Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.
Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
clatd's environment may not have a sufficiently large memlock
ulimit; it needs >=1MB but values much lower can be encountered.
The mmap() is performed while clatd is still root, before dropping
privileges; allow this to succeed.
Bug: 21736319
Change-Id: I8171e077046566924c769e855144ae5fac634d4c
clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
under RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. The latter check succeeds. As a result, clatd
does not need CAP_IPC_LOCK, so we suppress any denials we see
from clatd asking for this capability.
See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940
Suppresses the following denial:
type=1400 audit(1424916750.163:7): avc: denied { ipc_lock } for pid=3458 comm="clatd" capability=14 scontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tcontext=u:r:clatd:s0 tclass=capability
Change-Id: Ica108f66010dfc6a5431efa0b4e58f6a784672d1
Revert the tightening of /proc/net access. These changes
are causing a lot of denials, and I want additional time to
figure out a better solution.
Addresses the following denials (and many more):
avc: denied { read } for comm="SyncAdapterThre" name="stats" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="facebook.katana" name="iface_stat_fmt" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="IntentService[C" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { read } for comm="dumpstate" name="iface_stat_all" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
This reverts commit 0f0324cc82
and commit 99940d1af5
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 19034637
Change-Id: I436a6e3638ac9ed49afbee214e752fe2b0112868
SELinux domains wanting read access to /proc/net need to
explicitly declare it.
TODO: fixup the ListeningPortsTest cts test so that it's not
broken.
Bug: 9496886
Change-Id: Ia9f1214348ac4051542daa661d35950eb271b2e4
These are no longer necessary after the clatd change to acquire
membership in AID_VPN when dropping root privileges.
Change-Id: I9955296fe79e6dcbaa12acad1f1438e11d3b06cf
This is no longer required now that clatd has switched from IPv6
forwarding to sockets.
Bug: 15340961
Change-Id: Id7d503b842882d30e6cb860ed0af69ad4ea3e62c
Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.
Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.
For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.
Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.
This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.
Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Otherwise we'll never see denials in userdebug or eng builds and
never make progress on confining it. clatd does exist in AOSP
and is built by default, and is started via netd.
Change-Id: Iee6e0845fad7647962d73cb6d047f27924fa799a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
