This required for kernel to do loopback mounts on filesystem
images created by the kernel system call tests in LTP.
Add a corresponding neverallow to stop all domains from accessing
the location at /data/local/tmp/ltp.
Bug: 73220071
Test: Boot sailfish successfully
Test: run vts-kernel -m VtsKernelLtp -t syscalls.fchown04
Change-Id: I73f5f14017e22971fc246a05751ba67be4653bca
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Bug: 65643247
Test: sailfish boots, can take pictures, use browser without denials
form kernel domain.
Change-Id: I4fc0555f0b65fc5537e0b2765142b384ed0560c8
These were missing when the sepolicy was migrated.
Addresses denials:
E SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=drm.drmManager pid=11769
uid=10018 scontext=u:r:mediaprovider:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
W kworker/u16:2: type=1400 audit(0.0:1667): avc: denied { use } for
path="/storage/emulated/0/DCIM/Camera/IMG_20170425_124723.jpg"
dev="sdcardfs" ino=1032250 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0
tcontext=u:r:mediaprovider:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fd permissive=0
Bug: 37685394
Bug: 37686255
Test: Sync files
Test: Open downloaded file
Change-Id: Ibb02d233720b8510c3eec0463b8909fcc5bbb73d
MediaProvider requires permissions that diverge from those
of a typical priv_app. This create a new domain and removes
Mtp related permissions from priv_app.
Bug: 33574909
Test: Connect with MTP, download apps and files, select ringtones
Test: DownloadProvider instrument tests, CtsProviderTestCases
Change-Id: I950dc11f21048c34af639cb3ab81873d2a6730a9
file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts
Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This is a special file that can be mounted as a loopback device to
exercise adoptable storage code on devices that don't have valid
physical media. For example, they may only support storage media
through a USB OTG port that is being used for an adb connection.
avc: denied { read } for path="/data/misc/vold/virtual_disk" dev="sda35" ino=508695 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 34903607
Change-Id: I84721ec0e9495189a7d850461875df1839826212
The kernel should never be accessing files owned by other users.
Disallow this access.
Test: Marlin builds. Neverallow are build time assertions,
they do not policy on the device.
Change-Id: I6ba2eb27c0e2ecf46974059588508cd3223baceb
The kernel domain exists solely on boot, and is used by kernel threads.
Because of the way the system starts, there is never an entrypoint for
that domain, not even a file on rootfs. So tighten up the neverallow
restriction.
Remove an obsolete comment. The *.rc files no longer have a setcon
statement, and the transition from the kernel domain to init occurs
because init re-execs itself. The statement no longer applies.
Test: bullhead policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ibe75f3d25804453507dbb05c7a07bba1d37a1c7b
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
