# mediacodec - audio and video codecs live here type mediacodec, domain; type mediacodec_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type; typeattribute mediacodec mlstrustedsubject; # TODO(b/36375899) attributize this domain appropriately as hal_omx # and use macro hal_server_domain get_prop(mediacodec, hwservicemanager_prop) # can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder vndbinder_use(mediacodec) not_full_treble(` # on legacy devices, continue to allow /dev/binder traffic binder_use(mediacodec) binder_service(mediacodec) add_service(mediacodec, mediacodec_service) allow mediacodec mediametrics_service:service_manager find; allow mediacodec surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find; ') binder_call(mediacodec, binderservicedomain) binder_call(mediacodec, appdomain) # Allow mediacodec access to composer sync fences allow mediacodec hal_graphics_composer:fd use; allow mediacodec gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow mediacodec video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow mediacodec video_device:dir search; allow mediacodec ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow mediacodec hal_camera:fd use; crash_dump_fallback(mediacodec) add_hwservice(mediacodec, hal_omx_hwservice) hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_allocator) hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_cas) # allocate and use graphic buffers hal_client_domain(mediacodec, hal_graphics_allocator) # Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that mediacodec never # directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge # between those two: it talks to mediacodec via Binder and talks to bufferhubd # via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro. allow mediacodec bufferhubd:fd use; ### ### neverallow rules ### # mediacodec should never execute any executable without a # domain transition neverallow mediacodec { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans; # The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into # restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited # permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio # hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera # hardware/content. Etc. # # Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited # permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network. # Lengthier explanation here: # https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html neverallow mediacodec domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;