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16 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thiébaud Weksteen
9ec532752d Add fusefs_type for FUSE filesystems
Any FUSE filesystem will receive the 'fuse' type when mounted. It is
possible to change this behaviour by specifying the "context=" or
"fscontext=" option in mount().

Because 'fuse' has historically been used only for the emulated storage,
it also received the 'sdcard_type' attribute. Replace the 'sdcard_type'
attribute from 'fuse' with the new 'fusefs_type'. This attribute can be
attached on derived types (such as app_fusefs).

This change:
- Remove the neverallow restriction on this new type. This means any
  custom FUSE implementation can be mounted/unmounted (if the correct
  allow rule is added). See domain.te.
- Change the attribute of 'fuse' from 'sdcard_type' to 'fusefs_type'.
  See file.te.
- Modify all references to 'sdcard_type' to explicitly include 'fuse'
  for compatibility reason.

Bug: 177481425
Bug: 190804537
Test: Build and boot aosp_cf_x86_64_phone-userdebug
Change-Id: Id4e410a049f72647accd4c3cf43eaa55e94c318f
2021-06-28 13:18:46 +02:00
Marco Ballesio
aa4ce95c6f sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy
Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes

This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.

Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
2021-02-11 23:40:38 +00:00
Marco Ballesio
aa8bb3a29b Revert^3 "sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy"
a54bed6907

Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery

Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
2021-02-04 22:33:14 +00:00
Marco Ballesio
a54bed6907 Revert^2 "sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy"
51c04ac27b

Change-Id: Idc35a84b5faabfb9bdd7a7693f51b11938eb0489
2021-01-27 06:07:48 +00:00
Jonglin Lee
51c04ac27b Revert "sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy"
Revert submission 1511692-cgroup v2 uid/pid hierarchy

Reason for revert: Causing intermittent cgroup kernel panics
Reverted Changes:
I80c2a069b:sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy
I73f3e767d:libprocessgroup: uid/pid hierarchy for cgroup v2

Bug: 174776875
Change-Id: I63a03bb43d87c9aa564b1436a45fd5ec023aac87
Test: Locally reverted and booted 100 times without kernel panic
2020-12-04 03:12:59 +00:00
Marco Ballesio
f46d7a26c1 sepolicy: rules for uid/pid cgroups v2 hierarchy
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.

Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files

Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
2020-11-30 11:46:14 -08:00
Paul Crowley
04023ade9a Move layout_version to /data/misc/installd
Bug: 139543295
Test: Boot, ensure file is properly created
Change-Id: I577b25bcf61505970b153884d8ac3567957bb50a
2019-08-21 10:11:35 -07:00
Florian Mayer
4ab64c940f Relabel /data/system/packages.list to new type.
Conservatively grant access to packages_list_file to everything that had
access to system_data_file:file even if the comment in the SELinux
policy suggests it was for another use.

Ran a diff on the resulting SEPolicy, the only difference of domains
being granted is those that had system_data_file:dir permissiosn which
is clearly not applicable for packages.list

diff -u0 <(sesearch --allow -t system_data_file ~/sepolicy | sed 's/system_data_file/packages_list_file/') <(sesearch --allow -t packages_list_file ~/sepolicy_new)
--- /proc/self/fd/16	2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000
+++ /proc/self/fd/18	2019-03-19 20:01:44.378409146 +0000
@@ -3 +2,0 @@
-allow appdomain packages_list_file:dir getattr;
@@ -6 +4,0 @@
-allow coredomain packages_list_file:dir getattr;
@@ -8 +5,0 @@
-allow domain packages_list_file:dir search;
@@ -35 +31,0 @@
-allow system_server packages_list_file:dir { rename search setattr read lock create reparent getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -40 +35,0 @@
-allow tee packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open };
@@ -43,3 +37,0 @@
-allow traced_probes packages_list_file:dir { read getattr open search };
-allow vendor_init packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read create getattr write relabelfrom ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
-allow vold packages_list_file:dir { search setattr read lock create getattr mounton write ioctl rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -48 +39,0 @@
-allow vold_prepare_subdirs packages_list_file:dir { read write relabelfrom rmdir remove_name open add_name };
@@ -50 +40,0 @@
-allow zygote packages_list_file:dir { search read lock getattr ioctl open };

Bug: 123186697

Change-Id: Ieabf313653deb5314872b63cd47dadd535af7b07
2019-03-28 10:27:43 +00:00
Nick Kralevich
5e37271df8 Introduce system_file_type
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.

Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.

Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
2018-09-27 12:52:09 -07:00
Benjamin Gordon
342362ae3e sepolicy: grant dac_read_search to domains with dac_override
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks.  Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission.  Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.

Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
2018-09-19 15:54:37 -06:00
Benjamin Gordon
9b2e0cbeea sepolicy: Add rules for non-init namespaces
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.

This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.

This is essentially:
  1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
     that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
     respectively.
  2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
  3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
  4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
     so that it covers all capabilities.  This set was used by several
     neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
     classes are still appropriate.

Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
      only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
      Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831

Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
2017-11-21 08:34:32 -07:00
Dan Cashman
91d398d802 Sync internal master and AOSP sepolicy.
Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb
2017-09-26 14:38:47 -07:00
Jeff Vander Stoep
76aab82cb3 Move domain_deprecated into private policy
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.

Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
      permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
2017-05-15 13:37:59 -07:00
Jeff Vander Stoep
a1b4560088 Remove logspam
Grant observed uses of permissions being audited in domain_deprecated.

fsck
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

keystore
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

sdcardd
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532412 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for name="hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

vold
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: Marlin builds and boots, avc granted messages no longer observed.
Bug: 35197529
Change-Id: Iae34ae3b9e22ba7550cf7d45dc011ab043e63424
2017-02-10 12:06:38 -08:00
Daniel Rosenberg
df59b9f9f1 Allow sdcardd to remount sdcardfs
Sdcardfs now supports bind mounts and remounts
instead of needing several separate mounts

bug: 30954918
Test: Enable Sdcardfs, verify mounts
Change-Id: Id94713752a08ceeb6aea7d3c29a29d3293a9b0c8
2016-11-28 16:10:27 -08:00
dcashman
cc39f63773 Split general policy into public and private components.
Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
2016-10-06 13:09:06 -07:00
Renamed from sdcardd.te (Browse further)