Before the addition of sepolicy:
Error with service 'android.hardware.drm.IDrmFactory/widevine' while dumping: FAILED_TRANSACTION
Success after change.
Test: adb shell dumpsys android.hardware.drm.IDrmFactory/widevine
Bug: 238682056
Change-Id: I3817c9487bdec0c812690823cbb941cff80f394f
Bug: 168907513
Test: verified the correct working of the v2 uid/pid hierarchy in normal
and recovery modes
This reverts commit aa8bb3a29b.
Change-Id: Ib344d500ea49b86e862e223ab58a16601eebef47
a54bed6907
Bug: 151660495
Test: verified proper boot in regular mode and proper working of adb in
recovery
Change-Id: Id70d27a6162af6ede94661005d80a2a780057089
the cgroups v2 uid/gid hierarchy will replace cgroup for all sepolicy
rules. For this reason, old rules have to be duplicated to cgroup_v2,
plus some rules must be added to allow the ownership change for cgroup
files created by init and zygote.
Test: booted device, verified correct access from init, system_server
and zygote to the uid/pid cgroup files
Change-Id: I80c2a069b0fb409b442e1160148ddc48e31d6809
This change limits global access to /system files down to:
/system/bin/linker*
/system/lib[64]/*
/system/etc/ld.config*
/system/etc/seccomp_policy/*
/system/etc/security/cacerts/*
/system/usr/share/zoneinfo/*
Bug: 111243627
Test: boot device, browse internet without denials to system_* types.
Test: VtsHalDrmV1_{1, 0}TargetTest without denials
Change-Id: I69894b29733979c2bc944ac80229e84de5d519f4
Since this attribute just associates a hal_attribute
with a given hwservice in the standard way.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot + sanity + test for denials
Change-Id: I545de165515387317e6920ce8f5e8c491f9ab24e
For sanity, this makes 'hal_attribute_hwservice_client'
be associated with a specific hwservice thus making things
consistent.
After this change, only configstore, hal_allocator, and the
fwk_* services are inconsistent with all other HALs.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot device, sanity tests, check for denials
Change-Id: Ibffc65c9567a429e07a3dc4dd41117738459dc2a
Before, it was possible to access a hwservice without declaring
that you were a client.
This introduces the following macro:
hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_foo, hal_foo_hwservice)
which makes sure the above implication holds using a neverallow rule.
Bug: 80319537
Test: boot + sanity
Change-Id: Iededae68f14f0f3bd412c1205aa3b650a54d55c6
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Test: build taimen-user/userdebug
Change-Id: I619e71529e078235ed30dc06c60e6e448310fdbc
This reverts commit ed876a5e96.
Fixes user builds.
libsepol.report_failure: neverallow on line 513 of system/sepolicy/public/domain.te (or line 9149 of policy.conf) violated by allow update_verifier misc_block_device:blk_file { ioctl read write lock append open };
libsepol.check_assertions: 1 neverallow failures occurred
Error while expanding policy
Bug: 69566734
Test: build taimen-user
Change-Id: I969b7539dce547f020918ddc3e17208fc98385c4
Commit 7688161 "hal_*_(client|server) => hal(client|server)domain"
added neverallow rules on hal_*_client attributes while simultaneously
expanding these attribute which causes them to fail CTS neverallow
tests. Remove these neverallow rules as they do not impose specific
security properties that we want to enforce.
Modify Other neverallow failures which were imposed on hal_foo
attributes and should have been enforced on hal_foo_server attributes
instead.
Bug: 69566734
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest
CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 7s. 627 passed, 1 failed
remaining failure appears to be caused by b/68133473
Change-Id: I83dcb33c3a057f126428f88a90b95f3f129d9f0e
Sharing data folders by path will be disallowed because it violates
the approved API between platform and vendor components tested by
VTS. Move all violating permissions from core selinux policy to
device specific policy so that we can exempt existing devices from
the ban and enforce it on new devices.
Bug: 34980020
Test: Move permissions. Build and test wifi, wifi AP, nfc, fingerprint
and Play movies on Marlin and Taimen.
Test: build on Angler, Bullhead, Dragon, Fugu, Marlin, Walleye
Change-Id: Ib6fc9cf1403e74058aaae5a7b0784922f3172b4e
Comments indicate that these permissions are used to access already
open FDs. However, getattr of a directory is clearly not necessary
for that, search of system_data_file is already granted to domain
and following symlinks is clearly not needed for reading an already
open FD.
Bug: 34980020
Test: boot marlin. Test drm with google play movies, no related
denials
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsMediaTestCases -t \
android.media.cts.MediaCasTest
5/6 tests fail with no related selinux denials. The same 5/6
also fail in selinux permissive mode.
Change-Id: Ib4b9a1e18bdc479d656b2d64917bbc0358515525
This adds fine-grained policy about who can register and find which
HwBinder services in hwservicemanager.
Test: Play movie in Netflix and Google Play Movies
Test: Play video in YouTube app and YouTube web page
Test: In Google Camera app, take photo (HDR+ and conventional),
record video (slow motion and normal), and check that photos
look fine and videos play back with sound.
Test: Cast screen to a Google Cast device
Test: Get location fix in Google Maps
Test: Make and receive a phone call, check that sound works both ways
and that disconnecting the call frome either end works fine.
Test: Run RsHelloCompute RenderScript demo app
Test: Run fast subset of media CTS tests:
make and install CtsMediaTestCases.apk
adb shell am instrument -e size small \
-w 'android.media.cts/android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner'
Test: Play music using Google Play music
Test: Adjust screen brightness via the slider in Quick Settings
Test: adb bugreport
Test: Enroll in fingerprint screen unlock, unlock screen using
fingerprint
Test: Apply OTA update:
Make some visible change, e.g., rename Settings app.
make otatools && \
make dist
Ensure device has network connectivity
ota_call.py -s <serial here> --file out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Confirm the change is now live on the device
Bug: 34454312
(cherry picked from commit 632bc494f1)
Merged-In: Iecf74000e6c68f01299667486f3c767912c076d3
Change-Id: I7a9a487beaf6f30c52ce08e04d415624da49dd31
The tee domain is a vendor domain. Thus it cannot be accessed by
non-vendor components over Unix domain sockets.
It appears that the rules granting this access are not needed.
Test: Flash a clean build with this change. Confirm that bullhead,
angler, sailfish, ryu, boot without new denials.
Confirm that YouTube, Netflix, Google Play Movies play back
videos without new denials.
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266
Change-Id: I639cecd07c9a3cfb257e62622b51b7823613472a
This switches DRM HAL policy to the design which enables us to
conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are clients
of DRM HAL.
Domains which are clients of DRM HAL, such as mediadrmserver domain,
are granted rules targeting hal_drm only when the DRM HAL runs in
passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the HAL
runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting hal_drm
are not granted to client domains.
Domains which offer a binderized implementation of DRM HAL, such as
hal_drm_default domain, are always granted rules targeting hal_drm.
Test: Play movie using Google Play Movies
Test: Play movie using Netflix
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I3ab0e84818ccd61e54b90f7ade3509b7dbf86fb9
