More historical context in http://b/18504118
This also adds an auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can
delete it once no logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule
triggering.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I5729b89af83090e6e31c012c8acb0f0114c87d3d
This also adds an auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can
delete it once no logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule
triggerring.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I554e0cb00a53fd254c450c20e6c632e58472c3c8
This also adds an auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can
delete it once no logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule
triggerring.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I57f887e96d721ca69a7228df0a75515596776778
Mark tethering_service as app_api_service to allow applications to find
tethering service. Apps should able to use tethering service to
know tethering state if they have ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission, but
they may need privileged permission if they want to change tethering.
Bug: 144320246
Test: -build, flash, boot
-ON/OFF hotspot
Change-Id: Ie414618766144c4a4ad89c5cf03398a472638e71
Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
These denials are not helpful, are not the cause of a problem,
spam the logs, and cause presubmit flakes. Suppress them.
Bug: 145267097
Test: build
Change-Id: If87b9683e5694fced96a81747b1baf85ef6b2124
Looking at go/sedenials, we have learnt a lot of other priv-apps rely on
this permission. The auditallow has served its purpose and can now be
removed.
Bug: 142672293
Test: Treehugger
Change-Id: Iba81773b223d2bddbd32a0594c5aa01829252847
From go/sedenials, we see that com.android.vending needs this
permission. The auditallow was in place to see if any priv-apps other
than GMS core need this, and now we know.
Bug: 142672293
Test: Treehugger
Change-Id: Iad6caeb648bc23e85571b758a35649924cdeec69
This is needed to debug native crashes within the gmscore app.
Now that GMS core is running in gmscore_app and not in the priv_app
domain, we need this rule for the new domain. This also adds an
auditallow to the same rule for priv_app, so we can delete it once no
logs show up in go/sedenials for this rule triggerring.
Bug: 142672293
Test: TH
Change-Id: I7d28bb5df1a876d0092758aff321e62fa2979694
We've moved GMS core to its own domain, and these permissions should be
removed from the priv_app domain. This change adds auditallow to these
permissions so we know if it's safe to check if any other privapps are
relying on these.
Bug: 142672293
Test: Green builds
Change-Id: I35402f1166a0edf8e001d894413f470c090c7b57
This is needed to get Java heap graphs.
Test: flash aosp; profile system_server with setenforce 1
Bug: 136210868
Change-Id: I87dffdf28d09e6ce5f706782422510c615521ab3
Since this service no longer exists.
Fix: 80317992
Test: TH, codesearch.
Merged-In: I257c8cc3dba657d98f19eb61b36aae147afea393
Change-Id: I257c8cc3dba657d98f19eb61b36aae147afea393
and allow shell and system_app (Settings) to set it to enable Dynamic System Update.
Also allow priv_app (user of the API) to read it.
Bug: 119647479
Bug: 129060539
Test: run the following command on crosshatch-user:
adb shell setprop persist.sys.fflag.override.settings_dynamic_system 1
Change-Id: I24a5382649c64d36fd05a59bc87faca87e6f0eb8
Merged-In: I24a5382649c64d36fd05a59bc87faca87e6f0eb8
Previously we dumped the data into dropbox. This improves a couple
things:
- We write into dropbox via the fd, so dropbox doesn't pull from the
incidentd directory anymore.
- There is a new API to for priv apps to explicitly read incident
reports. That gives incidentd finer grained control over who can
read it (specifically, it only allows apps to access the incident
reports they requested, or were requested for them via statsd,
instead of getting DUMP and reading whatever they want from
dropbox).
Test: bit incident_test:* GtsIncidentManagerTestCases:*
Bug: 123543706
Change-Id: I9a323e372c4ff95d91419a61e8a20ea5a3a860a5
No semantic changes. Just trying to make this easier to understand:
- Separate out common bundles of services from individual services
(the naming doesn't make this obvious).
- Comment the common ones.
- Put related binder_call and service_manager:find rules together.
Test: Builds
Change-Id: Iba4a85a464da032e35450abff0febcdcf433df48
Allow all the app process with GUI to send GPU health metrics stats to
GpuService during the GraphicsEnvironment setup stage for the process.
Bug: 123529932
Test: Build, flash and boot. No selinux denials.
Change-Id: Ic7687dac3c8a3ea43fa744a6ae8a45716951c4df
Untrustworthy symlinks dereferenced by priv-apps could cause those apps
to access files they weren't intending to access. Trusted components
such as priv-apps should never trust untrustworthy symlinks from
untrusted apps.
Modify the rules and add a neverallow assertion to prevent regressions.
Bug: 123350324
Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: I8c4a5c9c8571fd29b2844b20b4fd1126db4128c0
This patch extends the current debug-specific rules to cover user
builds. As a reminder, on user, the target process fork-execs a private
heapprofd process, which then performs stack unwinding & talking to the
central tracing daemon while staying in the target's domain. The central
heapprofd daemon is only responsible for identifying targets & sending
the activation signal. On the other hand, on debug, the central
heapprofd can handle all processes directly, so the necessary SELinux
capabilities depend on the build type.
These rules are necessary but not sufficient for profiling. For zygote
children, the libc triggering logic will also check for the app to
either be debuggable, or go/profileable.
For more context, see go/heapprofd-security & go/heapprofd-design.
Note that I've had to split this into two separate macros, as
exec_no_trans - which is necessary on user, but nice-to-have on debug -
conflicts with a lot of neverallows (e.g. HALs and system_server) for
the wider whitelisting that we do on debug builds.
Test: built & flashed on {blueline-userdebug, blueline-user}, activated profiling of whitelisted/not domains & checked for lack of denials in logcat.
Bug: 120409382
Change-Id: Id0defc3105b99f777bcee2046d9894a2b39c6a29
system/sepolicy commit 23c9d91b46
introduced a new type called privapp_data_file. This type is used to
label priv-app's /home files. For backwards compatibility, priv-app
rules involving normal app_data_files were preserved. Subsequently,
system/sepolicy commit 5d1755194a
assigned the file label privapp_data_file to /home files owned
by priv-apps.
Because of the previous labeling of priv-app data files, priv-apps were
granted the ability to mmap(PROT_EXEC) any other app's /home files,
regardless of how trustworthy or untrustworthy those files were. Commit
23c9d91b46 preserved the status quo.
However, now that we have a more refined label for priv-app /home files,
we no longer need to be as permissive.
Drop the ability for priv-apps to map executable code from
untrusted_apps home directories. "execute" is removed in this change,
and "execute_no_trans" was previously removed in commit
8fb4cb8bc2. Add a neverallow assertion
(compile time assertion + CTS test) to prevent regressions.
Further clarify why we need to support priv-apps loading executable code
from their own home directories, at least for now. b/112037137 covers
further tightening we can do in this area.
Bug: 112357170
Test: Device boots and no problems.
Change-Id: Ia6a9eb4c2ed8a02ad45644d025181ba3c8424cda
Remove most of /proc/net access for priv_apps. Files in /proc/net leak
unique device identifiers and side channel information about other app's
network connections.
Access for most third party applications was removed in commit
d78e07cbb7. This change applies the same
constraints to priv-apps that we apply to normal apps.
Bug: 114475727
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: I5c41ba57fcd6b81d72c4f3a40b310d2188fc79c3
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Changes from original aosp/692189 which was reverted:
- There seem to be spurious denials from vendor-specific apps. So added
back access from { appdomain -all_untrusted_apps -priv_app } to cgroup.
Audit this access with intent to write explicit per-domain rules for it.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
This reverts commit cacea25ed0.
Change-Id: I05ab404f348a864e8409d811346c8a0bf49bc47a
This reverts commit 9899568f6c.
Reason for revert: Reports of high numbers of SELinux denials
showing up on the SELinux dashboard.
Bug: 110043362
Change-Id: Id8fc260c47ffd269ac2f15ff7dab668c959e3ab0
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
Change-Id: I9e441b26792f1edb1663c660bcff422ec7a6332b
In the next Android release, there will be devices that have no
xt_qtaguid module at all and framework and netd will decide which code
path it takes for trafficStats depending on the device setup. So all
apps and services should not depend on this device specific
implementation anymore and use public API for the data they need.
Bug: 114475331
Bug: 79938294
Test: QtaguidPermissionTest
Change-Id: I0d37b2df23782eefa2e8977c6cdbf9210db3e0d2
DropboxManager may pass FDs to any app with the READ_LOGS
permission which is available to all apps as a development
permission.
Test: atest CtsIncidentHostTestCases
Fixes: 111856304
Change-Id: I329e3125dab83de948b860061df9d232e31cb23e
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
The recommended solution is to not access encrypted storage until
after the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered.
Test: build
Fixes: 72811052
Fixes: 72550646
Change-Id: I80eb743e26047b7864de983c5a46c28b6f753a59
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
Create a new label for /data/system/dropbox, and neverallow direct
access to anything other than init and system_server.
While all apps may write to the dropbox service, only apps with
android.permission.READ_LOGS, a signature|privileged|development
permission, may read them. Grant access to priv_app, system_app,
and platform_app, and neverallow access to all untrusted_apps.
Bug: 31681871
Test: atest CtsStatsdHostTestCases
Test: atest DropBoxTest
Test: atest ErrorsTests
Change-Id: Ice302b74b13c4d66e07b069c1cdac55954d9f5df
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.
Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Merged-In: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Only untrusted apps had privilegs to read file descriptors passed in
from traceur, which was an oversight. This fixes the policy so that priv
apps can also access file descriptors from traceur in order to read
reports shared from traceur.
Bug: 74435522
Test: better bug has access to reports shared from traceur
Change-Id: I591872cdac31eec62edbc81d95f1220f1152427f
system_update service manages system update information: system updater
(priv_app) publishes the pending system update info through the service,
while other apps can read the info accordingly (design doc in
go/pi-ota-platform-api).
This CL adds the service type, and grants priv_app to access the service.
Bug: 67437079
Test: Build and flash marlin image. The system_update service works.
Change-Id: I7a3eaee3ecd3e2e16b410413e917ec603566b375
This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.
This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e2c
Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31
Perfetto is a performance instrumentation and logging framework,
living in AOSP's /external/pefetto.
Perfetto introduces in the system one binary and two daemons
(the binary can specialize in either depending on the cmdline).
1) traced: unprivileged daemon. This is architecturally similar to logd.
It exposes two UNIX sockets:
- /dev/socket/traced_producer : world-accessible, allows to stream
tracing data. A tmpfs file descriptor is sent via SCM_RIGHTS
from traced to each client process, which needs to be able to
mmap it R/W (but not X)
- /dev/socket/traced_consumer : privilege-accessible (only from:
shell, statsd). It allows to configure tracing and read the trace
buffer.
2) traced_probes: privileged daemon. This needs to:
- access tracingfs (/d/tracing) to turn tracing on and off.
- exec atrace
- connect to traced_producer to stream data to traced.
init.rc file:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/external/perfetto/+/575382/14/perfetto.rc
Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ia3b5fdacbd5a8e6e23b82f1d6fabfa07e4abc405
