FBE needs to access these files to set up or verify encryption for
directories during mkdir.
Bug: 77850279
Test: walleye + more restrictions continues to have FBE work
Change-Id: I84e201436ce4531d36d1257d932c3e2e772ea05e
Vendors may use this to write custom messages to their bootloader, and
as the bootloader is under vendor control, this makes sense to allow.
Bug: 77881566
Test: build
Merged-In: I78f80400e5f386cad1327a9209ee1afc8e334e56
Change-Id: I78f80400e5f386cad1327a9209ee1afc8e334e56
(cherry picked from commit db465285cf)
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
Merged-In: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
(cherry picked from commit 224921d18a)
A default value of persist.radio.multisim.config can be set by SoC
vendors, and so vendor-init-settable should be allowed to it.
Bug: 73871799
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: Ie62b91e7e3d7e05425b742838417f1cab7b3fed4
Merged-In: Ie62b91e7e3d7e05425b742838417f1cab7b3fed4
(cherry picked from commit ac8c6e3d44)
Now that the vendor_init mechanism is in place, this SELinux
restriction will disallow vendor init scripts from touching core data
files as intended with Treble.
Bug: 62875318
Test: None
Change-Id: Ifa50486c48551ba095d2ed8cc6570fc5040c172d
These property sets will be long term restricted with
compatible_property but allowing them now eases the transition.
Bug: 62875318
Test: boot marlin without audits for setprop in vendor_init
Change-Id: I25ab565bbf137e382c1dfc3b905b38403645f1d2
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
Do not let apps read uid_concurrent_active_time and
uid_concurrent_policy_time.
b/68399339
Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
without root permissions and system_server was able
to read them
Change-Id: I6f09ef608607cb9f4084ba403a1e7254b8c49a06
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
