Will add fuzzer once the service is implemented.
Test: Run remoteaccess HAL on gcar_emu. Verify the service is running.
Bug: 241483300
Change-Id: I01b31a88414536ddd90f9098f422ae43a48cf726
Add selinux policy so the healthconnect system service
can be accessed by other processes.
Bug: 246961138
Test: build
Change-Id: I37e0e7f1a2b4696b18f8876a107c509d2906e850
Conversion of the gatekeeper hidl interface to stable aidl interface.
Bug: 205760843
Test: run vts -m VtsHalGatekeeperTarget
Change-Id: I44f554e711efadcd31de79b543f42c0afb27c23c
ro.log.file_logger.path is a system property that liblog uses to
determine if file_logger should be used (instead of logd) and what file
the logs should be emitted to. It is primarily meant for non-Android
environment like Microdroid, and doesn't need to be set in Android. In
fact, setting it to a wrong value can break the system logging
functionality. This change prevents such a problem by assigning a
dedicated property context (log_file_logger_prop) to the property and
making it non-writable. (Note that it still has to be readable because
liblog reads it and liblog can be loaded in any process)
Bug: 222592894
Test: try to set ro.log.file_logger.path
Change-Id: Ic6b527327f5bd4ca70a58b6e45f7be382e093318
Previously in Microdroid, processes send log messages to logd over
socket and then logcat ran to hand the message to the host side over the
serial console.
That has changed. Now, the liblog library which processes use to emit
logs directly sends the given message to the serial console. Liblog does
this by reading a new system property ro.log.file_logger.path. When this
is set, liblog doesn't use the logd logger, but opens the file that the
sysprop refers to and writes logs there.
This change implments sepolicy side of the story.
* logd and logcat types are removed since they no longer are needed.
* existing references to those types are removed as well.
* a new property type `log_prop` is introduced and the two system
properties are labaled as log_prop
* all processes have read access to the system properties
* all processes have append access to /dev/hvc2
Bug: 222592894
Test: run microdroid, see log is still emitted.
Change-Id: I4c4f3f4fd0e7babeab28ddf39471e914445ef4da
This is needed for getting CPU time and wall time spent on subprocesses. Otherwise, the following denials will occur:
09-09 15:11:38.635 6137 6137 I binder:6137_1: type=1400 audit(0.0:185): avc: denied { read } for scontext=u:r:artd:s0 tcontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
09-09 15:11:38.635 6137 6137 I binder:6137_1: type=1400 audit(0.0:185): avc: denied { search } for name="6157" dev="proc" ino=57917 scontext=u:r:artd:s0 tcontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
09-09 15:11:38.635 6137 6137 I binder:6137_1: type=1400 audit(0.0:185): avc: denied { open } for path="/proc/6157/stat" dev="proc" ino=57954 scontext=u:r:artd:s0 tcontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Bug: 245380798
Test: -
1. adb shell pm art optimize-package -m speed -f \
com.google.android.youtube
2. See CPU time and wall time in the output. No denial occured.
Change-Id: I9c8c98a31e1ac0c9431a721938c7a9c5c3ddc42b
New ro.kernel.watermark_scale_factor property is used to store the
original value read from /proc/sys/vm/watermark_scale_factor before
extra_free_kbytes.sh changes it. The original value is necessary to
use the same reference point in case the script is invoked multiple
times. The property is set by init the first time script is invoked
and should never be changed afterwards.
Bug: 242837506
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Change-Id: I7760484854a41394a2efda9445cff8cb61587514
Next attempt at rolling forward aosp/2200430. It appears the
first-stage-init did not create the /dev/selinux folder on GSI
instances, resulting in breakages when selinux.cpp tries to copy files
to that folder.
To verify these changes for b/244793900, follow
gpaste/4922166775644160
Bug: 243923977
Test: atest SeamendcHostTest
Change-Id: I2bc630cfaad697d44053adcfd639a06e3510cc72
Starting with
91a9ab7c94
, calling io_uring_setup will need selinux permission to create anon
inodes.
Test: th
Bug: 244785938
Change-Id: I351983fefabe0f6fdaf9272506ea9dd24bc083a9
Revert "Add seamendc tests for sdk_sandbox in apex sepolicy"
Revert submission 2201484-sdk_sandbox
Note: this is not a clean revert, I kept the changes in aosp/2199179
and the changes to system/sepolicy/Android.mk. Those changes are already
part of internal, I do not want to put those files out of sync again.
Test: atest SeamendcHostTest
Reason for revert: b/244793900
Reverted Changes:
Ib14b14cbc:Add seamendc tests for sdk_sandbox in apex sepolic...
I27ee933da:Move allow rules of sdk_sandbox to apex policy
Change-Id: If225cdd090248e050d1f0b42f547a4b073bbafc6
Since the property is supposed to be used by vendor-side .rc file as
read-only (especially by vendor apex), it should be "system_restricted".
Also allow vendor_init to read the property.
Bug: 232172382
Test: boot cuttlefish (with vendor apex using the property)
Change-Id: I502388e550e0a3c961a51af2e2cf11335a45b992
See other cl in this topic for more information.
Bug: 198619163
Test: adb root; adb shell /system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data; adb logcat | grep obb shows "migrate_legacy_obb_data: No legacy obb data to migrate."
Change-Id: Ic2fb4183f80b36463f279b818e90c203e9a51422
Third attempt to roll-forward the apex_sepolicy changes from
aosp/2179294 and aosp/2170746.
I was finally able to figure out the likely root cause of the test
breakages in internal b/243971667. The related CL aosp/2199179 is making
the apex_sepolicy files mandatory for all AOSP builds.
Without the apex_sepolicy files, mixed GSI builds in internal using AOSP
as base would not implement the sdk_sandbox rules, causing breakages for
the SdkSandbox components.
Bug: 243923977
Test: atest SeamendcHostTest
Change-Id: I27ee933da6648cca8ff1f37bde388f72b4fe6ad6
New label proc_watermark_scale_factor was mistakenly added into ignore
list. Fix this by moving the mapping into correct .cil files.
Fixes: 6988677f22 ("Allow init to execute extra_free_kbytes.sh script")
Bug: 241761479
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Change-Id: If12cad2ed20504d374d77a68eaba1600d2768338
This is a roll-forward of a small chunk of aosp/2170746.
The previous CL was causing test breakages (b/240731742, b/240462388,
b/240463116).
This CL is smaller than the previous one, it only moves allow rules from
the platform policy to the apex policy (I believe the error was caused
by typeattribute rules). I also ran the closest approximation I could
find to the breaking environment, and it appears the tests are passing
https://android-build.googleplex.com/builds/abtd/run/L44100000955891118https://android-build.googleplex.com/builds/abtd/run/L68000000955937148
Bug: 236691128
Test: atest SeamendcHostTest
Change-Id: I4c480041838c8c14011f099ba8295097fe9212db
ro.tuner.lazyhal: system_vendor_config_prop to decide whether the lazy
tuner HAL is enabled.
tuner.server.enable: system_internal_prop to decide whether tuner server
should be enabled.
Bug: 236002754
Test: Check tuner HAL and framework behavior
Change-Id: I6a2ebced0e0261f669e7bda466f46556dedca016
Add example implementation services: IFactory under android.hardware.audio.effect.
An audio HAL AIDL example service will register with the default implementations.
Bug: 238913361
Test: m, and flash with Pixel 6a.
Change-Id: Ib331899fd47b6b334b120e20617174d01e71ddb8
The profilers cannot open files under
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache because they're not
allowed to search /data/misc/apexdata with the apex_module_data_file
label.
Example denial:
avc: denied { search } for name="apexdata" dev="dm-37" ino=89
scontext=u:r:traced_perf:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
(cherry-picked from aosp + updated prebuilts)
Tested: patched & flashed onto a TM device, then profiled system_server
Bug: 241544593
Merged-In: Ifd8b94a9ebcae09701e95f6cd6a14383209963db
Change-Id: Ifd8b94a9ebcae09701e95f6cd6a14383209963db
(cherry picked from commit 3f3e222527)
The profilers cannot open files under
/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art/dalvik-cache because they're not
allowed to search /data/misc/apexdata with the apex_module_data_file
label.
Example denial:
avc: denied { search } for name="apexdata" dev="dm-37" ino=89
scontext=u:r:traced_perf:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Tested: patched & flashed onto a TM device, then profiled system_server
Bug: 241544593
Change-Id: Ifd8b94a9ebcae09701e95f6cd6a14383209963db
srcs/android/sysprop/MemoryProperties.sysprop
This property is populated by property service from the kernel
command line parameter androidboot.ddr_size=XXXX. Vendors can set
this command line option from the bootloader.
Bug: 231718727
Test: n/a
Change-Id: I3fb8a18125081b1a30dee715831f5701964cb375
fastboot will read this prop to check if io uring is supported. Add
proper sepolicy.
Test: th
Bug: 31712568
Change-Id: I8990d8a31748534d4444a2ef25b58d629651dac7
ro.secure and ro.debuggable system properties are not intended
to be visible via Android SDK. This change blocks untrusted
apps from reading these properties.
Test: android.security.SELinuxTargetSdkTest
Bug: 193912100
Change-Id: I40ac5d43da5778b5fa863b559c28e8d72961f831
This service has valid use cases such as video players and should therefore not be audited.
Change-Id: I3a0cffb34429320a412a7c05220376c0b58e28a3
Test: make
Bug: 211632068
Grant system_server and flags_health_check permission to set the
properties that correspond to vendor system native boot experiments.
Ignore-AOSP-First: Will cherry-pick to aosp/2183135
Bug: 241730607
Test: Build
Change-Id: Idc2334534c2d42a625b451cfce488d7d7a651036
Grant system_server and flags_health_check permission to set the
properties that correspond to vendor system native boot experiments.
Bug: 241730607
Test: Build
Merged-In: Idc2334534c2d42a625b451cfce488d7d7a651036
Change-Id: I3e98f1b05058245cad345061d801ecd8de623109
Window manager team wants to leverage system properties for feature
flags that need to be read in ViewRootImpl and other classes preloaded
in Zygote. Appdomain is allowed to read that permission in commit
I5808bf92dbba37e9e6da5559f8e0a5fdac016bf3.
Bug: 241464028
Test: Zygote can preload persist.wm.debug.* props.
Ignore-AOSP-First: Cherry pick of aosp/2175950
Change-Id: I0c2ae63db53530c1facd8c2132f99c0d919b4ad8
Merged-In: I0c2ae63db53530c1facd8c2132f99c0d919b4ad8
Window manager team wants to leverage system properties for feature
flags that need to be read in ViewRootImpl and other classes preloaded
in Zygote. Appdomain is allowed to read that permission in commit
I5808bf92dbba37e9e6da5559f8e0a5fdac016bf3.
Bug: 241464028
Test: Zygote can preload persist.wm.debug.* props.
Change-Id: I0c2ae63db53530c1facd8c2132f99c0d919b4ad8
Allow perfetto to read the /proc/buddyinfo entry to trace
memory fragmentation of the system over time.
Test: Manual: Capture perfetto buddyinfo traces
Signed-off-by: Derek Smith <dpsmith@google.com>
Change-Id: If2336377ae241668496d2caf81c6eac6b50dd2ff
Revert "Add java SeamendcHostTest in cts"
Revert submission 2111065-seamendc
Reason for revert: b/240731742, b/240462388 and b/240463116
Reverted Changes:
I3ce2845f2:Move parts of sdk_sandbox from private to apex pol...
I0c10106e2:Add java SeamendcHostTest in cts
Test: revert cl
Change-Id: If9981796694b22b7cbfe1368cd815889c741e69d
Like the non-persistent variants, should be settable by shell without
root to allow external developer use on locked bootloaders.
Bug: 236738714
Test: atest bionic-unit-tests
Ignore-AOSP-First: cherry-pick to internal branch
Change-Id: Id9fc4abe491f560134267b06dd53c2dacca9422d
Merged-In: Id9fc4abe491f560134267b06dd53c2dacca9422d
There don't seem to be any security issues raised by allowing crash dump
to access keystore. More specifically, all key material is encrypted by
KeyMint anyways in the absolute worst case, so even if key exposure
occurred, there would be no harm.
Fixes: 186868271
Test: The comment is gone.
Change-Id: Ib09fc8e1eaa3f1a0876139e175dc28be9e0d4a4a
- Adapt installd rules for app compilation.
- Add profman rules for checking the profile before compilation. This is new behavior compared to installd.
Bug: 229268202
Test: -
1. adb shell pm art optimize-package -m speed-profile -f \
com.google.android.youtube
2. See no SELinux denial.
Change-Id: Idfe1ccdb1b27fd275fdf912bc8d005551f89d4fc
If something starts before servicemanager does,
intelligently wait for servicemanager to start rather
than sleeping for 1s.
Bug: 239382640
Test: boot
Change-Id: If0380c3a1fce937b0939cd6137fcb25f3e47d14c
This is used by the playback notification API to get a reference to the
AudioService with the help of the ServiceManager.
Change-Id: I70324cf0579fd029ee9b3a20115bdab9106d24a8
Test: avd/avd_boot_test
Bug: 235521198
(this is to allow /sys/fs/bpf/tethering -> net_shared/tethering
for InProcessTethering, ie. Android Go devices)
Bug: 190523685
Bug: 236925089
Test: TreeHugger, manually on aosp_cf_x86_go_phone-userdebug
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: Ifa52429f958b0af80f91af6bfb064c1cdf9cd070
This is needed for Watchdog to be able to dump InputProcessor HAL.
Watchdog can be triggered locally for testing by patching
InputDispatcher.cpp:
void InputDispatcher::monitor() {
// Acquire and release the lock to ensure that the dispatcher has not deadlocked.
std::unique_lock _l(mLock);
+ std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::minutes(40));
mLooper->wake();
mDispatcherIsAlive.wait(_l);
Bug: 237322365
Test: adb bugreport (after triggering watchdog)
Change-Id: I746df8be4faaef2a67293d6b1c0cde5fa7810de6
Merged-In: I746df8be4faaef2a67293d6b1c0cde5fa7810de6
This is needed for Watchdog to be able to dump InputProcessor HAL.
Watchdog can be triggered locally for testing by patching
InputDispatcher.cpp:
void InputDispatcher::monitor() {
// Acquire and release the lock to ensure that the dispatcher has not deadlocked.
std::unique_lock _l(mLock);
+ std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::minutes(40));
mLooper->wake();
mDispatcherIsAlive.wait(_l);
Ignore-AOSP-First: under review in aosp/2152242
Bug: 237322365
Test: adb bugreport (after triggering watchdog)
Change-Id: I746df8be4faaef2a67293d6b1c0cde5fa7810de6
Add mediaserver(32|64) for supporting 64-bit only devices. The patch is
for setting up the sepolicy for mediaserver(32|64).
Bug: 236664614
Test: make gsi_arm64-user; Check the sepolicy
Change-Id: I61c69588b84305b9863a72b5a466d4185f7f1958
When apexd installs an apex without reboot, init also need to do some
work around the installation (e.g. terminating services from the apex
and remove data read from the apex and updating linker configuration
etc)
Apexd sets control properties to unload and load apex and init notifies
the completion with state properties.
These new properties are supposed to be used by apexd/init interaction.
Bug: 232114573
Bug: 232173613
Test: CtsStagedInstallHostTestCases
Test: CtsInitTestCases
Change-Id: I5af6b36310f3c81f1cd55537473e54756541d347
A crosvm instance running a protected VM contains a memory mapping of
the VM's protected memory. crash_dump can trigger a kernel panic if it
attaches to such crosvm instance and tries to dump this memory region.
Until we have a means of excluding only the protected memory from
crash_dump, prevent crash_dump from dumping crosvm completely by taking
away its SELinux permission to ptrace crosvm.
Bug: 236672526
Test: run 'killall -s SIGSEGV crosvm' while running crosvm
Merged-In: I6672746c479183cc2bbe3dce625e5b5ebcf6d822
Change-Id: I6672746c479183cc2bbe3dce625e5b5ebcf6d822
(cherry picked from commit 28b34f1bca)
Please see bug for context.
This reverts commits:
* 6111f0cfc8
* bb197bba02
* 20d0aca7e6
And updates prebuilts/api/33.0 accordingly.
Bug: 217368496
Tested: redfin-user and barbet-userdebug: build+flash+boot;
manual test of typical profiling (heap and perf);
atest CtsPerfettoTestCases.
Change-Id: If7fcf3d5a2fdb1a48dcaf8ef8f97e8375d461e61
Merged-In: If7fcf3d5a2fdb1a48dcaf8ef8f97e8375d461e61
(cherry picked from commit babba5e83b)
(to be able to stat() nodes in /sys/fs/bpf)
Test: TreeHugger
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: Ic71ebea683844a8d5ac0b542da815bae2816973a
A crosvm instance running a protected VM contains a memory mapping of
the VM's protected memory. crash_dump can trigger a kernel panic if it
attaches to such crosvm instance and tries to dump this memory region.
Until we have a means of excluding only the protected memory from
crash_dump, prevent crash_dump from dumping crosvm completely by taking
away its SELinux permission to ptrace crosvm.
Bug: 236672526
Test: run 'killall -s SIGSEGV crosvm' while running crosvm
Change-Id: I6672746c479183cc2bbe3dce625e5b5ebcf6d822
Access to this functionality is gated elsewhere e.g. by
allowing/disallowing access to the service.
Bug: 237512474
Test: IpSecManagerTest
Test: Manual with GMSCore + PPN library
Ignore-AOSP-First: It's a CP of aosp/2143512
Change-Id: Ibb00b7c470a4cb148cfdcfb6b147edde45e49b1a
Access to this functionality is gated elsewhere e.g. by
allowing/disallowing access to the service.
Bug: 237512474
Test: IpSecManagerTest
Test: Manual with GMSCore + PPN library
Change-Id: Ibb00b7c470a4cb148cfdcfb6b147edde45e49b1a
Like the non-persistent variants, should be settable by shell without
root to allow external developer use on locked bootloaders.
Bug: 236738714
Test: atest bionic-unit-tests
Change-Id: Id9fc4abe491f560134267b06dd53c2dacca9422d
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps
and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory
and move into the target directory) per-map selection of
selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff
pinned directly into the target location.
BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows:
subdirectory selinux context mainline usecase / usable by
/ fs_bpf no (*) core operating system (ie. platform)
/net_private fs_bpf_net_private yes, T+ network_stack
/net_shared fs_bpf_net_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server
/netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd
/netd_shared fs_bpf_netd_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & netd [**]
/tethering fs_bpf_tethering yes, S+ network_stack
/vendor fs_bpf_vendor no, T+ vendor
* initial support for bpf was added back in P,
but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader,
and instead netd doing stuff by hand,
bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q
(and was definitely there in R)
** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper
for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions
'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex,
but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really
the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module.
Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules
into it (and maybe give it a saner name...).
The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that:
S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+
T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+
The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier
and the available bpf helper functions. Older kernels have
a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow.
/ && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work
with the bpfloader that's part of the core os.
Bug: 218408035
Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
(cherry picked from commit 15715aea32)
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps
and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory
and move into the target directory) per-map selection of
selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff
pinned directly into the target location.
BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows:
subdirectory selinux context mainline usecase / usable by
/ fs_bpf no (*) core operating system (ie. platform)
/net_private fs_bpf_net_private yes, T+ network_stack
/net_shared fs_bpf_net_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server
/netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd
/netd_shared fs_bpf_netd_shared yes, T+ network_stack & system_server & netd [**]
/tethering fs_bpf_tethering yes, S+ network_stack
/vendor fs_bpf_vendor no, T+ vendor
* initial support for bpf was added back in P,
but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader,
and instead netd doing stuff by hand,
bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q
(and was definitely there in R)
** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper
for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions
'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex,
but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really
the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module.
Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules
into it (and maybe give it a saner name...).
The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that:
S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+
T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+
The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier
and the available bpf helper functions. Older kernels have
a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow.
/ && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work
with the bpfloader that's part of the core os.
Ignore-AOSP-First: will be cherrypicked from tm-dev to aosp/master
Bug: 218408035
Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
Previously I've resisted granting write access to these files, since
it allows the instance image to be altered. But that doesn't allow an
attacker to do anything other than render it invalid, since it's
protected by the VM key.
Note that logs are only written when the VM is debuggable, which is
currently only when only non-protected VMs are available.
Bug: 235350758
Test: Force debug on, stage APEX, compile, reboot -> see vm logs
Test: Presubmit
Change-Id: I17c9a17db83d15adfab97b8cfe4ccd67393a08c1
This change allows remote_prov_app to find mediametrics. This is a
permission that all apps have. It is now needed for remote_prov_app due
to a new feature related to provisioning Widevine through the MediaDrm
framework.
Bug: 235491155
Test: no selinux denials related to remote_prov_app
Change-Id: Id3057b036486288358a9a84100fe808eb56df5fe
Merged-In: Id3057b036486288358a9a84100fe808eb56df5fe
These will get read by system libraries in arbitrary processes, so it's
a public property with read access by `domain`.
Bug: 235129567
Change-Id: I1ab880626e4efa2affe90165ce94a404b918849d
Init attempts to rm -rf these files, to ensure any that are owned by
the old virtualizationservice UID get deleted. This fails for newer
directories, now we use the system UID, which is harmless. But rm
attempts to chmod the directories since it can't read them, which also
fails and generates a spurious audit. So here we suppress that.
Bug: 235338094
Test: No denials seen even when there are stale directories present
Change-Id: If55fbe151174ee08a12b64b301e4aa86ffc1a5bf
This change allows remote_prov_app to find mediametrics. This is a
permission that all apps have. It is now needed for remote_prov_app due
to a new feature related to provisioning Widevine through the MediaDrm
framework.
Ignore-AOSP-First: Need to cherry pick to TM-dev
Bug: 235491155
Test: no selinux denials related to remote_prov_app
Change-Id: Id3057b036486288358a9a84100fe808eb56df5fe
The feature was superseded by tzdata mainline module(s).
Bug: 148144561
Test: see system/timezone
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
Merged-In: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
Remove mention of the /system/bin/idmap binary: the file no longer
exists.
Remove interaction between the domains installd and idmap to interact:
installd used to fork and exec the idmap binary, but the idmap2 binary
has its own binder service.
Bug: 118711077
Bug: 119264713
Test: atest FrameworksServicesTests:com.android.server.om OverlayDeviceTests OverlayHostTests CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases:OverlayHostTest
Change-Id: I06d22057308984e43cb84ff365dbdd1864c7064b
It was default_prop. Label it build_prop for good code hygiene.
Bug: 223517900
Test: Boot with and without debug boot image
Change-Id: I4e00d301eb526a0fc9e29657cbcedda8dd0fc7b1
Netd is now serving an AIDL HAL to replace the old HIDL HAL.
Bug: 205764585
Test: Boot and check for avc denials
Change-Id: I1ca5ed4ff3b79f082ea2f6d3e81f60a64ca04855
This CL adds rules to allow artd to delete optimized artifacts.
In general, some functionalities from installd are being migrated to
artd, so artd needs permissions to do what installd is doing: managing
profiles and compilation artifacts that belong to individual apps.
Bug: 225827974
Test: adb shell pm art delete-optimized-artifacts com.google.android.youtube
Change-Id: I1780cdfb481175fd3b0bc9031fdabb8e7cd71a12
Adding a new system property that will act as a toggle
enabling/disabling the framework changes that were submitted to prevent
leaked animators.
Bug: 233391022
Test: manual.
Merged-In: I57225feb50a3f3b4ac8c39998c47f263ae211b66
Change-Id: Ifc339efc1c3a5e19920b77d1f24bef19c39d5f44
This is required for testing new ethernet APIs in T.
This change is not identical to the corresponding AOSP change
because it also needs to update the T prebuilts.
Test: TH
Bug: 171872016
Merged-In: I1e6024d7d649be50aa2321543b289f81fcdfc483
(cherry picked from commit 02b55354bd)
Change-Id: I1d620bcd9b3d02c6acb45636bb862f40282f636d
This change enables xfrm netlink socket use for the system server,
and the network_stack process. This will be used by IpSecService
to configure SAs, and network stack to monitor counters & replay
bitmaps for monitoring of IPsec tunnels.
This patch updates the prebuilts, in addition to the changes to the
master source.
Bug: 233392908
Test: Compiled
Merged-In: I25539dc579f21d6288fa962d1fad9b51573f017d
(cherry picked from commit b25b4bf53f)
Change-Id: I25539dc579f21d6288fa962d1fad9b51573f017d
Give system_server and network_stack the same permissions as netd.
This is needed as we are continuously moving code out of netd into
network_stack and system_server.
This change is not identical to the corresponding AOSP change
because it also needs to update the T prebuilts.
Test: TH
Bug: 233300834
Change-Id: I9559185081213fdeb33019733654ce95af816d99
(cherry picked from commit ab02397814)
Merged-In: I9559185081213fdeb33019733654ce95af816d99
Adding a new system property that will act as a toggle
enabling/disabling the framework changes that were submitted to prevent
leaked animators.
Bug: 233391022
Test: manual.
Ignore-AOSP-First: planning to commit to tm-dev then cherry-pick over to
AOSP later.
Change-Id: I57225feb50a3f3b4ac8c39998c47f263ae211b66
Bluetooth stack needs to read persist.logd.security and
ro.organization_owned sysprop (via __android_log_security())
to control security logging for Bluetooth events.
Bug: 232283779
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ic8162cd4a4436981a15acea6ac75079081790525
(cherry picked from commit a274858e3b)
Merged-In: Ic8162cd4a4436981a15acea6ac75079081790525
This change enables xfrm netlink socket use for the system server,
and the network_stack process. This will be used by IpSecService
to configure SAs, and network stack to monitor counters & replay
bitmaps for monitoring of IPsec tunnels.
Bug: 233392908
Test: Compiled
Change-Id: I25539dc579f21d6288fa962d1fad9b51573f017d
To perform sdk sandbox data isolation, the zygote gets the selinux label
of SDK sandbox storage (e.g. /data/misc_{ce,de}/<user-id>/sdksandbox)
before tmpfs is mounted onto /data/misc_{ce,de} (or other volumes). It
relabels it back once bind mounting of required sandbox data is done.
This change allows for the zygote to perform these operations.
Bug: 214241165
Test: atest SdkSandboxStorageHostTest
Ignore-AOSP-First: Already merged in aosp
Change-Id: Ie8fd1f478fd12141bd6240cee96d0c3da55ba7a0
Merged-In: I28d1709ab4601f0fb1788435453ed19d023dc80b
To perform sdk sandbox data isolation, the zygote gets the selinux label
of SDK sandbox storage (e.g. /data/misc_{ce,de}/<user-id>/sdksandbox)
before tmpfs is mounted onto /data/misc_{ce,de} (or other volumes). It
relabels it back once bind mounting of required sandbox data is done.
This change allows for the zygote to perform these operations.
Bug: 214241165
Test: atest SdkSandboxStorageHostTest
Change-Id: I28d1709ab4601f0fb1788435453ed19d023dc80b
Give system_server and network_stack the same permissions as netd.
This is needed as we are continuously moving code out of netd into
network_stack and system_server.
Test: TH
Bug: 233300834
Change-Id: I9559185081213fdeb33019733654ce95af816d99
Currently, app process can freely execute path at
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>` since it's labeled as system
file. They can't read or write, but use 403/404
error to figure out if an app is installed or not.
By changing the selinux label of the parent directory:
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox`, we can restrict app process from executing
inside the directory and avoid the privacy leak.
Sandbox process should only have "search" permission on the new label so
that it can pass through it to its data directory located in
`/data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox/<package-name>/<per-sdk-dir>`.
Bug: 214241165
Test: atest SdkSandboxStorageHostTest
Test: `adb shell cd /data/misc_ce/0/sdksandbox` gives error
Test: manual test to verify webview still works
Change-Id: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
Merged-In: Id8771b322d4eb5532eaf719f203ca94035e2a8ed
