##################################### # domain_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain) # Allow a transition from olddomain to newdomain # upon executing a file labeled with type. # This only allows the transition; it does not # cause it to occur automatically - use domain_auto_trans # if that is what you want. # define(`domain_trans', ` # Old domain may exec the file and transition to the new domain. allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute }; allow $1 $3:process transition; # New domain is entered by executing the file. allow $3 $2:file { entrypoint open read execute getattr }; # New domain can send SIGCHLD to its caller. ifelse($1, `init', `', `allow $3 $1:process sigchld;') # Enable AT_SECURE, i.e. libc secure mode. dontaudit $1 $3:process noatsecure; # XXX dontaudit candidate but requires further study. allow $1 $3:process { siginh rlimitinh }; ') ##################################### # domain_auto_trans(olddomain, type, newdomain) # Automatically transition from olddomain to newdomain # upon executing a file labeled with type. # define(`domain_auto_trans', ` # Allow the necessary permissions. domain_trans($1,$2,$3) # Make the transition occur by default. type_transition $1 $2:process $3; ') ##################################### # file_type_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type) # Allow domain to create a file labeled file_type in a # directory labeled dir_type. # This only allows the transition; it does not # cause it to occur automatically - use file_type_auto_trans # if that is what you want. # define(`file_type_trans', ` # Allow the domain to add entries to the directory. allow $1 $2:dir ra_dir_perms; # Allow the domain to create the file. allow $1 $3:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms; allow $1 $3:dir create_dir_perms; ') ##################################### # file_type_auto_trans(domain, dir_type, file_type) # Automatically label new files with file_type when # they are created by domain in directories labeled dir_type. # define(`file_type_auto_trans', ` # Allow the necessary permissions. file_type_trans($1, $2, $3) # Make the transition occur by default. type_transition $1 $2:dir $3; type_transition $1 $2:notdevfile_class_set $3; ') ##################################### # r_dir_file(domain, type) # Allow the specified domain to read directories, files # and symbolic links of the specified type. define(`r_dir_file', ` allow $1 $2:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms; ') ##################################### # tmpfs_domain(domain) # Define and allow access to a unique type for # this domain when creating tmpfs / shmem / ashmem files. define(`tmpfs_domain', ` type $1_tmpfs, file_type; type_transition $1 tmpfs:file $1_tmpfs; allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file { read write }; allow $1 tmpfs:dir { getattr search }; ') # pdx macros for IPC. pdx is a high-level name which contains transport-specific # rules from underlying transport (e.g. UDS-based implementation). ##################################### # pdx_server(domain) define(`pdx_server', ` allow $1 pdx_socket:dir create_dir_perms; allow $1 pdx_socket:sock_file create_file_perms; ') ##################################### # use_pdx(clientdomain, serverdomain) define(`use_pdx', ` # Open the socket. allow $1 pdx_socket:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1 pdx_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms; # Use the socket. allow $1 $2:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write shutdown }; # Clients recieve an event fd from the server. allow $1 $2:fd use; # Servers may receive sync fences, gralloc buffers, etc, from clients. # This could be tightened on a per-server basis, but keeping track of service # clients is error prone. allow $2 $1:fd use; ') ##################################### # init_daemon_domain(domain) # Set up a transition from init to the daemon domain # upon executing its binary. define(`init_daemon_domain', ` domain_auto_trans(init, $1_exec, $1) tmpfs_domain($1) ') ##################################### # app_domain(domain) # Allow a base set of permissions required for all apps. define(`app_domain', ` typeattribute $1 appdomain; # Label ashmem objects with our own unique type. tmpfs_domain($1) # Map with PROT_EXEC. allow $1 $1_tmpfs:file execute; ') ##################################### # untrusted_app_domain(domain) # Allow a base set of permissions required for all untrusted apps. define(`untrusted_app_domain', ` typeattribute $1 untrusted_app_all; ') ##################################### # net_domain(domain) # Allow a base set of permissions required for network access. define(`net_domain', ` typeattribute $1 netdomain; ') ##################################### # bluetooth_domain(domain) # Allow a base set of permissions required for bluetooth access. define(`bluetooth_domain', ` typeattribute $1 bluetoothdomain; ') # TODO: Remove hal_impl_domain once all uses have been switched to hal_server_domain. ##################################### # hal_impl_domain(domain[, hal_type_attr]) # Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to host a # HAL implementation. # # Optionally, the type of the HAL can be specified as the second # argument. This is useful for HALs which may have multiple # implementations. Attributes are used to group the various # implementations of such HALs. # # For example, default implementation of Foo HAL: # type hal_foo_default, domain; # hal_impl_domain(hal_foo_default, hal_foo) # define(`hal_impl_domain', ` typeattribute $1 halserverdomain; ifelse($2, `', `', `typeattribute $1 $2;') ') ##################################### # hal_server_domain(domain, hal_type) # Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to offer a # HAL implementation of the specified type over HwBinder. # # For example, default implementation of Foo HAL: # type hal_foo_default, domain; # hal_server_domain(hal_foo_default, hal_foo) # define(`hal_server_domain', ` typeattribute $1 halserverdomain; typeattribute $1 $2_server; typeattribute $1 $2; ') ##################################### # hal_client_domain(domain, hal_type) # Allow a base set of permissions required for a domain to be a # client of a HAL of the specified type. # # For example, make some_domain a client of Foo HAL: # hal_client_domain(some_domain, hal_foo) # define(`hal_client_domain', ` typeattribute $1 halclientdomain; typeattribute $1 $2_client; # TODO(b/34170079): Make the inclusion of the rules below conditional, # once we know at build time whether a HAL is going to run in # passthrough or binderized mode. typeattribute $1 $2; # Find passthrough HAL implementations allow $2 system_file:dir r_dir_perms; ') ##################################### # unix_socket_connect(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain) # Allow a local socket connection from clientdomain via # socket to serverdomain. # # Note: If you see denial records that distill to the # following allow rules: # allow clientdomain property_socket:sock_file write; # allow clientdomain init:unix_stream_socket connectto; # allow clientdomain something_prop:property_service set; # # This sequence is indicative of attempting to set a property. # use set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty) # define(`unix_socket_connect', ` ifelse($2, `property', ` ifelse($3,`init', ` print(`deprecated: unix_socket_connect($1, $2, $3) Please use set_prop($1, ) instead.') ') ') __unix_socket_connect__($1, $2, $3) ') define(`__unix_socket_connect__', ` allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write; allow $1 $3:unix_stream_socket connectto; ') ##################################### # set_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty) # Allows source domain to set the # targetproperty. # define(`set_prop', ` __unix_socket_connect__($1, property, init) allow $1 $2:property_service set; get_prop($1, $2) ') ##################################### # get_prop(sourcedomain, targetproperty) # Allows source domain to read the # targetproperty. # define(`get_prop', ` allow $1 $2:file r_file_perms; ') ##################################### # unix_socket_send(clientdomain, socket, serverdomain) # Allow a local socket send from clientdomain via # socket to serverdomain. define(`unix_socket_send', ` allow $1 $2_socket:sock_file write; allow $1 $3:unix_dgram_socket sendto; ') ##################################### # binder_use(domain) # Allow domain to use Binder IPC. define(`binder_use', ` # Call the servicemanager and transfer references to it. allow $1 servicemanager:binder { call transfer }; # servicemanager performs getpidcon on clients. allow servicemanager $1:dir search; allow servicemanager $1:file { read open }; allow servicemanager $1:process getattr; # rw access to /dev/binder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to # all domains in domain.te. ') ##################################### # hwbinder_use(domain) # Allow domain to use HwBinder IPC. define(`hwbinder_use', ` # Call the hwservicemanager and transfer references to it. allow $1 hwservicemanager:binder { call transfer }; # Allow hwservicemanager to send out callbacks allow hwservicemanager $1:binder { call transfer }; # hwservicemanager performs getpidcon on clients. allow hwservicemanager $1:dir search; allow hwservicemanager $1:file { read open }; allow hwservicemanager $1:process getattr; # TODO(b/34274385): hals wait for data to be mounted so they can # start only if persist.hal.binderization is enabled. (for dogfood # stability). getService must also check for data to be mounted # if the vintf promises the hal will be registered over hwbinder. get_prop($1, hal_binderization_prop) get_prop($1, persistent_properties_ready_prop) get_prop($1, vold_prop) # rw access to /dev/hwbinder and /dev/ashmem is presently granted to # all domains in domain.te. ') ##################################### # binder_call(clientdomain, serverdomain) # Allow clientdomain to perform binder IPC to serverdomain. define(`binder_call', ` # Call the server domain and optionally transfer references to it. allow $1 $2:binder { call transfer }; # Allow the serverdomain to transfer references to the client on the reply. allow $2 $1:binder transfer; # Receive and use open files from the server. allow $1 $2:fd use; ') ##################################### # binder_service(domain) # Mark a domain as being a Binder service domain. # Used to allow binder IPC to the various system services. define(`binder_service', ` typeattribute $1 binderservicedomain; ') ##################################### # hwallocator_use(domain) # Allow a domain to use Hidl shared memory define(`hwallocator_use', ` # Call into the allocator hal binder_call($1, hal_allocator); ') ##################################### # wakelock_use(domain) # Allow domain to manage wake locks define(`wakelock_use', ` # Access /sys/power/wake_lock and /sys/power/wake_unlock allow $1 sysfs_wake_lock:file rw_file_perms; # Accessing these files requires CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND allow $1 self:capability2 block_suspend; ') ##################################### # selinux_check_access(domain) # Allow domain to check SELinux permissions via selinuxfs. define(`selinux_check_access', ` r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs) allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms; allow $1 kernel:security compute_av; allow $1 self:netlink_selinux_socket { read write create getattr setattr lock relabelfrom relabelto append bind connect listen accept getopt setopt shutdown recvfrom sendto name_bind }; ') ##################################### # selinux_check_context(domain) # Allow domain to check SELinux contexts via selinuxfs. define(`selinux_check_context', ` r_dir_file($1, selinuxfs) allow $1 selinuxfs:file w_file_perms; allow $1 kernel:security check_context; ') ##################################### # create_pty(domain) # Allow domain to create and use a pty, isolated from any other domain ptys. define(`create_pty', ` # Each domain gets a unique devpts type. type $1_devpts, fs_type; # Label the pty with the unique type when created. type_transition $1 devpts:chr_file $1_devpts; # Allow use of the pty after creation. allow $1 $1_devpts:chr_file { open getattr read write ioctl }; allowxperm $1 $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls; # TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it. # b/33073072, b/7530569 # http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14 neverallowxperm * $1_devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI; # Note: devpts:dir search and ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms # allowed to everyone via domain.te. ') ##################################### # Non system_app application set # define(`non_system_app_set', `{ appdomain -system_app }') ##################################### # Recovery only # SELinux rules which apply only to recovery mode # define(`recovery_only', ifelse(target_recovery, `true', $1, )) ##################################### # Userdebug or eng builds # SELinux rules which apply only to userdebug or eng builds # define(`userdebug_or_eng', ifelse(target_build_variant, `eng', $1, ifelse(target_build_variant, `userdebug', $1))) #################################### # Fallback crash handling for processes that can't exec crash_dump (e.g. because of seccomp). # define(`crash_dump_fallback', ` userdebug_or_eng(` allow $1 su:fifo_file append; ') allow $1 anr_data_file:file append; allow $1 tombstoned:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow $1 tombstoned:fd use; allow $1 tombstoned_crash_socket:sock_file write; allow $1 tombstone_data_file:file append; ') ##################################### # WITH_DEXPREOPT builds # SELinux rules which apply only when pre-opting. # define(`with_dexpreopt', ifelse(target_with_dexpreopt, `true', $1)) ##################################### # write_logd(domain) # Ability to write to android log # daemon via sockets define(`write_logd', ` unix_socket_send($1, logdw, logd) allow $1 pmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms; ') ##################################### # read_logd(domain) # Ability to run logcat and read from android # log daemon via sockets define(`read_logd', ` allow $1 logcat_exec:file rx_file_perms; unix_socket_connect($1, logdr, logd) ') ##################################### # read_runtime_log_tags(domain) # ability to directly map the runtime event log tags define(`read_runtime_log_tags', ` allow $1 runtime_event_log_tags_file:file r_file_perms; ') ##################################### # control_logd(domain) # Ability to control # android log daemon via sockets define(`control_logd', ` # Group AID_LOG checked by filesystem & logd # to permit control commands unix_socket_connect($1, logd, logd) ') ##################################### # use_keystore(domain) # Ability to use keystore. # Keystore is requires the following permissions # to call getpidcon. define(`use_keystore', ` allow keystore $1:dir search; allow keystore $1:file { read open }; allow keystore $1:process getattr; allow $1 keystore_service:service_manager find; binder_call($1, keystore) ') ########################################### # use_drmservice(domain) # Ability to use DrmService which requires # DrmService to call getpidcon. define(`use_drmservice', ` allow drmserver $1:dir search; allow drmserver $1:file { read open }; allow drmserver $1:process getattr; ') ########################################### # add_service(domain, service) # Ability for domain to add a service to service_manager # and find it. It also creates a neverallow preventing # others from adding it. define(`add_service', ` allow $1 $2:service_manager { add find }; neverallow { domain -$1 } $2:service_manager add; ') ########################################## # print a message with a trailing newline # print(`args') define(`print', `errprint(`m4: '__file__: __line__`: $* ')')