Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b
We simplified the way we track whether or not a dex file is used by
other apps. DexManager in the framework keeps track of the data and we
no longer need file markers on disk.
Test: device boots, foreign dex markers are not created anymore
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I464ed6b09439cf0342020ee07596f9aa8ae53b62
untrusted_v2_app is basically a refinement of untrusted_app with legacy
capabilities removed and potentially backwards incompatible changes.
This is not currently hooked up to anything.
Bug: 33350220
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic9fad57476bc2b6022b1eaca8667bf6d844753c2
Motivation:
Provide the ability to phase in new security policies by
applying them to apps with a minimum targetSdkVersion.
Place untrusted apps with targetSdkVersion<=25 into the
untrustd_app_25 domain. Apps with targetSdkVersion>=26 are placed
into the untrusted_app domain. Common rules are included in the
untrusted_app_all attribute. Apps with a more recent targetSdkVersion
are granted fewer permissions.
Test: Marlin builds and boots. Apps targeting targetSdkVersion<=25
run in untrusted_app_25 domain. Apps targeting the current development
build >=26 run in the untrusted_app domain with fewer permissions. No
new denials observed during testing.
Bug: 34115651
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: Ie6a015566fac07c44ea06c963c40793fcdc9a083
The implementation for NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed from the kernel in commit
d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84 ("netfilter: remove ip_queue
support") circa Linux 3.5. Unless we need to retain compatibility
for kernels < 3.5, we can drop these classes from the policy altogether.
Possibly the neverallow rule in app.te should be augmented to include
the newer netlink security classes, similar to webview_zygote, but
that can be a separate change.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: Iab9389eb59c96772e5fa87c71d0afc86fe99bb6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The neverallows in untrusted_app will all apply equally to ephemeral app
and any other untrusted app domains we may add, so this moves them to a
dedicated separate file.
This also removes the duplicate rules from isolated_app.te and ensures
that all the untrusted_app neverallows also apply to isolated_app.
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ib38e136216ccbe5c94daab732b7ee6acfad25d0b
