# Rules for all domains.

# Allow reaping by init.
allow domain init:process sigchld;

# Intra-domain accesses.
allow domain self:process {
    fork
    sigchld
    sigkill
    sigstop
    signull
    signal
    getsched
    setsched
    getsession
    getpgid
    setpgid
    getcap
    setcap
    getattr
    setrlimit
};
allow domain self:fd use;
allow domain proc:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain proc_net:dir search;
r_dir_file(domain, self)
allow domain self:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
allow domain self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };

# Inherit or receive open files from others.
allow domain init:fd use;

userdebug_or_eng(`
  # Same as adbd rules above, except allow su to do the same thing
  allow domain su:unix_stream_socket connectto;
  allow domain su:fd use;
  allow domain su:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt read write shutdown };

  allow { domain -init } su:binder { call transfer };
  allow { domain -init } su:fd use;

  # Running something like "pm dump com.android.bluetooth" requires
  # fifo writes
  allow domain su:fifo_file { write getattr };

  # allow "gdbserver --attach" to work for su.
  allow domain su:process sigchld;

  # Allow writing coredumps to /cores/*
  allow domain coredump_file:file create_file_perms;
  allow domain coredump_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
')

# Root fs.
allow domain rootfs:dir search;
allow domain rootfs:lnk_file { read getattr };

# Device accesses.
allow domain device:dir search;
allow domain dev_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow domain devpts:dir search;
allow domain socket_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain owntty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain zero_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# /dev/binder can be accessed by non-vendor domains and by apps
allow {
  coredomain
  appdomain
  binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
  -hwservicemanager
} binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# Devices which are not full TREBLE have fewer restrictions on access to /dev/binder
not_full_treble(`allow { domain -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;')
allow { domain -servicemanager -vndservicemanager -isolated_app } hwbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain ptmx_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain alarm_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow domain random_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain properties_device:dir { search getattr };
allow domain properties_serial:file r_file_perms;

# For now, everyone can access core property files
# Device specific properties are not granted by default
get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
# Let everyone read log properties, so that liblog can avoid sending unloggable
# messages to logd.
get_prop(domain, log_property_type)
dontaudit domain property_type:file audit_access;
allow domain property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;

allow domain init:key search;
allow domain vold:key search;

# logd access
write_logd(domain)

# System file accesses.
allow domain system_file:dir { search getattr };
allow domain system_file:file { execute read open getattr map };
allow domain system_file:lnk_file { getattr read };

# Make sure system/vendor split doesn not affect non-treble
# devices
not_full_treble(`
    allow domain vendor_file_type:dir { search getattr };
    allow domain vendor_file_type:file { execute read open getattr };
    allow domain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
')

# All domains are allowed to open and read directories
# that contain HAL implementations (e.g. passthrough
# HALs require clients to have these permissions)
allow domain vendor_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Everyone can read and execute all same process HALs
allow domain same_process_hal_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr };

# Any process can load vndk-sp libraries, which are system libraries
# used by same process HALs
allow domain vndk_sp_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain vndk_sp_file:file { execute read open getattr };

# All domains get access to /vendor/etc
allow domain vendor_configs_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow domain vendor_configs_file:file { read open getattr };

full_treble_only(`
    # Allow all domains to be able to follow /system/vendor symlink
    allow domain vendor_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };

    # This is required to be able to search & read /vendor/lib64
    # in order to lookup vendor libraries. The execute permission
    # for coredomains is granted *only* for same process HALs
    allow domain vendor_file:dir { getattr search };

    # Allow reading and executing out of /vendor to all vendor domains
    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:file { read open getattr execute };
    allow { domain -coredomain } vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr read };
')

# read any sysfs symlinks
allow domain sysfs:lnk_file read;

# libc references /data/misc/zoneinfo for timezone related information
# This directory is considered to be a VNDK-stable
r_dir_file(domain, zoneinfo_data_file)

# Lots of processes access current CPU information
r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_devices_system_cpu)

r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_usb);

# files under /data.
not_full_treble(`allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;')
allow { coredomain appdomain } system_data_file:dir getattr;
# /data has the label system_data_file. Vendor components need the search
# permission on system_data_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
allow domain system_data_file:dir search;

# required by the dynamic linker
allow domain proc:lnk_file { getattr read };

# /proc/cpuinfo
allow domain proc_cpuinfo:file r_file_perms;

# jemalloc needs to read /proc/sys/vm/overcommit_memory
allow domain proc_overcommit_memory:file r_file_perms;

# profiling needs to read /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_sample_rate
allow domain proc_perf:file r_file_perms;

# toybox loads libselinux which stats /sys/fs/selinux/
allow domain selinuxfs:dir search;
allow domain selinuxfs:file getattr;
allow domain sysfs:dir search;
allow domain selinuxfs:filesystem getattr;

# For /acct/uid/*/tasks.
allow domain cgroup:dir { search write };
allow domain cgroup:file w_file_perms;

# Almost all processes log tracing information to
# /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker
# The reason behind this is documented in b/6513400
allow domain debugfs:dir search;
allow domain debugfs_tracing:dir search;
allow domain debugfs_trace_marker:file w_file_perms;

# Filesystem access.
allow domain fs_type:filesystem getattr;
allow domain fs_type:dir getattr;

# Restrict all domains to a whitelist for common socket types. Additional
# ioctl commands may be added to individual domains, but this sets safe
# defaults for all processes. Note that granting this whitelist to domain does
# not grant the ioctl permission on these socket types. That must be granted
# separately.
allowxperm domain domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
# default whitelist for unix sockets.
allowxperm domain domain:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket }
  ioctl unpriv_unix_sock_ioctls;

# Restrict PTYs to only whitelisted ioctls.
# Note that granting this whitelist to domain does
# not grant the wider ioctl permission. That must be granted
# separately.
allowxperm domain devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;

# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing hwservice_manager_type
# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
allow { domain -domain } hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager { add find };
# Workaround for policy compiler being too aggressive and removing vndservice_manager_type
# when it's not explicitly used in allow rules
allow { domain -domain } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager { add find };

# Under ASAN, processes will try to read /data, as the sanitized libraries are there.
with_asan(`allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;')

###
### neverallow rules
###

# All socket ioctls must be restricted to a whitelist.
neverallowxperm domain domain:socket_class_set ioctl { 0 };

# TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it.
# b/33073072, b/7530569
# http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/26/14
neverallowxperm * devpts:chr_file ioctl TIOCSTI;

# Do not allow any domain other than init or recovery to create unlabeled files.
neverallow { domain -init -recovery } unlabeled:dir_file_class_set create;

# Limit device node creation to these whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
  domain
  -kernel
  -init
  -ueventd
  -vold
} self:capability mknod;

# Limit raw I/O to these whitelisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
neverallow {
  domain
  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
  -kernel
  -init
  -recovery
  -ueventd
  -healthd
  -uncrypt
  -tee
} self:capability sys_rawio;

# No process can map low memory (< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR).
neverallow * self:memprotect mmap_zero;

# No domain needs mac_override as it is unused by SELinux.
neverallow * self:capability2 mac_override;

# Only recovery needs mac_admin to set contexts not defined in current policy.
neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin;

# Once the policy has been loaded there shall be none to modify the policy.
# It is sealed.
neverallow * kernel:security load_policy;

# Only init prior to switching context should be able to set enforcing mode.
# init starts in kernel domain and switches to init domain via setcon in
# the init.rc, so the setenforce occurs while still in kernel. After
# switching domains, there is never any need to setenforce again by init.
neverallow * kernel:security setenforce;
neverallow { domain -kernel } kernel:security setcheckreqprot;

# No booleans in AOSP policy, so no need to ever set them.
neverallow * kernel:security setbool;

# Adjusting the AVC cache threshold.
# Not presently allowed to anything in policy, but possibly something
# that could be set from init.rc.
neverallow { domain -init } kernel:security setsecparam;

# Only init, ueventd, shell and system_server should be able to access HW RNG
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -shell # For CTS and is restricted to getattr in shell.te
  -system_server
  -ueventd
} hw_random_device:chr_file *;

# Ensure that all entrypoint executables are in exec_type or postinstall_file.
neverallow * { file_type -exec_type -postinstall_file }:file entrypoint;

# Ensure that nothing in userspace can access /dev/mem or /dev/kmem
neverallow {
  domain
  -shell # For CTS and is restricted to getattr in shell.te
  -ueventd # Further restricted in ueventd.te
} kmem_device:chr_file *;
neverallow * kmem_device:chr_file ~{ create relabelto unlink setattr getattr };

#Ensure that nothing in userspace can access /dev/port
neverallow {
  domain
  -shell # Shell user should not have any abilities outside of getattr
  -ueventd
} port_device:chr_file *;
neverallow * port_device:chr_file ~{ create relabelto unlink setattr getattr };
# Only init should be able to configure kernel usermodehelpers or
# security-sensitive proc settings.
neverallow { domain -init } usermodehelper:file { append write };
neverallow { domain -init -ueventd } sysfs_usermodehelper:file { append write };
neverallow { domain -init } proc_security:file { append open read write };

# No domain should be allowed to ptrace init.
neverallow * init:process ptrace;

# Init can't do anything with binder calls. If this neverallow rule is being
# triggered, it's probably due to a service with no SELinux domain.
neverallow * init:binder *;

# Don't allow raw read/write/open access to block_device
# Rather force a relabel to a more specific type
neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery } block_device:blk_file { open read write };

# Do not allow renaming of block files or character files
# Ability to do so can lead to possible use in an exploit chain
# e.g. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/chrome-os-exploit-one-byte-overflow-and.html
neverallow * *:{ blk_file chr_file } rename;

# Don't allow raw read/write/open access to generic devices.
# Rather force a relabel to a more specific type.
neverallow domain device:chr_file { open read write };

# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
# sdcard_type / vfat is exempt as a larger set of domains need
# this capability, including device-specific domains.
neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery -vold -zygote -update_engine -otapreopt_chroot } { fs_type -sdcard_type }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };

#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
#
neverallow {
    domain
    -appdomain
    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
    -dumpstate
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
    -webview_zygote
    -zygote
} {
    file_type
    -system_file
    -vendor_file_type
    -exec_type
    -postinstall_file
}:file execute;

neverallow {
    domain
    -appdomain # for oemfs
    -recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
# Files from cache should never be executed
neverallow domain { cache_file cache_backup_file cache_private_backup_file cache_recovery_file }:file execute;

# Protect most domains from executing arbitrary content from /data.
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
} {
  data_file_type
  -dalvikcache_data_file
  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
  -apk_data_file
}:file no_x_file_perms;

neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-shell') } nativetest_data_file:file no_x_file_perms;

# Only the init property service should write to /data/property and /dev/__properties__
neverallow { domain -init } property_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
neverallow { domain -init } property_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
neverallow { domain -init } property_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
neverallow { domain -init } properties_device:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
neverallow { domain -init } properties_serial:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

# Only recovery should be doing writes to /system & /vendor
neverallow {
    domain
    -recovery
    with_asan(`-asan_extract')
} {
    system_file
    vendor_file_type
    exec_type
}:dir_file_class_set { create write setattr relabelfrom append unlink link rename };

neverallow { domain -recovery -kernel with_asan(`-asan_extract') } { system_file vendor_file_type exec_type }:dir_file_class_set relabelto;

# Don't allow mounting on top of /system files or directories
neverallow * exec_type:dir_file_class_set mounton;
neverallow { domain -init } { system_file vendor_file_type }:dir_file_class_set mounton;

# Nothing should be writing to files in the rootfs.
neverallow * rootfs:file { create write setattr relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Restrict context mounts to specific types marked with
# the contextmount_type attribute.
neverallow * {fs_type -contextmount_type}:filesystem relabelto;

# Ensure that context mount types are not writable, to ensure that
# the write to /system restriction above is not bypassed via context=
# mount to another type.
neverallow { domain -recovery } contextmount_type:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Do not allow service_manager add for default service labels.
# Instead domains should use a more specific type such as
# system_app_service rather than the generic type.
# New service_types are defined in {,hw,vnd}service.te and new mappings
# from service name to service_type are defined in {,hw,vnd}service_contexts.
neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager add;
neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager { add find };
neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };

# Looking up the base class/interface of all HwBinder services is a bad idea.
# hwservicemanager currently offer such lookups only to make it so that security
# decisions are expressed in SELinux policy. However, it's unclear whether this
# lookup has security implications. If it doesn't, hwservicemanager should be
# modified to not offer this lookup.
# This rule can be removed if hwservicemanager is modified to not permit these
# lookups.
neverallow * hidl_base_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;

# Require that domains explicitly label unknown properties, and do not allow
# anyone but init to modify unknown properties.
neverallow { domain -init } default_prop:property_service set;
neverallow { domain -init } mmc_prop:property_service set;

# Do not allow reading device's serial number from system properties except form
# a few whitelisted domains.
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -dumpstate
  -hal_drm
  -hal_cas
  -init
  -mediadrmserver
  -recovery
  -shell
  -system_server
} serialno_prop:file r_file_perms;

# Do not allow reading the last boot timestamp from system properties
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } firstboot_prop:file r_file_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -recovery
  -system_server
  -shell # Shell is further restricted in shell.te
  -ueventd # Further restricted in ueventd.te
} frp_block_device:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# The metadata block device is set aside for device encryption and
# verified boot metadata. It may be reset at will and should not
# be used by other domains.
neverallow { domain -init -recovery -vold } metadata_block_device:blk_file
  { append link rename write open read ioctl lock };

# No domain other than recovery and update_engine can write to system partition(s).
neverallow { domain -recovery -update_engine } system_block_device:blk_file write;

# No domains other than install_recovery or recovery can write to recovery.
neverallow { domain -install_recovery -recovery } recovery_block_device:blk_file write;

# No domains other than a select few can access the misc_block_device. This
# block device is reserved for OTA use.
# Do not assert this rule on userdebug/eng builds, due to some devices using
# this partition for testing purposes.
neverallow {
  domain
  userdebug_or_eng(`-domain') # exclude debuggable builds
  -hal_bootctl
  -init
  -uncrypt
  -update_engine
  -vold
  -recovery
  -ueventd
} misc_block_device:blk_file { append link relabelfrom rename write open read ioctl lock };

# Only (hw|vnd|)servicemanager should be able to register with binder as the context manager
neverallow { domain -servicemanager -hwservicemanager -vndservicemanager } *:binder set_context_mgr;
# The service managers are only allowed to access their own device node
neverallow servicemanager hwbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow servicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow hwservicemanager binder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow hwservicemanager vndbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow vndservicemanager binder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow vndservicemanager hwbinder_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;

# On full TREBLE devices, only core components and apps can use Binder and servicemanager. Non-core
# domain apps need this because Android framework offers many of its services to apps as Binder
# services.
full_treble_only(`
  neverallow {
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain
    -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
  } binder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
  neverallow {
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain # restrictions for vendor apps are declared lower down
    -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
  } service_manager_type:service_manager find;
  # Vendor apps are permited to use only stable public services. If they were to use arbitrary
  # services which can change any time framework/core is updated, breakage is likely.
  neverallow {
    appdomain
    -coredomain
  } {
    service_manager_type
    -app_api_service
    -ephemeral_app_api_service
    -audioserver_service # TODO(b/36783122) remove exemptions below once app_api_service is fixed
    -cameraserver_service
    -drmserver_service
    -keystore_service
    -mediadrmserver_service
    -mediaextractor_service
    -mediametrics_service
    -mediaserver_service
    -nfc_service
    -radio_service
    -surfaceflinger_service
    -virtual_touchpad_service
    -vr_hwc_service
    -vr_manager_service
  }:service_manager find;
  neverallow {
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain
    -binder_in_vendor_violators # TODO(b/35870313): Remove once all violations are gone
  } servicemanager:binder { call transfer };
')

# On full TREBLE devices, only vendor components, shell, and su can use VendorBinder.
full_treble_only(`
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
    -ueventd # uevent is granted create for this device, but we still neverallow I/O below
  } vndbinder_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
  neverallow ueventd vndbinder_device:chr_file { read write append ioctl };
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
  } vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    -shell
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
  } vndservicemanager:binder *;
')

# On full TREBLE devices, socket communications between core components and vendor components are
# not permitted.
full_treble_only(`
  # Most general rules first, more specific rules below.

  # Core domains are not permitted to initiate communications to vendor domain sockets.
  # We are not restricting the use of already established sockets because it is fine for a process
  # to obtain an already established socket via some public/official/stable API and then exchange
  # data with its peer over that socket. The wire format in this scenario is dicatated by the API
  # and thus does not break the core-vendor separation.
  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
    coredomain
    -init
    -adbd
  }, {
    domain
    -coredomain
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  });
  # Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate communications to core domain sockets
  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  }, {
    coredomain
    -logd # Logging by writing to logd Unix domain socket is public API
    -netd # netdomain needs this
    -mdnsd # netdomain needs this
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
    -init
    -incidentd # TODO(b/35870313): Remove incidentd from this list once vendor domains no longer declare Binder services
    -tombstoned # TODO(b/36604251): Remove tombstoned from this list once mediacodec (OMX HAL) no longer declares Binder services
  });

  # Vendor domains (except netdomain) are not permitted to initiate communications to netd sockets
  neverallow_establish_socket_comms({
    domain
    -coredomain
    -netdomain
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  }, netd);

  # Vendor domains are not permitted to initiate create/open sockets owned by core domains
  neverallow {
    domain
    -coredomain
    -appdomain # appdomain restrictions below
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  } {
    coredomain_socket
    core_data_file_type
    unlabeled # used only by core domains
  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
  neverallow {
    appdomain
    -coredomain
  } {
    coredomain_socket
    unlabeled # used only by core domains
    core_data_file_type
    -app_data_file
    -pdx_endpoint_socket_type # used by VR layer
    -pdx_channel_socket_type # used by VR layer
  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };

  # Core domains are not permitted to create/open sockets owned by vendor domains
  neverallow {
    coredomain
    -init
    -ueventd
    -socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators
  } {
    file_type
    dev_type
    -coredomain_socket
    -core_data_file_type
    -unlabeled
  }:sock_file ~{ append getattr ioctl read write };
')

# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
# only a few whitelisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
full_treble_only(`
    # Limit access to /vendor/app
    neverallow {
        coredomain
        -appdomain
        -dex2oat
        -idmap
        -init
        -installd
        -postinstall_dexopt
        -system_server
    } vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };

    neverallow {
        coredomain
        -appdomain
        -dex2oat
        -idmap
        -init
        -installd
        -postinstall_dexopt
        -system_server
    } vendor_app_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;

    # Limit access to /vendor/overlay
    neverallow {
        coredomain
        -appdomain
        -idmap
        -init
        -installd
        -system_server
        -zygote
    } vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };

    neverallow {
        coredomain
        -appdomain
        -idmap
        -init
        -installd
        -system_server
        -zygote
    } vendor_overlay_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;

    # Non-vendor domains are not allowed to file execute shell
    # from vendor
    neverallow {
        coredomain
        -init
    } vendor_shell_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };

    # Do not allow vendor components to execute files from system
    # except for the ones whitelist here.
    neverallow {
        domain
        -coredomain
        -appdomain
        -rild
        -vendor_executes_system_violators
    } {
        exec_type
        -vendor_file_type
        -crash_dump_exec
        -netutils_wrapper_exec
    }:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
')

# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
neverallow {
  domain
  -init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
  -zygote
  -installd
  -postinstall_dexopt
  -cppreopts
  -dex2oat
  -otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -installd
  -postinstall_dexopt
  -cppreopts
  -dex2oat
  -zygote
  -otapreopt_slot
} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;

# Only system_server should be able to send commands via the zygote socket
neverallow { domain -zygote -system_server } zygote:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow { domain -system_server } zygote_socket:sock_file write;

neverallow { domain -system_server -webview_zygote } webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow { domain -system_server } webview_zygote_socket:sock_file write;

neverallow {
  domain
  -tombstoned
  -crash_dump
  -dumpstate
  -system_server

  # Processes that can't exec crash_dump
  -mediacodec
  -mediaextractor
} tombstoned_crash_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;

neverallow {
  domain
  -crash_dump
  -mediacodec
  -mediaextractor
} tombstoned_crash_socket:sock_file write;

# Never allow anyone except dumpstate or the system server to connect or write to
# the tombstoned intercept socket.
neverallow { domain -dumpstate -system_server } tombstoned_intercept_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { domain -dumpstate -system_server } tombstoned_intercept_socket:unix_stream_socket connectto;

# Android does not support System V IPCs.
#
# The reason for this is due to the fact that, by design, they lead to global
# kernel resource leakage.
#
# For example, there is no way to automatically release a SysV semaphore
# allocated in the kernel when:
#
# - a buggy or malicious process exits
# - a non-buggy and non-malicious process crashes or is explicitly killed.
#
# Killing processes automatically to make room for new ones is an
# important part of Android's application lifecycle implementation. This means
# that, even assuming only non-buggy and non-malicious code, it is very likely
# that over time, the kernel global tables used to implement SysV IPCs will fill
# up.
neverallow * *:{ shm sem msg msgq } *;

# Do not mount on top of symlinks, fifos, or sockets.
# Feature parity with Chromium LSM.
neverallow * { file_type fs_type dev_type }:{ lnk_file fifo_file sock_file } mounton;

# Nobody should be able to execute su on user builds.
# On userdebug/eng builds, only dumpstate, shell, and
# su itself execute su.
neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate -shell -su') } su_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

# Do not allow the introduction of new execmod rules. Text relocations
# and modification of executable pages are unsafe.
# The only exceptions are for NDK text relocations associated with
# https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=23203
# which, long term, need to go away.
neverallow * {
  file_type
  -apk_data_file
  -app_data_file
  -asec_public_file
}:file execmod;

# Do not allow making the stack or heap executable.
# We would also like to minimize execmem but it seems to be
# required by some device-specific service domains.
neverallow * self:process { execstack execheap };

# prohibit non-zygote spawned processes from using shared libraries
# with text relocations. b/20013628 .
neverallow { domain -untrusted_app_all } file_type:file execmod;

neverallow { domain -init } proc:{ file dir } mounton;

# Ensure that all types assigned to processes are included
# in the domain attribute, so that all allow and neverallow rules
# written on domain are applied to all processes.
# This is achieved by ensuring that it is impossible to transition
# from a domain to a non-domain type and vice versa.
# TODO - rework this: neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
neverallow ~domain domain:process { transition dyntransition };

#
# Only system_app and system_server should be creating or writing
# their files. The proper way to share files is to setup
# type transitions to a more specific type or assigning a type
# to its parent directory via a file_contexts entry.
# Example type transition:
#  mydomain.te:file_type_auto_trans(mydomain, system_data_file, new_file_type)
#
neverallow {
  domain
  -system_server
  -system_app
  -init
  -installd # for relabelfrom and unlink, check for this in explicit neverallow
  with_asan(`-asan_extract')
} system_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
# do not grant anything greater than r_file_perms and relabelfrom unlink
# to installd
neverallow installd system_data_file:file ~{ r_file_perms relabelfrom unlink };

# respect system_app sandboxes
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
  -system_server #populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
  -installd # creation of app sandbox
} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };
neverallow {
  isolated_app
  untrusted_app_all # finer-grained rules for appdomain are listed below
  ephemeral_app
  priv_app
} system_app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink open };


# Services should respect app sandboxes
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -installd # creation of sandbox
} app_data_file:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };

#
# Only these domains should transition to shell domain. This domain is
# permissible for the "shell user". If you need a process to exec a shell
# script with differing privilege, define a domain and set up a transition.
#
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -init
  -runas
  -zygote
} shell:process { transition dyntransition };

# Only domains spawned from zygote and runas may have the appdomain attribute.
neverallow { domain -runas -webview_zygote -zygote } {
  appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
}:process { transition dyntransition };

# Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
# This is to prevent malicious symlink attacks.
neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -installd
  -uncrypt  # TODO: see if we can remove
} app_data_file:lnk_file read;

neverallow {
  domain
  -shell
  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
  -installd
} shell_data_file:lnk_file read;

# In addition to the symlink reading restrictions above, restrict
# write access to shell owned directories. The /data/local/tmp
# directory is untrustworthy, and non-whitelisted domains should
# not be trusting any content in those directories.
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -dumpstate
  -installd
  -init
  -shell
  -vold
} shell_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;

neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -appdomain
  -dumpstate
  -init
  -installd
  -system_server # why?
  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
} shell_data_file:dir { open search };

# Same as above for /data/local/tmp files. We allow shell files
# to be passed around by file descriptor, but not directly opened.
neverallow {
  domain
  -adbd
  -appdomain
  -dumpstate
  -installd
  userdebug_or_eng(`-uncrypt')
} shell_data_file:file open;


# servicemanager and vndservicemanager are the only processes which handle the
# service_manager list request
neverallow * ~{
    servicemanager
    vndservicemanager
    }:service_manager list;

# hwservicemanager is the only process which handles hw list requests
neverallow * ~{
    hwservicemanager
    }:hwservice_manager list;

# only service_manager_types can be added to service_manager
# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~service_manager_type:service_manager { add find };

# Prevent assigning non property types to properties
# TODO - rework this: neverallow * ~property_type:property_service set;

# Domain types should never be assigned to any files other
# than the /proc/pid files associated with a process. The
# executable file used to enter a domain should be labeled
# with its own _exec type, not with the domain type.
# Conventionally, this looks something like:
# $ cat mydaemon.te
# type mydaemon, domain;
# type mydaemon_exec, exec_type, file_type;
# init_daemon_domain(mydaemon)
# $ grep mydaemon file_contexts
# /system/bin/mydaemon -- u:object_r:mydaemon_exec:s0
neverallow * domain:file { execute execute_no_trans entrypoint };

# Do not allow access to the generic debugfs label. This is too broad.
# Instead, if access to part of debugfs is desired, it should have a
# more specific label.
# TODO: fix system_server and dumpstate
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -dumpstate } debugfs:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Profiles contain untrusted data and profman parses that. We should only run
# in from installd forked processes.
neverallow {
  domain
  -installd
  -profman
} profman_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

# Enforce restrictions on kernel module origin.
# Do not allow kernel module loading except from system,
# vendor, and boot partitions.
neverallow * ~{ system_file vendor_file rootfs }:system module_load;

# Only allow filesystem caps to be set at build time or
# during upgrade by recovery.
neverallow {
  domain
  -recovery
} self:capability setfcap;

# Enforce AT_SECURE for executing crash_dump.
neverallow domain crash_dump:process noatsecure;

# Do not permit non-core domains to register HwBinder services which are
# guaranteed to be provided by core domains only.
neverallow ~coredomain coredomain_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;

# Do not permit the registeration of HwBinder services which are guaranteed to
# be passthrough only (i.e., run in the process of their clients instead of a
# separate server process).
neverallow * same_process_hwservice:hwservice_manager add;