c4055f0d04
Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to grant permissions to individual services provided by processes, not all services of a process. Also tighter control over which permissions are required for client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints, channels, etc). Bug: 37646189 Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea Merged-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
18 lines
782 B
Text
18 lines
782 B
Text
# performanced
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type performanced, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type performanced_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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pdx_server(performanced, performance_client)
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# TODO: use file caps to obtain sys_nice instead of setuid / setgid.
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allow performanced self:capability { setuid setgid sys_nice };
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# Access /proc to validate we're only affecting threads in the same thread group.
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# Performanced also shields unbound kernel threads. It scans every task in the
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# root cpu set, but only affects the kernel threads.
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r_dir_file(performanced, { appdomain bufferhubd kernel sensord surfaceflinger })
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dontaudit performanced domain:dir read;
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allow performanced { appdomain bufferhubd kernel sensord surfaceflinger }:process setsched;
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# Access /dev/cpuset/cpuset.cpus
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r_dir_file(performanced, cgroup)
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