a6acef9a9e
Bug: 73952536 Test: run cts -m CtsCameraTestCases -t android.hardware.camera2.cts.IdleUidTest#testCameraAccessBecomingInactiveUid Change-Id: I508352671367dfa106e80108c3a5c0255b5273b2
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Text
# cameraserver - camera daemon
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type cameraserver, domain;
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type cameraserver_exec, exec_type, file_type;
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binder_use(cameraserver)
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binder_call(cameraserver, binderservicedomain)
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binder_call(cameraserver, appdomain)
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binder_service(cameraserver)
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hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_camera)
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hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator)
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allow cameraserver ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Talk with graphics composer fences
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allow cameraserver hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
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add_service(cameraserver, cameraserver_service)
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allow cameraserver activity_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver appops_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver audioserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver batterystats_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver cameraproxy_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver processinfo_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver scheduling_policy_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
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allow cameraserver hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
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###
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### neverallow rules
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###
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# cameraserver should never execute any executable without a
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# domain transition
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neverallow cameraserver { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
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# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
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# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
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# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
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# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
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# hardware/content. Etc.
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#
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# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
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# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
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# Lengthier explanation here:
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# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
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neverallow cameraserver domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
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# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
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allow cameraserver adbd:fd use;
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allow cameraserver adbd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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allow cameraserver shell:fd use;
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allow cameraserver shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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allow cameraserver shell:fifo_file { read write };
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# Allow shell commands from ADB for CTS testing/dumping
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow cameraserver su:fd use;
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allow cameraserver su:fifo_file { read write };
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allow cameraserver su:unix_stream_socket { read write };
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')
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