An example app in this domain is com.android.settings.
This was an accidental omission from https://r.android.com/1966610.
Context and rationale remain the same as for that patch, please see the
bug.
Tested: both traced_perf and heapprofd successfully profiled the
settings app with the right additional profileability permissions on a
user build (beta candidate).
Bug: 217368496
Change-Id: Id8a9e16dab7774f8840cdd6b74d59f70584b5156
mdns service is a subset of netd-provided services, so it gets
the same treatment as netd_service or dnsresolver_service
Bug: 209894875
Test: built, flashed, booted
Change-Id: I33de769c4fff41e816792a34015a70f89e4b8a8c
Bug: 209713977
Bug: 193467627
Test: local build and manual check.
Signed-off-by: Super Liu <supercjliu@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib1d2d6dcc7d6ddc6243c806a883d9252d7c081af
This change adds a neverallow rule in traced.te to limit the processes
that can find tracingproxy_service, the context for TracingServiceProxy.
I wanted to avoid moving the tracingproxy_service definition to public,
so there were a few services that are exempted from this neverallow
rule.
Bug: 191391382
Test: Manually verified that with this change, along with the other
change in this topic, I see no errors when taking a bugreport while a
Traceur trace is running.
Change-Id: I8658df0db92ae9cf4fefe2eebb4d6d9a5349ea89
This addresses the following SELinux failure:
trigger_perfett: type=1400 audit(0.0:331): avc: denied { write }
for name="traced_producer" dev="tmpfs" ino=35064
scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
tclass=sock_file permissive=0 app=com.android.systemui
This is necessary so that, on user builds, system apps like systemui can
trigger Perfetto traces. This is already allowed on userdebug/end by the
capability in app.te.
In a follow up, we'll probably remove all the perfetto_producer in the
*_app.te and remove the userdebug_or_eng in app.te.
Bug: 190620348
Change-Id: I715979970cde760efdf4497c7cd2a2039ca86c85
untrusted apps were already granted this policy and we now extend it
to all apps. This allows FileManager apps with the
MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permisssion to access USB OTG volumes mounted
on /mnt/media_rw/<vol>.
This permission access in the framework is implemented by granting
those apps the external_storage gid. And at the same time USB volumes
will be mounted on /mnt/media_rw/<vol> with the external_storage gid.
There is no concern of interferring with FUSE on USB volumes because
they are not FUSE mounted.
For sdcards (non-USB) volumes mounted on /mnt/media_rw/<vol>, those
volumes are mounted with the media_rw gid, so even though they are
FUSE mounted on /storage/<vol>, arbitrary apps cannot access the
/mnt/media_rw path since only the FUSE daemon is granted the media_rw
gid.
Test: Manual
Bug: 182732333
Change-Id: I70a3eb1f60f32d051f44253b0db2c7b852d79ba1
Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes
This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.
Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
This is needed because Wifi module needs to import and
generate keys and it runs in system_server.
Also, remove "grant" from system_app and system_server
since there is no need to grant any keys.
Test: Create an enterprise wifi config with EAP-TLS
Bug: 171305388
Change-Id: I50c25f2fe52e968c8cdf1ea20d110f9f052699db
Add the wifi namespace to sepolicy and allow system_app (Settings) and
wifi_supplicant to manage/use the keys in that namespace
Test: N/A
Bug: 171305388
Change-Id: Ib6af8656b18288a1116c241c2e76d9aea421a889
a54bed6907
Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery
Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
debugfs_tracing can only be accessed by tracing tools provided by the
platform.
Bug: 172028429
Test: boot with no relevant log showing up
Change-Id: I412dd51a1b268061c5a972488b8bc4a0ee456601
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.
Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files
Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
The suspend_control_aidl_interface is updated, renamed, and splitted
into android.system.suspend.control and
android.system.suspend.control.internal. This resulted in two suspend
services, update sepolicy to support this change.
Test: m
Bug: 171598743
Change-Id: I695bde405672af834fe662242347e62079f2e25f
The list permission protects the ability to list arbitrary namespaces.
This is not a namespace specific permission but a Keystore specific
permission. Listing the entries of a given namsepace is covered by the
get_info permission already.
Ignore-AOSP-First: This needs to land in googleplex first to updated
prebuilt vendor images. Otherwise it breaks
aosp-with-phone builds.
Test: N/A
Change-Id: If6e79fd863a79acf8d8ab10c6362a4eeaa88a5b8
Bug: 158500146
Bug: 159466840
Test: keystore2_test tests part of this policy
Change-Id: Id3dcb2ba4423d93170b9ba7ecf8aed0580ce83bc
Merged-In: Id3dcb2ba4423d93170b9ba7ecf8aed0580ce83bc
We have various apps which inherently work across all users,
configured in seapp_contexts with levelFrom=None (usually implicitly).
This change marks those apps, where they have private data files, as
mlstrustedsubject, to allow us to increase restrictions on cross-user
access without breaking them.
Currently these apps are granted full access to [priv_]app__data_file
via TE rules, but are blocked from calling open (etc) by mls rules
(they don't have a matching level).
This CL changes things round so they are granted access by mls, but
blocked from calling open by TE rules; the overall effect is thus the
same - they do not have access.
A neverallow rule is added to ensure this remains true.
Note that there are various vendor apps which are appdomain,
levelFrom=None; they will also need modified policy.
Test: builds, boots, no new denials.
Bug: 141677108
Change-Id: Ic14f24ec6e8cbfda7a775adf0c350b406d3a197e
This removes bad context names "exported*_prop". Property contexts of
following properties are changed. All properties are settable only by
vendor-init.
- ro.config.per_app_memcg
This becomes lmkd_config_prop.
- ro.zygote
This becomes dalvik_config_prop.
- ro.oem_unlock_supported
This becomes oem_unlock_prop. It's readable by system_app which includes
Settings apps.
- ro.storage_manager.enabled
This becomes storagemanagr_config_prop. It's readable by coredomain.
Various domains in coredomain seem to read it.
- sendbug.preferred.domain
This bcomes sendbug_config_prop. It's readable by appdomain.
There are still 3 more exported3_default_prop, which are going to be
tracked individually.
Bug: 155844385
Test: selinux denial check on Pixel devices
Change-Id: I340c903ca7bda98a92d0f157c65f6833ed00df05
For whatever reason sys.usb.config* has been labeled as
system_radio_prop, which doesn't make sense. Changing context name as
usb_prop. For the same reason exported_system_radio_prop is also
renamed to usb-related names.
Bug: 71814576
Bug: 154885206
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: If30bc620dbeac926a8b9bcde908357fda739a6c1
Merged-In: If30bc620dbeac926a8b9bcde908357fda739a6c1
(cherry picked from commit 44fbcdb677)
When the device is running DSU, the DSULoader button should
be disabled.
Bug: 151792130
Test: open developer settings and check the DSULoader
Change-Id: Iae2d3dcc9d2b6de1fa5f6a0931465b355fe74ddf
To let end user enable/disable the verbose vender logging,
a developer option is added into Settings app which need
directly interact with Dumpstate HAL. In the future, the
same function may be added into SystemUI, eg. as a
QuickSettings tile.
To allow both Settings app and system.ui, system_app is
the best candidate for the sepolicy change.
Bug: 148822215
Test: make && make RunSettingsRoboTests
Change-Id: Ic6ef497505719e07cc37518b78c9dc146cda2d2c
We don't want to accidentally allow this, and a neverallow also means
that the issue will be found during development, instead of review.
Fixes: 148081219
Test: compile policy only
Change-Id: I57990a2a4ab9e5988b09dae2dd6a710ce8f53800
/data/local/tmp is an attacker controlled location which system_apps
should not be depending on. system_apps should only depend on files in
their home directory and files passed to them by file descriptor. To
support this best practice, neverallow access to /data/local/tmp. This
adds a compile time assertion and CTS test to assert that this rule is
never present.
This is conceptually a tightening of already defined neverallow rules in
domain.te. The existing neverallow assertions exclude appdomain, which
is too broad:
neverallow {
domain
-adbd
-appdomain
-dumpstate
-init
-installd
-simpleperf_app_runner
-system_server # why?
userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
} shell_data_file:dir { open search };
# Same as above for /data/local/tmp files. We allow shell files
# to be passed around by file descriptor, but not directly opened.
neverallow {
domain
-adbd
-appdomain
-dumpstate
-installd
userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
} shell_data_file:file open;
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ib7178e2b9d5a41c03837a535f7db5eaf10319aac
This reverts commit e47d2365a8.
Reason for revert: Original CL was not the cause of the breakage. It went green before this revert landed. https://android-build.googleplex.com/builds/branches/aosp-master/grid?
Original CL went in 5695273.
Went green in 5695399.
Revert went in 5695588.
Change-Id: Ie4d7065fe7d3c58cdff99c2b7d76b50b941895bb
This reverts commit 0c0ba46192.
Reason for revert: <Broken build 5695273 on aosp-master on aosp_x86_64-eng>
Change-Id: I763f19aa5b72f2e1aaebbc78bb8ab3020c3d2a7b
In order to show licensing information, we need to read it from
an asset stored in the .apex file.
Bug: 135183006
Test: Manual; settings can access apex files stored on /data
Change-Id: I71fbde6e295d9c890c9b9b0449e5150834a6680e
and allow shell and system_app (Settings) to set it to enable Dynamic System Update.
Also allow priv_app (user of the API) to read it.
Bug: 119647479
Bug: 129060539
Test: run the following command on crosshatch-user:
adb shell setprop persist.sys.fflag.override.settings_dynamic_system 1
Change-Id: I24a5382649c64d36fd05a59bc87faca87e6f0eb8
Merged-In: I24a5382649c64d36fd05a59bc87faca87e6f0eb8
Since ipmemorystore service has been moved to network stack from
system service, also should revert the relevant sepolicy which is
corresponding to the previous configuration.
Bug: 128392280
Test: atest FrameworksNetTests NetworkStackTests
Change-Id: I1ae09696e620b246f817db71e7b71c32aae9be05
- lpdump is a binary on the device that talks to lpdumpd
via binder.
- lpdumpd is a daemon on the device that actually reads
dynamic partition metadata. Only lpdump can talk to it.
Bug: 126233777
Test: boots (sanity)
Test: lpdump
Change-Id: I0e21f35ac136bcbb0603940364e8117f2d6ac438
This change allows those daemons of the audio and Bluetooth which
include HALs to access the bluetooth_audio_hal_prop. This property is
used to force disable the new BluetoothAudio HAL.
- persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled
Bug: 128825244
Test: audio HAL can access the property
Change-Id: I87a8ba57cfbcd7d3e4548aa96bc915d0cc6b2b74
Allow all the app process with GUI to send GPU health metrics stats to
GpuService during the GraphicsEnvironment setup stage for the process.
Bug: 123529932
Test: Build, flash and boot. No selinux denials.
Change-Id: Ic7687dac3c8a3ea43fa744a6ae8a45716951c4df
The auditallow added in 7a4af30b3 has not triggered. This is safe to
remove.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Test: No audit messages seen since May 2018 on go/sedenials
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Change-Id: I3861b462467e1fc31e67a263ad06716a4111dcb8
What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.
Changes from original aosp/692189 which was reverted:
- There seem to be spurious denials from vendor-specific apps. So added
back access from { appdomain -all_untrusted_apps -priv_app } to cgroup.
Audit this access with intent to write explicit per-domain rules for it.
Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
This reverts commit cacea25ed0.
Change-Id: I05ab404f348a864e8409d811346c8a0bf49bc47a
This reverts commit 9899568f6c.
Reason for revert: Reports of high numbers of SELinux denials
showing up on the SELinux dashboard.
Bug: 110043362
Change-Id: Id8fc260c47ffd269ac2f15ff7dab668c959e3ab0
