Manual testing protocol:
* Verify prng_seeder daemon is running and has the
correct label (via ps -Z)
* Verify prng_seeder socket present and has correct
label (via ls -Z)
* Verify no SELinux denials
* strace a libcrypto process and verify it reads seeding
data from prng_seeder (e.g. strace bssl rand -hex 1024)
* strace seeder daemon to observe incoming connections
(e.g. strace -f -p `pgrep prng_seeder`)
* Kill daemon, observe that init restarts it
* strace again and observe clients now seed from new instance
Bug: 243933553
Test: Manual - see above
Change-Id: I0a7e339115a2cf6b819730dcf5f8b189a339c57d
Like zygote, webview_zygote, add userfaultfd policy for app_zygote as
well.
Bug: 160737021
Test: manual (use userfaultfd in an app-zygote)
Change-Id: I42f558c5b646bb0bd83b81fddfb608567f95c811
app_zygote inherits tmpfs files from zygote, and needs to be able to
stat them after fork.
Bug: 192634726
Bug: 192572973
Bug: 119800099
Test: manually configure JIT zygote and run
atest \
CtsExternalServiceTestCases:\
android.externalservice.cts.ExternalServiceTest\
#testBindExternalServiceWithZygote
Change-Id: I401808c984edd4e3e4ef335f6a75cecc5cf69eca
ART is becoming a module and we need to be able to add new properties
without modifying the non updatable part of the platform:
- convert ART properties to use prefix in the namespace of
[ro].dalvik.vm.
- enable appdomain and coredomain to read device_config properties
that configure ART
Test: boot
Bug: 181748174
Change-Id: Id23ff78474dba947301e1b6243a112b0f5b4a832
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
This mostly reverts the revert in commit
b01e1d97bf, restoring commit
27e0c740f1. Changes to check_seapp to
enforce use of app_data_file_type is omitted, to be included in a
following CL.
Test: Presubmits
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: I02b31e7b3d5634c94763387284b5a154fe5b71b4
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
Also extend check_seapp to check that all types specified in
seapp_contexts files have the attribute, to ensure that the neverallow
rules apply to them. As a small bonus, also verify that domain and
type values are actually types not attributes.
Test: Presubmits
Test: Manual: specify an invalid type, build breaks.
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: Iab6018af449dab3b407824e635dc62e3d81e07c9
The mapping of UIDs to categories can only take 16 bits, yet isolated
processes start at UID 90000. Additionally, the main purpose of these
categories was to isolate app-private storage, but since isolated
processes don't have access to app-private storage anyway, removing them
doesn't hurt.
The upside is that this allows us to remove mIstrustedsubject from the
app_zygote domain, which prevents app code running in that context from
assigning itself arbitrary categories.
Bug: 157598026
Test: inspect categories of app_zygote and children; verify Chrome works
Merged-In: Idfa8625d939cf30f3683436949bb4f335851622a
Change-Id: Idfa8625d939cf30f3683436949bb4f335851622a
As with heapprofd, it's useful to profile the platform itself on debug
builds (compared to just apps on "user" builds).
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I8630c20e0da9c67e4927496802a4cd9cacbeb81a
System_server will listen on incoming packets from zygotes.
Bug: 136036078
Test: atest CtsAppExitTestCases:ActivityManagerAppExitInfoTest
Change-Id: I42feaa317615b90c5277cd82191e677548888a71
app_zygote used by for example Google Chrome needs access
to at least search /oem partition.
Google chrome version: 76.0.3809.132 is running in app_zygote
and the following access is blocked by selinux causing Chrome
to hang.
avc: denied { search } for pid=813 comm="d.chrome_zygote"
name="/" dev="sda42" ino=2 scontext=u:r:app_zygote:s0:c214,c256,c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:oemfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0 ppid=798
pcomm="d.chrome_zygote" pgid=798 pgcomm="d.chrome_zygote"
Change-Id: Idcce1a5ad1a8be3d7bd057c12ec477baa9669235
This change allows those daemons of the audio and Bluetooth which
include HALs to access the bluetooth_audio_hal_prop. This property is
used to force disable the new BluetoothAudio HAL.
- persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled
Bug: 128825244
Test: audio HAL can access the property
Change-Id: I87a8ba57cfbcd7d3e4548aa96bc915d0cc6b2b74
all_untrusted_apps apart from untrusted_app_{25, 27} and mediaprovider
are now expected to go to ashmemd for /dev/ashmem fds.
Give coredomain access to ashmemd, because ashmemd is the default way
for coredomain to get a /dev/ashmem fd.
Bug: 113362644
Test: device boots, ashmemd running
Test: Chrome app works
Test: "lsof /system/lib64/libashmemd_client.so" shows
libashmemd_client.so being loaded into apps.
Change-Id: I279448c3104c5d08a1fefe31730488924ce1b37a
The app_zygote should never use any unix sockets, except the
logd socket and some sockets only available on userdebug/eng.
Prevent it from using ptrace.
Bug: 111434506
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic47cfca51fba0b150a136194ba0e4a8a488c9996
The application zygote is a new sort of zygote process that is a
child of the regular zygote. Each application zygote is tied to the
application for which it's launched. Once it's started, it will
pre-load some of the code for that specific application, much like
the regular zygote does for framework code.
Once the application zygote is up and running, it can spawn
isolated service processes that run in the isolated_app domain. These
services can then benefit from already having the relevant
application code and data pre-loaded.
The policy is largely the same as the webview_zygote domain,
however there are a few crucial points where the policy is different.
1) The app_zygote runs under the UID of the application that spawned
it.
2) During app_zygote launch, it will call a callback that is
controlled by the application, that allows the application to
pre-load code and data that it thinks is relevant.
Especially point 2 is imporant: it means that untrusted code can run
in the app_zygote context. This context is severely limited, and the
main concern is around the setgid/setuid capabilities. Those conerns
are mitigated by installing a seccomp filter that only allows
setgid/setuid to be called in a safe range.
Bug: 111434506
Test: app_zygote can start and fork children without denials.
Change-Id: I1cc49ee0042d41e5ac6eb81d8f8a10ba448d4832
