system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.
Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
Add additional compile time constraints on the ability to ptrace various
sensitive domains.
llkd: remove some domains which llkd should never ptrace, even on
debuggable builds, such as kernel threads and init.
crash_dump neverallows: Remove the ptrace neverallow checks because
it duplicates other neverallow assertions spread throughout the policy.
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: Ia4240d1ce7143b983bb048e046bb4729d0af5a6e
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
vendor_init needs to touch a bunch of files. Forgotten within this set
of permissions is the ability to mmap files.
Addresses the following denial:
avc: denied { map } for pid=1167 comm="init" path="/system/etc/selinux/plat_file_contexts" dev="vda1" ino=1845 scontext=u:r:vendor_init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
While I'm here, add mmap() support to other areas where it's likely
needed.
Bug: 111742629
Test: make -j80, ran emulator
Change-Id: Icab00e45ae88f0d86be66d85a22e018af6ffcd75
This property is read by the audio service in system server to toggle
camera shutter sound enforcement on a device-specific basis.
Test: Camera shutter sound enforcement works when audio.camerasound.force is set
Bug: 110126976
Change-Id: I2720d3c699c4712d1a328f59dde0b16bbf1016f3
init is now a dynamic executable. So it has to be able to execute the
dynamic linker (/system/bin/linker) and shared libraries (e.g.,
/system/lib/libc.so). Furthermore, when in recovery mode, the files are
all labeled as rootfs - because the recovery ramdisk does not support
xattr, so files of type rootfs is allowed to be executed.
Do the same for kernel and ueventd because they are executing the init
executable.
Bug: 63673171
Test: `adb reboot recovery; adb devices` shows the device ID
Change-Id: Ic6225bb8e129a00771e1455e259ff28241b70396
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
FBE needs to access these files to set up or verify encryption for
directories during mkdir.
Bug: 77850279
Test: walleye + more restrictions continues to have FBE work
Change-Id: I84e201436ce4531d36d1257d932c3e2e772ea05e
(cherry picked from commit 18a284405f)
Vendors may use this to write custom messages to their bootloader, and
as the bootloader is under vendor control, this makes sense to allow.
Bug: 77881566
Test: build
Change-Id: I78f80400e5f386cad1327a9209ee1afc8e334e56
Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status
So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.
Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
This will allow adb shell getprop ro.vendor.build.security_patch to
properly return the correct build property, whereas previously it was
offlimits due to lack of label.
Test: adb shell getprop ro.vendor.build.security_patch successfully
returns whatever VENDOR_SECURITY_PATCH is defined to be in the Android
.mk files
Change-Id: Ie8427738125fc7f909ad8d51e4b76558f5544d49
A default value of persist.radio.multisim.config can be set by SoC
vendors, and so vendor-init-settable should be allowed to it.
Bug: 73871799
Test: succeeded building and tested with taimen
Change-Id: Ie62b91e7e3d7e05425b742838417f1cab7b3fed4
Now that the vendor_init mechanism is in place, this SELinux
restriction will disallow vendor init scripts from touching core data
files as intended with Treble.
Bug: 62875318
Test: None
Change-Id: Ifa50486c48551ba095d2ed8cc6570fc5040c172d
These property sets will be long term restricted with
compatible_property but allowing them now eases the transition.
Bug: 62875318
Test: boot marlin without audits for setprop in vendor_init
Change-Id: I25ab565bbf137e382c1dfc3b905b38403645f1d2
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
Do not let apps read uid_concurrent_active_time and
uid_concurrent_policy_time.
b/68399339
Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
without root permissions and system_server was able
to read them
Change-Id: I6f09ef608607cb9f4084ba403a1e7254b8c49a06
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
