Updates to allow profiling module to run new trace_redactor binary.
Allow the trace_redactor binary to read the input trace file and write
the output file.
Bug: 327423523
Test: build/flash and
atest CtsProfilingModuleTests#testRequestSystemTraceSuccess
Change-Id: Id6684d8a9891e9ed42fe115066e41a89a7e8a097
Give perfetto rw dir and create file permissions for new directory.
Give system server control to read, write, search, unlink files from new directory.
Test: locally ensure traces can be written by perfetto and accessed and deleted by system server
Bug: 293957254
Change-Id: Id015429b48ffffb73e7a71addddd48a22e4740bf
This includes rules for starting Perfetto as well as rules for
communicating over stdio between Perfetto and system_server.
Bug: 293957254
Test: Presubmit & tested in conjunction with internal change
Change-Id: I7e4c044a6a2afb48c33d65cc421e797d77aacc12
We are changing the --save-for-bugreport feature and moving
the file opening/write from the traced service to the perfetto
cmdline client.
This is as part of a bigger refactor to simplify the API surface
in view of non-destructive snapshots of trace buffers.
Add matching sepolicies to perfetto.te
Bug: 260112703
Test: atest perfetto_integrationtests --test-filter '*PerfettoCmdlineTest*'
Change-Id: Ic1dd6b1bf3183f6b7fb551859e35cae950676ffb
The feature was superseded by tzdata mainline module(s).
Bug: 148144561
Test: see system/timezone
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
Merged-In: I48d445ac723ae310b8a134371342fc4c0d202300
Creating a per-user encrypted directory such as /data/system_ce/0 and
the subdirectories in it too early has been a recurring bug. Typically,
individual services in system_server are to blame; system_server has
permission to create these directories, and it's easy to write
"mkdirs()" instead of "mkdir()". Such bugs are very bad, as they
prevent these directories from being encrypted, as encryption policies
can only be set on empty directories. Due to recent changes, a factory
reset is now forced in such cases, which helps detect these bugs;
however, it would be much better to prevent them in the first place.
This CL locks down the ability to create these directories to just vold
and init, or to just vold when possible. This is done by assigning new
types to the directories that contain these directories, and then only
allowing the needed domains to write to these parent directories. This
is similar to what https://r.android.com/1117297 did for /data itself.
Three new types are used instead of just one, since these directories
had three different types already (system_data_file, media_rw_data_file,
vendor_data_file), and this allows the policy to be a bit more precise.
A significant limitation is that /data/user/0 is currently being created
by init during early boot. Therefore, this CL doesn't help much for
/data/user/0, though it helps a lot for the other directories. As the
next step, I'll try to eliminate the /data/user/0 quirk. Anyway, this
CL is needed regardless of whether we're able to do that.
Test: Booted cuttlefish. Ran 'sm partition disk:253,32 private', then
created and deleted a user. Used 'ls -lZ' to check the relevant
SELinux labels on both internal and adoptable storage. Also did
similar tests on raven, with the addition of going through the
setup wizard and using an app that creates media files. No
relevant SELinux denials seen during any of this.
Bug: 156305599
Change-Id: I1fbdd180f56dd2fe4703763936f5850cef8ab0ba
Allow mm_events to periodically arm the mm_events
perfetto trace config if mm_events is enabled.
Bug: 183037386
Test: boot; setprop persist.mm_events.enabled true; No avc denials
Change-Id: Ia9760001e7fb591f18e3e816a63281167a658c74
Users are unable to pass config files directly to
perfetto via `perfetto -c /path/to/config` and have to
resort to awkward quirks like `cat config | perfetto -c -'.
This is because /system/bin/perfetto runs in its own SELinux
domain for reasons explained in the bug.
This causes problem to test infrastructures authors. Instead
of allowing the use of /data/local/tmp which is too ill-scoped
we create a dedicated folder and allow only shell and perfetto
to operate on it.
Bug: 170404111
Test: manual, see aosp/1459023
Change-Id: I6fefe066f93f1f389c6f45bd18214f8e8b07079e
CTS runs are being polluted by denial logs from the best-effort isatty (
-> TCGETS ioctl) check done by the perfetto's log formatter.
This patch suppresses the denial.
I believe that what's actually being denied is the ioctl itself, NOT the
TCGETS aspect of it (there is a domain-wide fifo_file TCGETS allowxperms
rule in domain.te:303). But the "dontauditxerms" suppresses the denial
anyway.
Bug: 159988048
Merged-In: Ieee1d7de8b023dd632d0e37afa3a2434cfd1a3a1
Change-Id: Ieee1d7de8b023dd632d0e37afa3a2434cfd1a3a1
(cherry picked from commit 8519c6d316)
Change 1: when running the "perfetto" binary via "adb shell
perfetto...", ctrl-Cing the host process doesn't propagate the teardown
to the on-device process (which normally should stop the tracing session
immediately). Allow signals adbd->perfetto to resolve.
Change 2: don't print audit logs for a harmless isatty() check on adb
sockets when they're the stderr of a "perfetto" process.
Example denials from the isatty() check (ioctl is TCGETS):
avc: denied { getattr } for path="socket:[244990]" dev="sockfs"
ino=244990 scontext=u:r:perfetto:s0 tcontext=u:r:adbd:s0
tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=0
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="socket:[244992]" dev="sockfs" ino=244992
ioctlcmd=0x5401 scontext=u:r:perfetto:s0 tcontext=u:r:adbd:s0
tclass=unix_stream_socket permissive=0
Example denial from ctrl-c'ing "adb shell perfetto ...":
avc: denied { signal } for comm=7368656C6C20737663203134343537
scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:r:perfetto:s0 tclass=process
permissive=0
Tested: patched onto an internal branch, then verified that denials are
gone on a flashed crosshatch-userdebug.
Change-Id: I1dbe00ea91e3c3377d6e5eab05ad99620e02b965
This is needed to get Java heap graphs.
Test: flash aosp; profile system_server with setenforce 1
Bug: 136210868
Change-Id: I87dffdf28d09e6ce5f706782422510c615521ab3
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
This change originally landed as aosp/1106014 and was reverted in
aosp/1116238 to fix b/140402208. aosp/1116298 fixes the underlying
problem, and with that we can re-land this change.
Bug: 139190159
Bug: 140402208
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I1a366c577a0fff307ca366a6844231bcf8afe3bf
Give /data itself a different label to its contents, to ensure that
only init creates files and directories there.
Bug: 139190159
Test: aosp boots, logs look good
Change-Id: I3ee654a928bdab3f5d435ab6ac24040d9bdd9abe
Bug: http://b/135139675
Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type). Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.
Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.
Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
logcat.
Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
This set of patches adds a way for the perfetto command line client to
save a trace to a hardcoded location,
/data/misc/perfetto-traces/incident-trace, and call into incidentd to
start a report, which will include said trace in a new section.
This is not a long-term solution, and is structured to minimize changes
to perfetto and incidentd. The latter is currently architected in a way
where it can only pull pre-defined information out of the system, so
we're resorting to persisting the intermediate results in a hardcoded
location.
This will introduce at most two more linked files at the same time.
Bug: 130543265
Bug: 134706389
Tested: manually on blueline-userdebug
Change-Id: I2aa27e25f0209b3a5cdf5d550d0312693932b808
This change allows the perfetto cmdline client to access
the (unprivileged) producer socket of traced, with the
intent of triggering finalization of already running traces
(see b/130135730). Matching change: aosp/932138
Note that:
- perfetto cmdline can already access the consumer socket
(to start tracing sessions).
- The producer socket is already exposed to most domains,
including unprivileged apps.
Bug: 130135730
Bug: 128966650
Change-Id: Id9106279584798e6689102085fa46a0b7ecb1ba7
This is being done in preparation for the migration from ashmem to
memfd. In order for tmpfs objects to be usable across the Treble
boundary, they need to be declared in public policy whereas, they're
currently all declared in private policy as part of the
tmpfs_domain() macro. Remove the type declaration from the
macro, and remove tmpfs_domain() from the init_daemon_domain() macro
to avoid having to declare the *_tmpfs types for all init launched
domains. tmpfs is mostly used by apps and the media frameworks.
Bug: 122854450
Test: Boot Taimen and blueline. Watch videos, make phone calls, browse
internet, send text, install angry birds...play angry birds, keep
playing angry birds...
Change-Id: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
Merged-In: I20a47d2bb22e61b16187015c7bc7ca10accf6358
(cherry picked from commit e16fb9109c)
When daemonizing perfetto, SIGINT should be sent to ensure clean
shutdown.
Denial:
12-06 11:12:16.566 3099 3099 I sh : type=1400 audit(0.0:462): avc: denied { signal } for scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:r:perfetto:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
Test: m
Test: flash walleye
Test: SIGINT perfetto from shell
Change-Id: I8d34b447ea90c315faf88f020f1dfc49e4abbcce
system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.
Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.
Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5
Restrictions introduced in vendor init mean that new devices
may not no longer exempt vendor init from writing to system_data_file.
This means we must introduce a new label for /data/vendor which
vendor_init may write to.
Bug: 73087047
Test: build and boot Taimen and Marlin. Complete SUW, enroll fingerprint
No new denials.
Change-Id: I65f904bb28952d4776aab947515947e14befbe34
Instead of having statsd linking the perfetto client library
and talk directly to its socket, we let just statsd exec()
the /system/bin/perfetto cmdline client.
There are two reasons for this:
1) Simplify the interaction between statsd and perfetto, reduce
dependencies, binary size bloat and isolate faults.
2) The cmdline client also takes care of handing the trace to
Dropbox. This allows to expose the binder interaction surface
to the short-lived cmdline client and avoid to grant binder
access to the perfetto traced daemon.
This cmdline client will be used by:
- statsd
- the shell user (for our UI and Studio)
Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: I8cdde181481ad0a1a5cae5937ac446cedac54a1f
