Commit graph

9 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Steven Moreland
7baf725ea6 mediacodec->mediacodec+hal_omx{,_server,_client}
(breaks vendor blobs, will have to be regenerated
after this CL)

This moves mediacodec to vendor so it is replaced with
hal_omx_server. The main benefit of this is that someone
can create their own implementation of mediacodec without
having to alter the one in the tree. mediacodec is still
seccomp enforced by CTS tests.

Fixes: 36375899
Test: (sanity) YouTube
Test: (sanity) camera pics + video
Test: check for denials
Change-Id: I31f91b7ad6cd0a891a1681ff3b9af82ab400ce5e
2018-05-30 18:12:32 +00:00
Jeff Tinker
e1a7190f51 Allow default drm hal to access allocator hal
This fixes failing vts drm tests

bug:67675811

Test:vts-tradefed run commandAndExit vts -m VtsHalDrmV1_0Target
Change-Id: I2f7e1c97e8c70fc312ca3c2c901f0a9607b05e83
2018-01-03 23:44:05 +00:00
Alex Klyubin
20c2d4e98c Remove unnecessary attributes
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 34980020

(cherry picked from commit 3cc6a95944)

Change-Id: I64c7275551e8e27d68072e8ec38c07b539989da0
2017-04-14 09:39:19 -07:00
Sandeep Patil
2ee66e7d14 sepolicy: make exec_types in /vendor a subset of vendor_file_type
We install all default hal implementations in /vendor/bin/hw along with
a few domains that are defined in vendor policy and installed in
/vendor. These files MUST be a subset of the global 'vendor_file_type'
which is used to address *all files installed in /vendor* throughout the
policy.

Bug: 36463595
Test: Boot sailfish without any new denials

Change-Id: I3d26778f9a26f9095f49d8ecc12f2ec9d2f4cb41
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
2017-04-11 17:20:36 +00:00
Alex Klyubin
0f6c047d2e tee domain is a vendor domain
As a result, Keymaster and DRM HALs are permitted to talk to tee domain
over sockets. Unfortunately, the tee domain needs to remain on the
exemptions list because drmserver, mediaserver, and surfaceflinger are
currently permitted to talk to this domain over sockets.

We need to figure out why global policy even defines a TEE domain...

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36601092
Bug: 36601602
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266
Change-Id: I0b95e23361204bd046ae5ad22f9f953c810c1895
2017-03-29 13:13:27 -07:00
Jeff Vander Stoep
4a478c47f4 Ban vendor components access to core data types
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open file:
stat/read/write/append.

This commit marks core data types as core_data_file_type and bans
access to non-core domains with an exemption for apps. A temporary
exemption is also granted to domains that currently rely on
access with TODOs and bug number for each exemption.

Bug: 34980020
Test: Build and boot Marlin. Make phone call, watch youtube video.
      No new denials observed.
Change-Id: I320dd30f9f0a5bf2f9bb218776b4bccdb529b197
2017-03-28 15:44:39 -07:00
Alex Klyubin
2746ae6822 Ban socket connections between core and vendor
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (coredomain) and
vendor domain are not permitted to connect to each other's sockets.
There are two main exceptions: (1) apps are permitted to talk to other
apps over Unix domain sockets (this is public API in Android
framework), and (2) domains with network access (netdomain) are
permitted to connect to netd.

This commit thus:
* adds neverallow rules restricting socket connection establishment,
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
  rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
  "socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute
  is needed because the types corresponding to violators are not
  exposed to the public policy where the neverallow rules are.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36613996
Change-Id: I458f5a09a964b06ad2bddb52538ec3a15758b003
2017-03-27 08:49:13 -07:00
Alex Klyubin
9b718c409f Switch DRM HAL policy to _client/_server
This switches DRM HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of DRM HAL.

Domains which are clients of DRM HAL, such as mediadrmserver domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_drm only when the DRM HAL runs in
passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the HAL
runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting hal_drm
are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of DRM HAL, such as
hal_drm_default domain, are always granted rules targeting hal_drm.

Test: Play movie using Google Play Movies
Test: Play movie using Netflix
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I3ab0e84818ccd61e54b90f7ade3509b7dbf86fb9
2017-02-17 15:36:41 -08:00
Alex Klyubin
ac1a6d440c Move hal_*_default policy to vendor image
hal_*_default daemons whose policy is in common/device-agnostic policy
are provided by the vendor image (see vendor/file_contexts). Thus,
their policy should also reside in the vendor image, rather than in
the system image. This means their policy should live in the vendor
subdirectory of this project.

Test: Device boots and appears to work
Bug: 34135607
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I6613e43733e03d4a3d4726f849732d903e024016
2017-02-14 18:35:50 -08:00
Renamed from private/hal_drm_default.te (Browse further)