*mac_permissions.xml files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' or 'rootfs' label.
Bug: 36003167
Test: no new 'mac_perms_file' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I1c882872bb78d1242ba273756ef0dc27487f58fc
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
sepolicy files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' or 'rootfs' label.
Bug: 36527360
Test: no new 'sepolicy_file' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I6fe8ba31588c2d75521c6e2b0bf7e6d6eaf80a19
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
seapp_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'seapp_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospSeappContexts
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
video
Change-Id: I19b3e50c6a7c292713d3e56ef0448acf6e4270f7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts
Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
The label applies to all service_contexts regardless of their location.
This also lets us track the service_contexts usage and limit access to
the files for the corresponding object manager alone.
Bug: 36002427
Test: Boot sailfish and observe no denials for 'serice_contexts'
Test: cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
--abi arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
-t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospServiceContexts
Change-Id: I97fc8b24bc99ca5c00d010fb522cd39a35572858
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
split property context file in vendor and sytem were left untouched by
the recent changes. This was working accidentally because they were
still accessible to all domains as 'system_file'.
Bug: 36002573
Test: Boot sailfish to observe no new denials.
Test: 'adb sideload' OTA on sailfish successfully
Change-Id: I5bec058b59db83d2a431e9f7e91c5a09af7d2942
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open file:
stat/read/write/append.
This commit marks core data types as core_data_file_type and bans
access to non-core domains with an exemption for apps. A temporary
exemption is also granted to domains that currently rely on
access with TODOs and bug number for each exemption.
Bug: 34980020
Test: Build and boot Marlin. Make phone call, watch youtube video.
No new denials observed.
Change-Id: I320dd30f9f0a5bf2f9bb218776b4bccdb529b197
In f5446eb148 I forgot to let violators
of "no Binder in vendor" rule keep their access to /dev/binder. This
commit fixes the issue.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313
Bug: 36657020
Change-Id: I3fc68df1d78e2a2da94ac9bf036a51923e3a9aae
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (coredomain) and
vendor domain are not permitted to connect to each other's sockets.
There are two main exceptions: (1) apps are permitted to talk to other
apps over Unix domain sockets (this is public API in Android
framework), and (2) domains with network access (netdomain) are
permitted to connect to netd.
This commit thus:
* adds neverallow rules restricting socket connection establishment,
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute
is needed because the types corresponding to violators are not
exposed to the public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36613996
Change-Id: I458f5a09a964b06ad2bddb52538ec3a15758b003
This is a special file that can be mounted as a loopback device to
exercise adoptable storage code on devices that don't have valid
physical media. For example, they may only support storage media
through a USB OTG port that is being used for an adb connection.
avc: denied { read } for path="/data/misc/vold/virtual_disk" dev="sda35" ino=508695 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 34903607
Change-Id: I84721ec0e9495189a7d850461875df1839826212
Moves selinux policy build decisions to system/sepolicy/Android.mk.
This is done because the PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE variable isn't available
in embedded.mk and TARGET_SANITIZE isn't available to dependencies of
init.
Test: Build/boot Bullhead PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE=false
Test: Build/boot Marlin PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE=true
Test: Build Marlin TARGET_SANITIZE=address. Verify asan rules are
included in policy output.
Bug: 36138508
Change-Id: I20a25ffdfbe2b28e7e0f3e090a4df321e85e1235
Per loop(4), this device is the preferred way of allocating new
loop devices since Linux 3.1.
avc: denied { read write } for name="loop-control" dev="tmpfs" ino=15221 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0
Bug: 34903607
Change-Id: I1f5f62cf0a1c24c6f6453100004812af4b8e1503
secilc is being used without -f which is causing a file_contexts
file to be generated in the root of the tree where the build tools
run:
$ stat $T/file_contexts
File: 'file_contexts'
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 regular empty file
Device: fc00h/64512d Inode: 5508958 Links: 1
Access: (0664/-rw-rw-r--) Uid: ( 1000/wcrobert) Gid: ( 1000/wcrobert)
Access: 2017-03-23 11:23:41.691538047 -0700
Modify: 2017-03-23 11:23:41.691538047 -0700
Change: 2017-03-23 11:23:41.691538047 -0700
Test: remove $T/file_contexts, touch a policy file and make sepolicy,
ensure file is not regenerated. Also, ensure hikey builds and
boots.
Change-Id: I0d15338a540dba0194c65a1436647c7d38fe3c79
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
