platform_system_sepolicy/private/storaged.te
Jeff Vander Stoep 7a4af30b38 Start the process of locking down proc/net
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.

To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
    navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
    Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest

Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
2018-05-04 21:36:33 +00:00

66 lines
1.8 KiB
Text

# storaged daemon
type storaged, domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
type storaged_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(storaged)
# Read access to pseudo filesystems
r_dir_file(storaged, proc_net_type)
userdebug_or_eng(`
auditallow storaged proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
r_dir_file(storaged, domain)
# Read /proc/uid_io/stats
allow storaged proc_uid_io_stats:file r_file_perms;
# Read /data/system/packages.list
allow storaged system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Store storaged proto file
allow storaged storaged_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow storaged storaged_data_file:file create_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Read access to debugfs
allow storaged debugfs_mmc:dir search;
allow storaged debugfs_mmc:file r_file_perms;
')
# Needed to provide debug dump output via dumpsys pipes.
allow storaged shell:fd use;
allow storaged shell:fifo_file write;
# Needed for GMScore to call dumpsys storaged
allow storaged priv_app:fd use;
allow storaged app_data_file:file write;
allow storaged permission_service:service_manager find;
# Binder permissions
add_service(storaged, storaged_service)
binder_use(storaged)
binder_call(storaged, system_server)
# use batteryproperties service
allow storaged batteryproperties_service:service_manager find;
binder_call(storaged, healthd)
# Implements a dumpsys interface.
allow storaged dumpstate:fd use;
# use a subset of the package manager service
allow storaged package_native_service:service_manager find;
# Kernel does extra check on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for libbinder when storaged is
# running as root. See b/35323867 #3.
dontaudit storaged self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
# For collecting bugreports.
allow storaged dumpstate:fifo_file write;
###
### neverallow
###
neverallow storaged domain:process ptrace;
neverallow storaged self:capability_class_set *;