Add a file context for keeping track of last reboot reason and label
directory /data/misc/reboot/ for this purpose.
Bug: 30994946
Test: manual: reboot ocmmand, setprop sys.powerctl, SoC thermal mgr
Change-Id: I9569420626b4029a62448b3f729ecbbeafbc3e66
The implementation for NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed from the kernel in commit
d16cf20e2f2f13411eece7f7fb72c17d141c4a84 ("netfilter: remove ip_queue
support") circa Linux 3.5. Unless we need to retain compatibility
for kernels < 3.5, we can drop these classes from the policy altogether.
Possibly the neverallow rule in app.te should be augmented to include
the newer netlink security classes, similar to webview_zygote, but
that can be a separate change.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: Iab9389eb59c96772e5fa87c71d0afc86fe99bb6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Add a definition for the extended_socket_class policy capability used
to enable the use of separate socket security classes for all network
address families rather than the generic socket class. The capability
also enables the use of separate security classes for ICMP and SCTP
sockets, which were previously mapped to rawip_socket class. Add
definitions for the new socket classes and access vectors enabled by
this capability. Add the new socket classes to the socket_class_set
macro, and exclude them from webview_zygote domain as with other socket
classes.
Allowing access by specific domains to the new socket security
classes is left to future commits. Domains previously allowed
permissions to the 'socket' class will require permission to the
more specific socket class when running on kernels with this support.
The kernel support will be included upstream in Linux 4.11. The
relevant kernel commits are da69a5306ab92e07224da54aafee8b1dccf024f6
("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families"),
ef37979a2cfa3905adbf0c2a681ce16c0aaea92d ("selinux: handle ICMPv6
consistently with ICMP"), and b4ba35c75a0671a06b978b6386b54148efddf39f
("selinux: drop unused socket security classes").
This change requires selinux userspace commit
d479baa82d67c9ac56c1a6fa041abfb9168aa4b3 ("libsepol: Define
extended_socket_class policy capability") in order to build the
policy with this capability enabled. This commit is already in
AOSP master.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: I788b4be9f0ec0bf2356c0bbef101cd42a1af49bb
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Kernel commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f
(selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks)
introduced support for distinguishing capability
checks against a target associated with the init user namespace
versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init
user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the
latter. This support is needed on Linux to support e.g. Chrome usage of
user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to
also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace.
Define the new security classes and access vectors for the Android policy.
Refactor the original capability and capability2 access vector definitions
as common declarations to allow reuse by the new cap_userns and cap2_userns
classes.
This change does not allow use of the new classes by any domain; that
is deferred to future changes as needed if/when Android enables user
namespaces and the Android version of Chrome starts using them.
The kernel support went upstream in Linux 4.7.
Based on the corresponding refpolicy patch by Chris PeBenito, but
reworked for the Android policy.
Test: policy builds
Change-Id: I71103d39e93ee0e8c24816fca762944d047c2235
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The neverallows in untrusted_app will all apply equally to ephemeral app
and any other untrusted app domains we may add, so this moves them to a
dedicated separate file.
This also removes the duplicate rules from isolated_app.te and ensures
that all the untrusted_app neverallows also apply to isolated_app.
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ib38e136216ccbe5c94daab732b7ee6acfad25d0b
The rules for the two types were the same and /data/app-ephemeral is
being removed. Remove these types.
Test: Builds
Change-Id: I520c026395551ad1362dd2ced53c601d9e6f9b28
This change adds selinux policy for configstore@1.0 hal. Currently, only
surfaceflinger has access to the HAL, but need to be widen.
Bug: 34314793
Test: build & run
Merged-In: I40e65032e9898ab5f412bfdb7745b43136d8e964
Change-Id: I40e65032e9898ab5f412bfdb7745b43136d8e964
(cherry picked from commit 5ff0f178ba)
Required for I0aeb653afd65e4adead13ea9c7248ec20971b04a
Test: Together with I0aeb653afd65e4adead13ea9c7248ec20971b04a, ensure that the
system service works
Bug: b/30932767
Change-Id: I994b1c74763c073e95d84222e29bfff5483c6a07
Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.
The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.
Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
no more auditallow logs
Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6
The event log tag service uses /dev/event-log-tags, pstore and
/data/misc/logd/event-log-tags as sticky storage for the invented
log tags.
Test: gTest liblog-unit-tests, logd-unit-tests & logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Change-Id: Iacc8f36f4a716d4da8dca78a4a54600ad2a288dd
Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags. Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access. Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.
Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e
Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.
Change-Id: I87f95292b5860283efb2081b2223e607a52fed04
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This adds the premissions required for
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service to access the keymaster TA
as well as for keystore and vold to lookup and use
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service.
IT DOES NOT remove the privileges from keystore and vold to access
the keymaster TA directly.
Test: Run keystore CTS tests
Bug: 32020919
(cherry picked from commit 5090d6f324)
Change-Id: Ib02682da26e2dbcabd81bc23169f9bd0e832eb19
This leaves only the existence of webview_zygote domain and its
executable's webview_zygote_exec file label as public API. All other
rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus
now private.
Test: Device boots, with Multiproces WebView developer setting
enabled, apps with WebView work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: I179476c43a50863ee3b327fc5155847d992a040d
Bug: 31015010
cherry-pick from b6e4d4bdf1
Test: checked for selinux denial msgs in the dmesg logs.
Change-Id: I8285ea05162ea0d75459e873e5c2bad2dbc7e5ba
This leaves only the existence of zygote domain and its
executable's zygote_exec file label as public API. All other rules are
implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus now
private.
Test: Device boot, apps (untrusted_app, system_app, platform_app,
priv_app) work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Ie37128531be841b89ecd602992d83d77e26533bc
This leaves only the existence of appdomain attribute as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this attribute's policy
and are thus now private.
Test: Device boot, apps (untrusted_app, system_app, platform_app,
priv_app) work fine. No new denials.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Ie22e35bad3307bb9918318c3d034f1433d51677f
- Added set_prop to shell so that you can set it from shell.
- Added set_prop to sytem_app so that it can be updated in settings.
Bug: 34256441
Test: can update prop from Settings and shell. nfc and lights work with
ag/1833821 with persist.hal.binderization set to on and off. There are
no additional selinux denials.
Change-Id: I883ca489093c1d56b2efa725c58e6e3f3b81c3aa
Introduce the add_service() macro which wraps up add/find
permissions for the source domain with a neverallow preventing
others from adding it. Only a particular domain should
add a particular service.
Use the add_service() macro to automatically add a neverallow
that prevents other domains from adding the service.
mediadrmserver was adding services labeled mediaserver_service.
Drop the add permission as it should just need the find
permission.
Additionally, the macro adds the { add find } permission which
causes some existing neverallow's to assert. Adjust those
neverallow's so "self" can always find.
Test: compile and run on hikey and emulator. No new denials were
found, and all services, where applicable, seem to be running OK.
Change-Id: Ibbd2a5304edd5f8b877bc86852b0694732be993c
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
reflect the change from "mediaanalytics" to "mediametrics"
Also incorporates a broader access to the service -- e.g. anyone.
This reflects that a number of metrics submissions come from application
space and not only from our controlled, trusted media related processes.
The metrics service (in another commit) checks on the source of any
incoming metrics data and limits what is allowed from unprivileged
clients.
Bug: 34615027
Test: clean build, service running and accessible
Change-Id: I657c343ea1faed536c3ee1940f1e7a178e813a42
This CLs adds SElinux policies necessary to compile secondary dex files.
When an app loads secondary dex files via the base class loader the
files will get reported to PM. During maintance mode PM will compile the
secondary dex files which were used via the standard installd model
(fork, exec, change uid and lower capabilities).
What is needed:
dexoptanalyzer - needs to read the dex file and the boot image in order
to decide if we need to actually comppile.
dex2oat - needs to be able to create *.oat files next to the secondary
dex files.
Test: devices boots
compilation of secondary dex files works without selinux denials
cmd package compile --secondary-dex -f -m speed
com.google.android.gms
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I038955b5bc9a72d49f6c24c1cb76276e0f53dc45
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { read } for name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=2755
scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
which occurs when a priv-app attempts to follow the /cache symlink. This
symlink occurs on devices which don't have a /cache partition, but
rather symlink /cache to /data/cache.
Bug: 34644911
Test: Policy compiles.
Change-Id: I9e052aeb0c98bac74fa9225b9253b1537ffa5adc
Delete rule for permission_service since we use packages.list instead.
Test: adb shell storaged -u
Bug: 34198239
Change-Id: Ic69d0fe185e627a932bbf8e85fc13163077bbe6b
Test: Device boots
Can take photos
Run "adb shell atrace -c -b 16000 -t 5 gfx" without root and check produces
output
Run "python systrace.py view gfx freq sched am wm dalvik
binder_driver" from external/chromium-trace after adb root and
check populated
Bug: 31856701
Change-Id: Ic319f8a0a3e395efa7ee8ba33a868ac55cb44fe4
/sys/class/leds is the standard location for linux files dealing with
leds, however the exact contents of this directory is non-standard
(hence the need for a hal).
Bug: 32022100
Test: compiles and works for the subset of common files
Change-Id: I7571d7267d5ed531c4cf95599d5f2acc22287ef4
Ephemeral apps cannot open files from external storage, but can be given
access to files via the file picker.
Test: ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENTS from an ephemeral app returns a readable fd.
Change-Id: Ie21b64a9633eff258be254b9cd86f282db1509e8
Ephemeral apps are still apps with very similar capabilities, it makes
more sense to have them under appdomain and benefit from the shared
state (and all the neverallow rules) than to try and dupplicate them and
keep them in sync.
This is an initial move, there are parts of ephemeral_app that still
need to be locked down further and some parts of appdomain that should
be pushed down into the various app domains.
Test: Builds, ephemeral apps work without denials.
Change-Id: I1526b2c2aa783a91fbf6543ac7f6d0d9906d70af
Revise policy, to allow init and system_server to configure,
clear, and read kernel trace events. This will enable us to
debug certain WiFi failures.
Note that system_server is restricted to only accessing
a wifi-specific trace instance. (Hence, system_server is
not allowed to interfere with atrace.) Moreover, even for
the wifi trace instance, system_server is granted limited
permissions. (system_server can not, e.g., change which
events are traced.)
Note also that init and system_server are only granted these
powers on userdebug or eng builds.
The init.te and system_server.te changes resolve the
following denials:
// Denials when wifi-events.rc configures tracing
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ add_name } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ create } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="buffer_size_kb" dev="debugfs" ino=18061 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server sets up fail-safe
// (auto-terminate tracing if system_server dies)
{ search } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server toggles tracing on or off
// (WifiStateMachine is a thread in system_server)
{ search } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
// Denials when system_server reads the event trace
// (This happens in response to a dumpsys request)
{ search } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Bug: 27254565
Test: manual
Manual test:
- Build this CL along with CL:322337
- Verify that system boots, and that we can connect to GoogleGuest.
(Testing of actual trace functionality with require some more
patches in frameworks/opt/net/wifi.)
$ adb root && adb shell dmesg | egrep 'avc: denied.+debugfs'
Change-Id: Ib6eb4116549277f85bd510d25fb30200f1752f4d
Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.
Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed
- Allow cameraservice to talk to hwbinder, hwservicemanager
- Allow hal_camera to talk to the same interfaces as cameraservice
Test: Compiles, confirmed that cameraservice can call hwservicemanager
Bug: 32991422
Change-Id: Ied0a3f5f7149e29c468a13887510c78d555dcb2a
