platform_system_sepolicy/private/zygote.te
Jeff Vander Stoep 7a4af30b38 Start the process of locking down proc/net
Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.

To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
    navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
    Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest

Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 087318957f)
2018-05-04 21:36:33 +00:00

146 lines
5 KiB
Text

# zygote
typeattribute zygote coredomain;
typeattribute zygote mlstrustedsubject;
init_daemon_domain(zygote)
read_runtime_log_tags(zygote)
# Override DAC on files and switch uid/gid.
allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override setgid setuid fowner chown };
# Drop capabilities from bounding set.
allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set setpcap;
# Switch SELinux context to app domains.
allow zygote self:process setcurrent;
allow zygote system_server:process dyntransition;
allow zygote appdomain:process dyntransition;
allow zygote webview_zygote:process dyntransition;
# Allow zygote to read app /proc/pid dirs (b/10455872).
allow zygote appdomain:dir { getattr search };
allow zygote appdomain:file { r_file_perms };
# Move children into the peer process group.
allow zygote system_server:process { getpgid setpgid };
allow zygote appdomain:process { getpgid setpgid };
allow zygote webview_zygote:process { getpgid setpgid };
# Read system data.
allow zygote system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow zygote system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Write to /data/dalvik-cache.
allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Create symlinks in /data/dalvik-cache.
allow zygote dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Write to /data/resource-cache.
allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# When WITH_DEXPREOPT is true, the zygote does not load executable content from
# /data/dalvik-cache.
allow { zygote with_dexpreopt(`-zygote') } dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
# Execute idmap and dex2oat within zygote's own domain.
# TODO: Should either of these be transitioned to the same domain
# used by installd or stay in-domain for zygote?
allow zygote idmap_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow zygote dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
r_dir_file(zygote, vendor_overlay_file)
# Control cgroups.
allow zygote cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
allow zygote cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
allow zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
# Allow zygote to stat the files that it opens. The zygote must
# be able to inspect them so that it can reopen them on fork
# if necessary: b/30963384.
allow zygote pmsg_device:chr_file getattr;
allow zygote debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
# Get seapp_contexts
allow zygote seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# Check validity of SELinux context before use.
selinux_check_context(zygote)
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(zygote)
# Native bridge functionality requires that zygote replaces
# /proc/cpuinfo with /system/lib/<ISA>/cpuinfo using a bind mount
allow zygote proc_cpuinfo:file mounton;
# Allow remounting rootfs as MS_SLAVE.
allow zygote rootfs:dir mounton;
allow zygote tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
allow zygote fuse:filesystem { unmount };
allow zygote sdcardfs:filesystem { unmount };
# Allow creating user-specific storage source if started before vold.
allow zygote mnt_user_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow zygote mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
# Allowed to mount user-specific storage into place
allow zygote storage_file:dir { search mounton };
# Handle --invoke-with command when launching Zygote with a wrapper command.
allow zygote zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
# Read access to pseudo filesystems.
r_dir_file(zygote, proc_net_type)
userdebug_or_eng(`
auditallow zygote proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')
# Root fs.
r_dir_file(zygote, rootfs)
# System file accesses.
r_dir_file(zygote, system_file)
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Allow zygote to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
allow zygote method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
allow zygote method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
')
allow zygote ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow zygote tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
# Let the zygote access overlays so it can initialize the AssetManager.
get_prop(zygote, overlay_prop)
get_prop(zygote, exported_overlay_prop)
# ingore spurious denials
dontaudit zygote self:capability sys_resource;
###
### neverallow rules
###
# Ensure that all types assigned to app processes are included
# in the appdomain attribute, so that all allow and neverallow rules
# written on appdomain are applied to all app processes.
# This is achieved by ensuring that it is impossible for zygote to
# setcon (dyntransition) to any types other than those associated
# with appdomain plus system_server and webview_zygote.
neverallow zygote ~{ appdomain system_server webview_zygote }:process dyntransition;
# Zygote should never execute anything from /data except for /data/dalvik-cache files.
neverallow zygote {
data_file_type
-dalvikcache_data_file # map PROT_EXEC
}:file no_x_file_perms;
# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties and files
neverallow zygote {
bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
bluetooth_prop
exported_bluetooth_prop
}:file create_file_perms;