Commit graph

11 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeff Vander Stoep
540ea534e0 gpsd: remove domain_deprecated
Only used in AOSP by flounder. No denials when running Google Maps.

Change-Id: I9902c263016b4d38f1b3ed0be0bc7c4cd17ee471
2016-01-20 16:37:56 -08:00
Jeff Vander Stoep
d22987b4da Create attribute for moving perms out of domain
Motivation: Domain is overly permissive. Start removing permissions
from domain and assign them to the domain_deprecated attribute.
Domain_deprecated and domain can initially be assigned to all
domains. The goal is to not assign domain_deprecated to new domains
and to start removing domain_deprecated where it is not required or
reassigning the appropriate permissions to the inheriting domain
when necessary.

Bug: 25433265
Change-Id: I8b11cb137df7bdd382629c98d916a73fe276413c
2015-11-03 23:11:11 +00:00
Stephen Smalley
a3c97a7660 Only allow toolbox exec where /system exec was already allowed.
When the toolbox domain was introduced, we allowed all domains to exec it
to avoid breakage.  However, only domains that were previously allowed the
ability to exec /system files would have been able to do this prior to the
introduction of the toolbox domain.  Remove the rule from domain.te and add
rules to all domains that are already allowed execute_no_trans to system_file.
Requires coordination with device-specific policy changes with the same Change-Id.

Change-Id: Ie46209f0412f9914857dc3d7c6b0917b7031aae5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2015-08-25 12:46:07 -04:00
Nick Kralevich
a711ec00b3 Don't allow gpsd to have capabilities other than block_suspend
Add a compile time assertion that gpsd never has capabilities other
than block_suspend.

Bug: 19908228
Change-Id: Iaaf83191902ed04fe9df52c1ed44248fb1ce732d
2015-03-24 13:23:34 -07:00
Stephen Smalley
0eaf7629b3 Make gpsd enforcing.
Change-Id: I68a8f37576d0d04d0f9df9ef8991407b6846ba15
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-14 08:42:53 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
a60abdce68 Confine gpsd, but leave it permissive for now.
Change-Id: Ie7414b49eac92f7d57789cc3082dbce774561126
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-01-14 10:52:56 -05:00
Nick Kralevich
353c72e3b0 Move unconfined domains out of permissive mode.
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
2013-10-21 12:52:03 -07:00
repo sync
77d4731e9d Make all domains unconfined.
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
2013-05-20 11:08:05 -07:00
repo sync
50e37b93ac Move domains into per-domain permissive mode.
Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
2013-05-14 21:36:32 -07:00
rpcraig
e07b8a56b9 Trusted Execution Environment policy. 2012-08-13 06:09:39 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
2dd4e51d5c SE Android policy. 2012-01-04 12:33:27 -05:00