ART runtime will be using userfaultfd for a new heap compaction
algorithm. After enabling userfaultfd in android kernels (with SELinux
support), the feature needs policy that allows { create ioctl read }
operations on userfaultfd file descriptors.
Bug: 160737021
Test: Manually tested by exercising userfaultfd ops in ART
Change-Id: I9ccb7fa9c25f91915639302715f6197d42ef988e
user_profile_data_file is mlstrustedobject. And it needs to be,
because we want untrusted apps to be able to write to their profile
files, but they do not have levels.
But now we want to apply levels in the parent directories that have
the same label, and we want them to work so they need to not be
MLS-exempt. To resolve that we introduce a new label,
user_profile_root_file, which is applied to those directories (but no
files). We grant mostly the same access to the new label as
directories with the existing label.
Apart from appdomain, almost every domain which accesses
user_profile_data_file, and now user_profile_root_file, is already
mlstrustedsubject and so can't be affected by this change. The
exception is postinstall_dexopt which we now make mlstrustedobject.
Bug: 141677108
Bug: 175311045
Test: Manual: flash with wipe
Test: Manual: flash on top of older version
Test: Manual: install & uninstall apps
Test: Manual: create & remove user
Test: Presubmits.
Change-Id: I4e0def3d513b129d6c292f7edb076db341b4a2b3
We no longer allow apps with mlstrustedsubject access to app_data_file
or privapp_data_file. For compatibility we grant access to all apps on
vendor images for SDK <= 30, whether mlstrustedsubject or not. (The
ones that are not already have access, but that is harmless.)
Additionally we have started adding categories to system_data_file
etc. We treat these older vendor apps as trusted for those types only.
The result is that apps on older vendor images still have all the
access they used to but no new access.
We add a neverallow to prevent the compatibility attribute being
abused.
Test: builds
Change-Id: I10a885b6a122292f1163961b4a3cf3ddcf6230ad
Now that we have an attribute for all app data files, make use of
it. It's cleaner.
The net effect here is a slight loosening of permissions - we now
allow open fds for any app_data_file_type to be passed to a different
process, rather than just app_data_file and privapp_data_file.
Bug: 171795911
Test: presubmits
Merged-In: I4cf812d01577b923efbe1ea3f276c209844d8858
Change-Id: I4cf812d01577b923efbe1ea3f276c209844d8858
This seems to have been omitted inadvertently.
Bug: 161356067
Test: Verified test app can no longer call stat()
Change-Id: I6bffa9d2932a221823648ab01b58437d5bf6e194
Move all app tmpfs types to appdomain_tmpfs. These are still protected
by mls categories and DAC. TODO clean up other app tmpfs types in a
separate change.
Treble-ize tmpfs passing between graphics composer HAL and
surfaceflinger.
Bug: 122854450
Test: boot Blueline with memfd enabled.
Change-Id: Ib98aaba062f10972af6ae80fb85b7a0f60a32eee
An app should never follow a symlink provided by another app.
Test: build, boot Taimen, install some apps, watch youtube, browse
chrome.
Bug: 123350324
Change-Id: Iedd42fe1c27d406f7f58293c20d05e1b7646d8a2
This is used to address a CTS testcase failure. This CTS
testcase need to access the content of Contact, some data
from ContactProvider is transfered through ashmem.
Currently ashmem is backed by the tmpfs filesystem, ContactProvider
in android run as a priv_app, so the file context of the ashmem
created by ContactProvider is priv_app_tmpfs. CTS runs as an
untrusted_app, need to be granted the read permission to the
priv_app_tmpfs files.
Bug: 117961216
[Android Version]:
android_p_mr0_r0
[Kernel Version]:
4.19.0-rc8
[CTS Version]:
cts-9.0_r1
[Failed Testcase]:
com.android.cts.devicepolicy.ManagedProfileTest#testManagedContactsPolicies
[Error Log]:
11-11 11:15:50.479 12611 12611 W AndroidTestSuit: type=1400 audit(0.0:811):
avc: denied { read } for path=2F6465762F6173686D656D202864656C6574656429
dev="tmpfs" ino=174636 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c113,c256,c522,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:priv_app_tmpfs:s0:c522,c768 tclass=file permissive=0
[Test Result With This Patch]:
PASS
Change-Id: I45efacabe64af36912a53df60ac059889fde1629
Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.
This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.
This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:
-user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
+user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.
Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
filesystem upgrade.
Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837
This is a partial cherry pick of commit 6231b4d9
'Enforce per-app data protections for targetSdk 28+'.
Untrusted_app_27 remains unreachable, but it's existence
prevents future merge conflicts.
Bug: 63897054
Test: build/boot aosp_walleye-userdebug
Change-Id: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
Merged-In: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
(cherry picked from commit 6231b4d9fc)
In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split. In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.
This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.
Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
