Bug: http://b/135139675
Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type). Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.
Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.
Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
logcat.
Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
These lines are copied from update_engine.te, and are needed to update
dynamic partitions in recovery.
Bug: 132943965
Test: sideload OTA on cuttlefish
Change-Id: Id03a658aac69b8d20fa7bb758530a4469c75cf9c
avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=599 comm="mke2fs" path="/dev/block/sda13" dev="tmpfs" ino=18975 ioctlcmd=127b scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:userdata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=587 comm="mke2fs" path="/dev/block/sda20" dev="tmpfs" ino=17931 ioctlcmd=0x127b scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:metadata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file
0x127b (BLKPBSZGET) is called by mke2fs that queries physical sector
size. Although the denial is currently non-fatal, as mke2fs falls back
to use logical sector size, it might lead to undesired result in future.
Test: Factory reset on taimen and blueline respectively.
Change-Id: I14fc6593aeae309c79f5eadcffc8158b0a2ab2f6
Commit ebc3a1a34c ("Move to ioctl
whitelisting for plain files / directories", Oct 10th), enabled ioctl
filtering on all files, including functionfs files. However, recovery
performs the ioctl FUNCTIONFS_ENDPOINT_DESC on functionfs files, so
allow it.
Addresses the following denial:
audit: type=1400 audit(673009.476:507811): avc: denied { ioctl } for pid=731 comm="recovery" path="/dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep1" dev="functionfs" ino=473 ioctlcmd=0x6782 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
Test: policy compiles.
Bug: 119877813
Change-Id: I09715acc16ab319b8d8b1f233cefaec23a358962
kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks. Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission. Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.
Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4
adbd is started by an init trigger now when sys.usb.config is set
to adb.
Test: adb sideload works in user/userdebug builds
Bug: 113563995
Change-Id: I23db4074cd49cf0ba6c4eb27510e3a5caad5681b
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I80c54d4eaf3b94a1fe26d2280af4e57cb1593790
Also allow adb and fastboot to talk to recovery
through recovery_socket. This enables changing
between modes with usb commands.
Test: No selinux denials
Bug: 78793464
Change-Id: I1f97659736429fe961319c642f458c80f199ffb4
This change makes it such that only init can start adbd directly. It
also introduces new rules for ctl.{start,stop,restart} properties such
that only usbd and recovery (and su, since it's permissive) can directly
ask init to start adbd.
Bug: 64720460
Test: adbd still runs
Test: /data/nativetest64/adbd_test/adbd_test
Test: python system/core/adb/test_adb.py
Test: "USB debugging" in System Settings still start/stop adbd
Test: Recovery menu still make the device show as "recovery" in adb
devices
Test: "Apply update from ADB" in recovery menu still works
Change-Id: Iafcda8aa44e85129afcc958036b472d856fa1192
The shell is now available directly in the recovery ramdisk. We no
longer need to mount system.img to /system as the recovery ramdisk is
self-contained. However, there is a problem that every file in the
ramdisk is labeled as rootfs because the ramdisk does not support xattr.
This CL adds several recovery-only rules that are required to make the
recovery ramdisk self-contained. Most importantly, adbd is allowed to
domain_trans to shell. Also shell is allowe to execute files of type
rootfs. Finally, the recovery is allowed to mount on tmpfs since it now
mounts system.img to /mnt/system.
Bug: 63673171
Test: `adb reboot recovery; adb devices` shows the device ID
Test: `adb root && adb shell` and then
$ lsof -p `pidof adbd` shows that libm.so, libc.so, etc. are loaded from
the /lib directory.
Change-Id: If21b069aee63541344a5ca8939fb9a46ffef4d3e
This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.
Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.
Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.
Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e
Commit b8b4f5d6 'Clean up old file-based OTA SELinux rules' removed
many permissions from recovery, a few of which are still required.
Restore these.
[ 2918.409108] type=1400 audit(2327427.540:159): avc: denied
{ search } for pid=339 comm="recovery" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p38"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:unlabeled:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0
[ 2586.563071] E:Failed to mount / create /cache/recovery: Permission
denied
[ 2586.780320] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/log: Permission denied
[ 2586.850399] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/last_log: Permission
denied
[ 2586.918979] E:Can't open /cache/recovery/last_install: Permission
denied
[ 54.035867] type=1400 audit(59206654.526:12): avc: denied { chown }
for pid=330 comm="recovery" capability=0 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0
tcontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tclass=capability permissive=0a
Bug: 70350029
Test: xunchang to test
Change-Id: I46ab049b8eb600b44c84a61777fade150cadd197
Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Bug: 69664758
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I22aa208859b8478a2a90e1ed1c0f0d6b62a6664e
Self sideload OTA installation is aborted in #PPR1.171122.001.
Likely cause is the removal of the file-based OTA rules. Revert
the change while I investigate.
This reverts commit 7388575591.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 69664758
Bug: 15575013
Change-Id: I65ca3bad7251f06df33eae8b2d4bcfada93ae9b8
Remove a number of SELinux rules which were required to support file
based OTA. After this, we can have a much stronger assertion that files
on /system are immutable. Tighten up the neverallow rules at the same
time.
Bug: 35853185
Bug: 15575013
Test: adb reboot recovery && adb sideload [file]
Change-Id: I4238d17808bed6a81f47e14eb1797496c07642e2
In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.
This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.
This is essentially:
1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
respectively.
2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
so that it covers all capabilities. This set was used by several
neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
classes are still appropriate.
Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831
Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f
Bug: 65643247
Test: adb sideload an ota package
Test: mount /system
Test: view recovery logs
Test: run graphics test
Test: run locale test
Test: wipe data/factory reset
Test: factory reset from Settings app
Tested on sailfish; no selinux denials to sysfs type are observed.
Change-Id: Ic8487d53d90b7d1d050574e0b084627d1b6abdba
New types:
1. proc_random
2. sysfs_dt_firmware_android
Labeled:
1. /proc/sys/kernel/random as proc_random.
2. /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android/{compatible, fstab,
vbmeta} as sysfs_dt_firmware_android.
Changed access:
1. uncrypt, update_engine, postinstall_dexopt have access to generic proc
and sysfs labels removed.
2. appropriate permissions were added to uncrypt, update_engine,
update_engine_common, postinstall_dexopt.
Bug: 67416435
Bug: 67416336
Test: fake ota go/manual-ab-ota runs without denials
Test: adb sideload runs without denials to new types
Change-Id: Id31310ceb151a18652fcbb58037a0b90c1f6505a
Access to /sys/class/android_usb/ was lost when that dir received a new
label sysfs_android_usb.
Bug: 65643247
Test: can enter recovery mode and sideload through usb without denials to /sys
Change-Id: I22821bab9833b832f13e0c45ff8da4dae115fa4d
Switch from /data/misc/reboot/last_reboot_reason to persistent
Android property persist.sys.boot.reason for indicating why the
device is rebooted or shutdown.
Introduce protection for all boot reason properties
Protect the following properties with these labels
ro.boot.bootreason u:object_r:bootloader_boot_reason_prop:s0
sys.boot.reason u:object_r:sys_boot_reason_prop:s0
persist.sys.boot.reason u:object_r:last_boot_reason_prop:s0
Setup the current as-need access rules for each.
ToDo: Remove u:object_r:reboot_data_file after internal fixes.
Test: system/core/bootstat/boot_reason_test.sh
Bug: 64687998
Change-Id: I3771c73933e8ae2d94aee936c7a38b6282611b80
This attribute is being actively removed from policy. Since
attributes are not being versioned, partners must not be able to
access and use this attribute. Move it from private and verify in
the logs that rild and tee are not using these permissions.
Bug: 38316109
Test: build and boot Marlin
Test: Verify that rild and tee are not being granted any of these
permissions.
Change-Id: I31beeb5bdf3885195310b086c1af3432dc6a349b
This is needed for devices using configfs, where init listens for
sys.usb.ffs.ready=1 to config usb_gadget. When recovery starts
sideloading, minadbd (forked from recovery) sets the property to trigger
that action.
avc: denied { set } for property=sys.usb.ffs.ready pid=541 uid=0 gid=0
scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ffs_prop:s0
tclass=property_service
Bug: 35803743
Test: Device shows up in sideload mode.
Change-Id: Ie7f1224d3a8650160ac29811f73b8286fbced4f4
Bug: 37485771
Test: sideloaded OTA through recovery on sailfish
Change-Id: I98bb4e0e919db585131391f57545f1a9a0096701
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.
Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
--skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts
Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
This adjusts the grants for recovery to make it explicit that recovery
can use the Boot Control HAL only in passthrough mode.
Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
1. make dist
2. Ensure device has network connectivity
3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I0888816eca4d77939a55a7816e6cae9176713ee5
This switches Boot Control HAL policy to the design which enables us
to conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are
clients of Boot Control HAL.
Domains which are clients of Boot Control HAL, such as update_server,
are granted rules targeting hal_bootctl only when the Boot Control HAL
runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the
HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting
hal_bootctl are not granted to client domains.
Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Boot Control HAL,
such as hal_bootctl_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_bootctl.
P. S. This commit removes direct access to Boot Control HAL from
system_server because system_server is not a client of this HAL. This
commit also removes bootctrl_block_device type which is no longer
used. Finally, boot_control_hal attribute is removed because it is now
covered by the hal_bootctl attribute.
Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
1. make dist
2. Ensure device has network connectivity
3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I9c410c092069e431a3852b66c04c4d2a9f1a25cf
Since it was introduced it caused quite a few issues and it spams the
SElinux logs unnecessary.
The end goal of the audit was to whitelist the access to the
interpreter. However that's unfeasible for now given the complexity.
Test: devices boots and everything works as expected
no more auditallow logs
Bug: 29795519
Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I9a7a65835e1e1d3f81be635bed2a3acf75a264f6
SELinux policy compiler complained about a quote inside the
recovery_only section of recovery.te. This section's contents are
inside quotes and thus can't contain quotes.
Test: mmm system/sepolicy produces no warnings
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I5bf943166f4f514d04472f7e59b025a9723eb1b8
This restricts access to ro.serialno and ro.boot.serialno, the two
system properties which contain the device's serial number, to a
select few SELinux domains which need the access. In particular, this
removes access to these properties from Android apps. Apps can access
the serial number via the public android.os.Build API. System
properties are not public API for apps.
The reason for the restriction is that serial number is a globally
unique identifier which cannot be reset by the user. Thus, it can be
used as a super-cookie by apps. Apps need to wean themselves off of
identifiers not resettable by the user.
Test: Set up fresh GMS device, install some apps via Play, update some apps, use Chrome
Test: Access the device via ADB (ADBD exposes serial number)
Test: Enable MTP over USB, use mtp-detect to confirm that serial number is reported in MTP DeviceInfo
Bug: 31402365
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: I4713133b8d78dbc63d8272503e80cd2ffd63a2a7
recovery (update_binary) may need to set up cpufreq during an update.
avc: denied { write } for pid=335 comm="update_binary" name="scaling_max_freq" dev="sysfs" ino=7410 scontext=u:r:recovery:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_devices_system_cpu:s0 tclass=file permissive=0
Bug: 32463933
Test: Build a recovery image and apply an OTA package that writes to
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_max_freq.
Change-Id: Ia90af9dd15e162dd94bcd4722b66aa296e3058c5
Divide policy into public and private components. This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies. The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation. Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.
Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal. For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.
Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
