### ### Untrusted_app_all. ### ### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except ### ephemeral_app for instant apps. ### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and ### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID ### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data ### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default ### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) ### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo ### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this ### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps ### that are not signed by the platform key. To move ### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to ### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values ### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and ### seapp_contexts. ### ### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also ### added to ephemeral_app.te. # Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out # to their sandbox directory and then execute. allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; auditallow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file execute; # Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables # from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422) allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans; # Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality. allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; # Allow handling of less common filesystem objects allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms; # Allow loading and deleting executable shared libraries # within an application home directory. Such shared libraries would be # created by things like renderscript or via other mechanisms. allow untrusted_app_all app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink }; # ASEC allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; # Execute libs in asec containers. allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute }; # Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when # running "adb install foo.apk". # TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. # Figure out a way to remove these rules. allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; # Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps # for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read }; # untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend # upon traceur to pass a file descriptor neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *; neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open }; # Allow to read staged apks. allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; # Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. # Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for # cropping or taking user photos. allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; # # Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. # This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. # # Access to /data/media. allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; # Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon # TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search; # allow cts to query all services allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; # gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; # Android Studio Instant Run has the application connect to a # runas_app socket listening in the abstract namespace. # https://developer.android.com/studio/run/ # b/123297648 allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:unix_stream_socket connectto; # Untrusted apps need to be able to send a SIGCHLD to runas_app # when running under a debugger (b/123612207) allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:process sigchld; # Cts: HwRngTest allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; # Allow apps to view preloaded media content allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; # Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can # be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. # TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed # apps. allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read }; # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all) # Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable. can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all) can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all) # allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not # modify them other than to connect allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket { connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; # Allow the renderscript compiler to be run. domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app_all, rs_exec, rs) # This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions. dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read; # These have been disallowed since Android O. # For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial. dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read; dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read; dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read; # Allow the allocation and use of ptys # Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm create_pty(untrusted_app_all) # Allow access to kcov via its ioctl interface for coverage # guided kernel fuzzing. userdebug_or_eng(` allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms; allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE }; ') # Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf # profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control # the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal). allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal;