Data outside of /data/vendor should have the core_data_file_type.
Exempt data_between_core_and_vendor for some types.
Ensure core_data_file_type and coredomain_socket do not get expanded
to their underlying types.
Test: build sepolicy for all targets in master (this is a build time
test)
Bug: 34980020
Change-Id: I59387a87875f4603a001fb03f22fa31cae84bf5a
(cherry picked from commit bdd454792d)
Data outside of /data/vendor should have the core_data_file_type.
Exempt data_between_core_and_vendor for some types.
Ensure core_data_file_type and coredomain_socket do not get expanded
to their underlying types.
Test: build sepolicy for all targets in master (this is a build time
test)
Bug: 34980020
Change-Id: I59387a87875f4603a001fb03f22fa31cae84bf5a
We use this attribute to annotate coredomains that execute vendor code
in a Treble-violating way.
Bug: 62041836
Test: sepolicy builds
Change-Id: Ie6052209b3901eaad8496b8fc9681421d7ee3c1c
As part of Treble, enforce that the communication between platform
and vendor components use the official hw binder APIs. Prevent sharing
of data by file path. Platform and vendor components may share
files, but only via FD passed over hw binder.
This change adds the violators attribute that will be used to mark
violating domains that need to be fixed.
Bug: 34980020
Test: build
Change-Id: Id9acfbbc86bfd6fd0633b8164a37ce94d25ffa2c
Same-process HALs are forbidden except for very specific HALs that have
been provided and whitelisted by AOSP. As a result, a vendor extension
HAL may have a need to be accessed by untrusted_app. This is still
discouraged, and the existing AOSP hwservices are still forbidden, but
remove the blanket prohibition. Also indicate that this is temporary,
and that partners should expect to get exceptions to the rule into AOSP
in the future.
Bug: 62806062
Test: neverallow-only change builds. Verify new attribute is in policy.
Change-Id: I6d3e659147d509a3503c2c9e0b6bb9016cc75832
Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks for the Tether Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.
Bug: 38417260
Test: New functionality. So we don't have any tests.
Change-Id: I2c95b290523c55c081afa1bca091f368559c9125
(cherry picked from commit 722249b3e8)
Update SE Policy to allow calls to and callbacks from Wifi Offload HAL
HIDL binderized service.
Combined cherry pick from d56aa1982d15acfc2408271138dac43f1e5dc987
and 66e27bf502
Bug: 32842314
Test: Unit tests, Mannual test to ensure Wifi can be brought up and
connected to an AP, ensure that Offload HAL service is running and that
that wificond can get the service handle by calling hwservicemanager.
Change-Id: I0fc51a4152f1891c8d88967e75d45ded115e766e
This hidl service provides information about vsync and hotplug
to vendor services which is required by at least some camera
hal implementations.
Test: VtsFwkDisplayServiceV1_0TargetTest
Test: no denials
Bug: 38311538
Change-Id: I64f0321e2832facf987057f0d48940e269d8e2d9
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.
Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
Sensord move in ag/2106763 should be accompanied by corresponding
sepolicy move of sensord-related files/declarations.
Bug: 36996994
Test: Sailfish build shows no related permission errors
Change-Id: Ibe41b363f7ca2752b5d3e0961298985cf784663d
Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.
Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).
Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to
arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the
attack surface. The reason is twofold:
1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it
did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of
apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for
authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that
a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to
perform operations offered by the service.
2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with
higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core
components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way
down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the
Android security model.
HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor
components) are considered safer because of point #2 above.
Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are
considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs
by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its
client already as, because these services run in the process of the
client.
This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services
in neverallow rules.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d
Temporary attribute (checked against in CTS) to point out vendor
processes that run /system executables. These are currently only down to
2-3 of them that are related to telephony on sailfish
Bug: 36463595
Test: Build succeeds for sailfish
Test: ./cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForVendorExecutingCore \
--skip-device-info --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a
Change-Id: I9eb40ad259aefba73869d6a1b40186d33fa475dd
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.
Following directories will remain world readable
/vendor/etc
/vendor/lib(64)/hw/
Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
/vendor/app
/vendor/framework/
/vendor/overlay
Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.
Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803
All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass
Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Wifi Keystore HAL is a HwBinder service (currently offered by keystore
daemon) which is used by Wifi Supplicant HAL. This commit thus
switches the SELinux policy of Wifi Keystore HAL to the approach used
for non-HAL HwBinder services.
The basic idea is simimilar to how we express Binder services in the
policy, with two tweaks: (1) we don't have 'hwservicemanager find' and
thus there's no add_hwservice macro, and (2) we need loosen the
coupling between core and vendor components. For example, it should be
possible to move a HwBinder service offered by a core component into
another core component, without having to update the SELinux policy of
the vendor image. We thus annotate all components offering HwBinder
service x across the core-vendor boundary with x_server, which enables
the policy of clients to contain rules of the form:
binder_call(mydomain, x_server), and, if the service uses IPC
callbacks, also binder_call(x_server, mydomain).
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: sesearch indicates to changes to binder { call transfer} between
keystore and hal_wifi_supplicant_default domains
Bug: 36896667
Change-Id: I45c4ce8159b63869d7bb6df5c812c5291776d892
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
ioctl/stat/read/write/append.
This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute
coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute
core_data_file_type.
A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on
access.
(cherry picked from commit cd97e71084)
Bug: 34980020
Test: build Marlin policy
Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc
