Currently, incidentd is allowed to read the wakeup_sources debugfs
node only if a device does not enforce debugfs restrictions. If a device
enforces debugfs restrictions, debugfs cannot be mounted on user builds,
but can be mounted on userdebug and eng builds.
Processes that need to use debugfs should therefore be able to
access it on userdebug and eng builds. So, allow incidentd to
read the wakeup sources debugfs node for userdebug and eng builds.
Bug: 300477252
Change-Id: I9bb480a0418a6d176b39753d552f409e139be178
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacmanjarres@google.com>
The properties for attestation are congifured in build.prop files and
used by frameworks Build.java.
Allow vendor_init to set these properties and allow Zygote to access
them.
Bug: 211547922
Test: SELinuxUncheckedDenialBootTest
Change-Id: I5666524a9708c6fefe113ad4109b8a344405ad57
This change adds a neverallow rule in traced.te to limit the processes
that can find tracingproxy_service, the context for TracingServiceProxy.
I wanted to avoid moving the tracingproxy_service definition to public,
so there were a few services that are exempted from this neverallow
rule.
Bug: 191391382
Test: Manually verified that with this change, along with the other
change in this topic, I see no errors when taking a bugreport while a
Traceur trace is running.
Change-Id: I8658df0db92ae9cf4fefe2eebb4d6d9a5349ea89
This reverts commit e95e0ec0a5.
Now that b/186727553 is fixed, it should be safe to revert this revert.
Test: build
Bug: 184381659
Change-Id: Ibea3882296db880f5cafe4f9efa36d79a183c8a1
Revert submission 1668411
Reason for revert: Suspect for b/186173384
Reverted Changes:
Iaa4fce9f0:Check that tracefs files are labelled as tracefs_t...
I743a81489:Exclude vendor_modprobe from debugfs neverallow re...
I63a22402c:Add neverallows for debugfs access
I289f2d256:Add a neverallow for debugfs mounting
Change-Id: I9b7d43ac7e2ead2d175b265e97c749570c95e075
Android R launching devices and newer must not ship with debugfs
mounted. For Android S launching devices and newer, debugfs must only be
mounted in userdebug/eng builds by init(for boot time initializations)
and dumpstate(for grabbing debug information from debugfs using the
dumpstate HAL).
This patch adds neverallow statements to prevent othe processes
being provided access to debugfs when the flag PRODUCT_SET_DEBUGFS_RESTRICTIONS
is set to true.
Test: make with/without PRODUCT_SET_DEBUGFS_RESTRICTIONS
Bug: 184381659
Change-Id: I63a22402cf6b1f57af7ace50000acff3f06a49be
For incident section 1116, it runs incident-helper-cmd which executes app_process.
The metrics reporting in app_process currently writes metrics to Statsd.
Now grant the required statsd socket permission.
Bug: 183759310
Test: $ make selinux_policy
Push SELinux modules
$ ./pts-tradefed run pts -m PtsSELinuxTest -t com.google.android.selinux.pts.SELinuxTest#scanBugreport
Change-Id: I7a1ff6a3022414c4da2592a9a215d4b5e5f59ca2
odrefresh is the process responsible for checking and creating ART
compilation artifacts that live in the ART APEX data
directory (/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art).
There are two types of change here:
1) enabling odrefresh to run dex2oat and write updated boot class path
and system server AOT artifacts into the ART APEX data directory.
2) enabling the zygote and assorted diagnostic tools to use the
updated AOT artifacts.
odrefresh uses two file contexts: apex_art_data_file and
apex_art_staging_data_file. When odrefresh invokes dex2oat, the
generated files have the apex_art_staging_data_file label (which allows
writing). odrefresh then moves these files from the staging area to
their installation area and gives them the apex_art_data_file label.
Bug: 160683548
Test: adb root && adb shell /apex/com.android.art/bin/odrefresh
Change-Id: I9fa290e0c9c1b7b82be4dacb9f2f8cb8c11e4895
incident report contains similar data as in a bugreport, but in proto
format.
Test: adb shell incident -p LOCAL 1000
Bug: 152173578
Change-Id: Iee53a3b8a6c95629a1d5c15b4d17f3d680b14178
This is to fix selinux denials on incident-helper-cmd.
incident-helper-cmd is a Java program spawn from app_process. There are
currently some selinux denials because app_process tries to read boot
flags, read dalvik cache, run JIT and exec from JIT cache.
This change:
- allows incidentd to read the runtime feature flag properties. This is
a normal behavior during app_process startup
- allows incidentd to lock a few java libraries under
/apex/com.android.art. Again, this is normal when ART starts
- mutes denial of writing to and exec from dalvik cache / JIT cache
Fixes: 149011438
Test: Run $ incident 1116, and verify there's no selinux denial
Change-Id: I95a6b93e6a5510c749bebe7ecbcab9a803be0801
Allow incidentd to run incident-helper-cmd, a Java program spawn by
app_process.
Allow incidentd to read /data/misc/logd and its files on userdebug
and eng build.
Bug: 147924172
Test: Build, flash and verify "adb shell incident -p EXPLICIT 1116"
can parse persisted logs.
Change-Id: Id0aa4286c304a336741ce8c0949b12ec559c2e16
incident report contains similar data as in a bugreport, but in proto
format. Currently ro.serialno is not captured due to selinux settings.
Test: adb shell incident -p LOCAL 1000
Bug: 143372261
Change-Id: I6a89308c1347fba2ce4f7b469f9a02b119d4aeb7
This set of patches adds a way for the perfetto command line client to
save a trace to a hardcoded location,
/data/misc/perfetto-traces/incident-trace, and call into incidentd to
start a report, which will include said trace in a new section.
This is not a long-term solution, and is structured to minimize changes
to perfetto and incidentd. The latter is currently architected in a way
where it can only pull pre-defined information out of the system, so
we're resorting to persisting the intermediate results in a hardcoded
location.
This will introduce at most two more linked files at the same time.
Bug: 130543265
Bug: 134706389
Tested: manually on crosshatch-userdebug
Merged-In: I2aa27e25f0209b3a5cdf5d550d0312693932b808
Change-Id: I2aa27e25f0209b3a5cdf5d550d0312693932b808
(cherry picked from commit ce3a33ff18)
Previously we dumped the data into dropbox. This improves a couple
things:
- We write into dropbox via the fd, so dropbox doesn't pull from the
incidentd directory anymore.
- There is a new API to for priv apps to explicitly read incident
reports. That gives incidentd finer grained control over who can
read it (specifically, it only allows apps to access the incident
reports they requested, or were requested for them via statsd,
instead of getting DUMP and reading whatever they want from
dropbox).
Test: bit incident_test:* GtsIncidentManagerTestCases:*
Bug: 123543706
Change-Id: I9a323e372c4ff95d91419a61e8a20ea5a3a860a5
An incident.proto section has been added to the bugreport. Need
appropriate sepolicy changes to allow binder calls and fd access.
Bug: 119417232
Test: adb bugreport. Verify incident.proto is in the proto folder,
and there are no sepolicy violations.
Change-Id: Iac27cbf283a2e1cb41862c76343c2b639f6c0e1e
There is now an incident section for statsd output data. These selinux
changes must be made for incident to call dump on statsd to get the
data.
Bug: 115678461
Test: adb shell incident -b 3023
and confirm that a valid statsd section is obtained
Change-Id: I761389c160ab3ab6c24556813a1a31088c0f5137
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
This is needed for bugreport to include ANR trace for the process.
Bug: 111604912
Test: adb bugreport
Change-Id: I3f09e17523ccf9b637fd9590e53a13e03e80ccaa
(breaks vendor blobs, will have to be regenerated
after this CL)
This moves mediacodec to vendor so it is replaced with
hal_omx_server. The main benefit of this is that someone
can create their own implementation of mediacodec without
having to alter the one in the tree. mediacodec is still
seccomp enforced by CTS tests.
Fixes: 36375899
Test: (sanity) YouTube
Test: (sanity) camera pics + video
Test: check for denials
Change-Id: I31f91b7ad6cd0a891a1681ff3b9af82ab400ce5e
Bug: 72177715
Bug: 72384374
Test: flash device and make sure incidentd is getting data without SELinux denials
Change-Id: I684fe014e19c936017a466ec2d6cd2e1f03022c0
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
