DropboxManager may pass FDs to any app with the READ_LOGS
permission which is available to all apps as a development
permission.
Test: atest CtsIncidentHostTestCases
Fixes: 111856304
Change-Id: I329e3125dab83de948b860061df9d232e31cb23e
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
The recommended solution is to not access encrypted storage until
after the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered.
Test: build
Fixes: 72811052
Fixes: 72550646
Change-Id: I80eb743e26047b7864de983c5a46c28b6f753a59
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
Create a new label for /data/system/dropbox, and neverallow direct
access to anything other than init and system_server.
While all apps may write to the dropbox service, only apps with
android.permission.READ_LOGS, a signature|privileged|development
permission, may read them. Grant access to priv_app, system_app,
and platform_app, and neverallow access to all untrusted_apps.
Bug: 31681871
Test: atest CtsStatsdHostTestCases
Test: atest DropBoxTest
Test: atest ErrorsTests
Change-Id: Ice302b74b13c4d66e07b069c1cdac55954d9f5df
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.
Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Merged-In: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Only untrusted apps had privilegs to read file descriptors passed in
from traceur, which was an oversight. This fixes the policy so that priv
apps can also access file descriptors from traceur in order to read
reports shared from traceur.
Bug: 74435522
Test: better bug has access to reports shared from traceur
Change-Id: I591872cdac31eec62edbc81d95f1220f1152427f
system_update service manages system update information: system updater
(priv_app) publishes the pending system update info through the service,
while other apps can read the info accordingly (design doc in
go/pi-ota-platform-api).
This CL adds the service type, and grants priv_app to access the service.
Bug: 67437079
Test: Build and flash marlin image. The system_update service works.
Change-Id: I7a3eaee3ecd3e2e16b410413e917ec603566b375
This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.
This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e2c
Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31
Perfetto is a performance instrumentation and logging framework,
living in AOSP's /external/pefetto.
Perfetto introduces in the system one binary and two daemons
(the binary can specialize in either depending on the cmdline).
1) traced: unprivileged daemon. This is architecturally similar to logd.
It exposes two UNIX sockets:
- /dev/socket/traced_producer : world-accessible, allows to stream
tracing data. A tmpfs file descriptor is sent via SCM_RIGHTS
from traced to each client process, which needs to be able to
mmap it R/W (but not X)
- /dev/socket/traced_consumer : privilege-accessible (only from:
shell, statsd). It allows to configure tracing and read the trace
buffer.
2) traced_probes: privileged daemon. This needs to:
- access tracingfs (/d/tracing) to turn tracing on and off.
- exec atrace
- connect to traced_producer to stream data to traced.
init.rc file:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/external/perfetto/+/575382/14/perfetto.rc
Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ia3b5fdacbd5a8e6e23b82f1d6fabfa07e4abc405
Vendor apps may only use servicemanager provided services
marked as app_api_service. surfaceflinger_service should be
available to vendor apps, so add this attribute and clean up
duplicate grants.
Addresses:
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qtelephony:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:ssr_detector:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: denied { find } scontext=u:r:qcneservice:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 69064190
Test: build
Change-Id: I00fcf43b0a8bde232709aac1040a5d7f4792fa0f
Bug: 37485771
Test: sideloaded OTA through recovery on sailfish
Change-Id: I98bb4e0e919db585131391f57545f1a9a0096701
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
MediaProvider requires permissions that diverge from those
of a typical priv_app. This create a new domain and removes
Mtp related permissions from priv_app.
Bug: 33574909
Test: Connect with MTP, download apps and files, select ringtones
Test: DownloadProvider instrument tests, CtsProviderTestCases
Change-Id: I950dc11f21048c34af639cb3ab81873d2a6730a9
* changes:
suppress audit logs from rild's access to core domain through system()
sepolicy: auditallow vendor components to execute files from /system
vendor_shell: add sepolicy for vendor shell
toolbox: add sepolicy for vendor toybox
Do not allow priv_apps to scan all exec files
Only privileged apps are supposed to be able to get unique IDs from
attestation.
Test: CTS test verifies the negative condition, manual the positive
Bug: 34671471
Change-Id: I9ab3f71b1e11ed1d7866ff933feece73152d2578
On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
"binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
public policy where the neverallow rules are.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95
Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags. Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access. Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.
Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e
reflect the change from "mediaanalytics" to "mediametrics"
Also incorporates a broader access to the service -- e.g. anyone.
This reflects that a number of metrics submissions come from application
space and not only from our controlled, trusted media related processes.
The metrics service (in another commit) checks on the source of any
incoming metrics data and limits what is allowed from unprivileged
clients.
Bug: 34615027
Test: clean build, service running and accessible
Change-Id: I657c343ea1faed536c3ee1940f1e7a178e813a42
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { read } for name="cache" dev="dm-0" ino=2755
scontext=u:r:priv_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:cache_file:s0
tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
which occurs when a priv-app attempts to follow the /cache symlink. This
symlink occurs on devices which don't have a /cache partition, but
rather symlink /cache to /data/cache.
Bug: 34644911
Test: Policy compiles.
Change-Id: I9e052aeb0c98bac74fa9225b9253b1537ffa5adc
No denials collected.
Bug: 28760354
Test: no denials collected.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems
Change-Id: I7fc053ecae2db3bb2ca7c298634453e930713bec
This leaves the existence of priv_app domain as public API. All other
rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus
now private.
Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
disappearance of all allow rules from priv_app_current
attribute (as expected) except for
allow priv_app_current update_engine_current:binder transfer;
which is caused by public update_engine.te rules and will go
away once update_engine rules go private.
Bug: 31364497
Change-Id: Iea583127fbf0a19c37dd42bf1ef2ae0454793391
app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e6373f to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy. These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware. Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.
(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea019)
Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665
In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split. In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.
This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.
Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317
