### ### A domain for further sandboxing privileged apps. ### typeattribute priv_app coredomain; app_domain(priv_app) # Access the network. net_domain(priv_app) # Access bluetooth. bluetooth_domain(priv_app) # Allow the allocation and use of ptys # Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm create_pty(priv_app) # webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7) allow priv_app self:process ptrace; # Some apps ship with shared libraries that they write out # to their sandbox directory and then dlopen(). allow priv_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute; allow priv_app app_api_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app audioserver_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app color_display_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app drmserver_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app network_watchlist_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app nfc_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app oem_lock_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app radio_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app stats_service:service_manager find; allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find; # Write to /cache. allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms; allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file create_file_perms; # /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link. allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; # Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages. allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms; allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms; # Access to /data/media. allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; # Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService. allow priv_app dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read }; # Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when # running "adb install foo.apk". allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; # Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to betterbug allow priv_app trace_data_file:file { getattr read }; # Allow verifier to access staged apks. allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms; allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms; # b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; # Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored # in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all # data stored in that directory to process them one by one. userdebug_or_eng(` allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms; allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; ') # For AppFuse. allow priv_app vold:fd use; allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write }; # /proc access allow priv_app { proc_vmstat }:file r_file_perms; # /proc/net access. # TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal. r_dir_file(priv_app, proc_net_type) userdebug_or_eng(` auditallow priv_app proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read }; ') # TODO(b/68774956) qtaguid access has been moved to netd. Access is deprecated. Audit for # removal. allow priv_app proc_qtaguid_ctrl:file rw_file_perms; userdebug_or_eng(` auditallow priv_app proc_qtaguid_ctrl:file rw_file_perms; ') r_dir_file(priv_app, proc_qtaguid_stat) userdebug_or_eng(` auditallow priv_app proc_qtaguid_stat:dir r_dir_perms; auditallow priv_app proc_qtaguid_stat:file r_file_perms; ') allow priv_app qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms; userdebug_or_eng(` auditallow priv_app qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms; ') allow priv_app sysfs_type:dir search; # Read access to /sys/class/net/wlan*/address r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_net) # Read access to /sys/block/zram*/mm_stat r_dir_file(priv_app, sysfs_zram) r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs) # Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr }; # access the mac address allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR; # Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update. binder_call(priv_app, update_engine) allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find; # Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged. binder_call(priv_app, storaged) allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find; # Allow GMS core to access system_update_service (e.g. to publish pending # system update info). allow priv_app system_update_service:service_manager find; # Allow GMS core to communicate with statsd. binder_call(priv_app, statsd) # Allow Phone to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system). allow priv_app ringtone_file:file { getattr read write }; # Access to /data/preloads allow priv_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms; allow priv_app preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; # Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id; # Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check allow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms; read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app) # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. allow priv_app traced:fd use; allow priv_app traced_tmpfs:file { read write getattr map }; unix_socket_connect(priv_app, traced_producer, traced) # suppress denials for non-API accesses. dontaudit priv_app exec_type:file getattr; dontaudit priv_app device:dir read; dontaudit priv_app fs_bpf:dir search; dontaudit priv_app net_dns_prop:file read; dontaudit priv_app proc:file read; dontaudit priv_app proc_interrupts:file read; dontaudit priv_app proc_modules:file read; dontaudit priv_app proc_stat:file read; dontaudit priv_app proc_version:file read; dontaudit priv_app sysfs:dir read; dontaudit priv_app sysfs:file read; dontaudit priv_app sysfs_android_usb:file read; dontaudit priv_app wifi_prop:file read; dontaudit priv_app { wifi_prop exported_wifi_prop }:file read; # allow privileged apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not # modify them other than to connect allow priv_app system_server:udp_socket { connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; # Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign # that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before # the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Suppress this # denial to prevent apps from spamming the logs. dontaudit priv_app system_data_file:dir write; ### ### neverallow rules ### # Receive or send uevent messages. neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *; # Receive or send generic netlink messages neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_socket *; # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable. neverallow priv_app debugfs:file read; # Do not allow privileged apps to register services. # Only trusted components of Android should be registering # services. neverallow priv_app service_manager_type:service_manager add; # Do not allow privileged apps to connect to the property service # or set properties. b/10243159 neverallow priv_app property_socket:sock_file write; neverallow priv_app init:unix_stream_socket connectto; neverallow priv_app property_type:property_service set; # Do not allow priv_app to be assigned mlstrustedsubject. # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being # enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls # constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow # on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject) # and priv_app is allowed fork permission to itself. neverallow priv_app mlstrustedsubject:process fork; # Do not allow priv_app to hard link to any files. # In particular, if priv_app links to other app data # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security # bugs, so we want to ensure priv_app never has this # capability. neverallow priv_app file_type:file link; # priv apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend # upon traceur to pass a file descriptor which they can then read neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:dir *; neverallow priv_app trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open };