ships with the system should not be reading this
property.

Bug: 34115651
Test: Device boots, wifi turns on, no problems browsing the internet
Change-Id: I8a32e98c4f573d634485c4feac91baa35d021d38
2017-02-09 16:14:05 -08:00
Steven Moreland
cd597cd52a property: add persist.hal.binderization
- Added set_prop to shell so that you can set it from shell.
- Added set_prop to sytem_app so that it can be updated in settings.

Bug: 34256441
Test: can update prop from Settings and shell. nfc and lights work with
ag/1833821 with persist.hal.binderization set to on and off. There are
no additional selinux denials.
Change-Id: I883ca489093c1d56b2efa725c58e6e3f3b81c3aa
2017-01-26 06:06:24 +00:00
Alex Klyubin
6e4508e625 Restrict access to Bluetooth system properties
This removes access to Bluetooth system properties from arbitrary
SELinux domains. Access remains granted to init, bluetooth, and
system_app domains. neverallow rules / CTS enforce that access is not
granted to Zygote and processes spawned from Zygote expcept for
system_app and bluetooth.

The reason is that some of these properties may leak persistent
identifiers not resettable by the user.

Test: Bluetooth pairing and data transfer works
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: Icdcb3927a423c4011a62942340a498cc1b302472
2016-12-27 18:08:13 -08:00
Alex Klyubin
062236a8c9 Remove access to ro.runtime.firstboot from apps
ro.runtime.firstboot system property is only used internally by
system_server to distinguish between first start after boot from
consecutive starts (for example, this happens when full-disk
encryption is enabled). The value of the property is a
millisecond-precise timestamp which can help track individual
device. Thus apps should not have access to this property.

Test: Device boots fine, reading ro.runtime.firstboot from an app results in an error and SELinux denial.
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I4c3c26a35c5dd840bced3a3e53d071f45317f63c
2016-12-27 14:18:47 -08:00
Alex Klyubin
20151072a7 Restrict access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno
This restricts access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno, the two
system properties which contain the device's serial number, to a
select few SELinux domains which need the access. In particular, this
removes access to these properties from Android apps. Apps can access
the serial number via the public android.os.Build API. System
properties are not public API for apps.

The reason for the restriction is that serial number is a globally
unique identifier which cannot be reset by the user. Thus, it can be
used as a super-cookie by apps. Apps need to wean themselves off of
identifiers not resettable by the user.

Test: Set up fresh GMS device, install some apps via Play, update some apps, use Chrome
Test: Access the device via ADB (ADBD exposes serial number)
Test: Enable MTP over USB, use mtp-detect to confirm that serial number is reported in MTP DeviceInfo
Bug: 31402365
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I4713133b8d78dbc63d8272503e80cd2ffd63a2a7
2016-12-22 11:38:29 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
bb9a388840 Assign a label to the ro.boottime.* properties
system/core commit 331cf2fb7c16b5b25064f8d2f00284105a9b413f created a
number of new properties of the form:

  [ro.boottime.init]: [5294587604]
  [ro.boottime.InputEventFind]: [10278767840]
  [ro.boottime.adbd]: [8359267180]
  ...

These properties were assigned the default_prop SELinux label because a
better label did not exist. Properties labeled with the default_prop
label are readable to any SELinux domain, which is overly broad.

  bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
  u:object_r:default_prop:s0

Instead, create a new label for the ro.boottime.* properties so we can
apply more fine grain read access control to these properties.

  bullhead:/ $ getprop -Z ro.boottime.adbd
  u:object_r:boottime_prop:s0

New SELinux property labels have minimal permissions by default. As a
result, after this change, ro.boottime.* properties will only be
readable to system_server, bootstat, init (because it manages the property
space), and "adb root" (because no SELinux permissions are enforced there).

Additional read access can be granted as-needed.

This is part of a larger effort to implement fine-grain access control
on the properties managed by init.

Test: Device boots and no SELinux denials on boot.
Change-Id: Ibf981cb81898f4356fdc5c1b6f15dd93c0d6d84d
2016-12-14 13:45:01 -08:00
Nick Kralevich
ee751c33c5 property.te: delete security_prop
This property is never used.

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I43ace92950e1221754db28548031fbbfc0437d7a
2016-11-11 12:31:19 -08:00
Jason Monk
0e1cbf568a Add persist.vendor.overlay. to properties
Allow the system_server to change. Allow the zygote to read it as well.

Test: Have system_server set a property
Change-Id: Ie90eec8b733fa7193861026a3a6e0fb0ba5d5318
2016-11-10 17:35:39 -05:00
dcashman
cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00
Renamed from property_contexts (Browse further)