Anything writable by rild should be in radio_data_file or efs_file.
System data should be read-only.
Change-Id: I442a253c22f567a147d0591d623e97a6ee8b76e3
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Audit attempts by rild to create/write to system_data_file
with avc: granted messages so that we can identify any such
instances and put such directories/files into radio_data_file or
some other type and then remove these rules.
Change-Id: Ice20fed1733a3f4208d541a4baaa8b6c6f44fbb0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Move the rild domain into SELinux enforcing mode. This will
start enforcing SELinux rules; security policy violations will
return EPERM.
Change-Id: Iadb51616ecf6f56148ce076d47f04511810de94c
Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.
Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.
For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.
Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.
This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.
Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.
Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.
This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.
Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.
Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
Assortment of policy changes include:
* Bluetooth domain to talk to init and procfs.
* New device node domains.
* Allow zygote to talk to its executable.
* Update system domain access to new device node domains.
* Create a post-process sepolicy with dontaudits removed.
* Allow rild to use the tty device.
Change-Id: Ibb96b590d0035b8f6d1606cd5e4393c174d10ffb
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
Two new types are introduced:
sdcard_internal
sdcard_external
The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute
sdcard_type is introduced.
The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for
controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external
sdcards.
Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
New property_contexts file for property selabel backend.
New property.te file with property type declarations.
New property_service security class and set permission.
Allow rules for setting properties.
