platform_system_sepolicy/healthd.te
Stephen Smalley ebc08e82a5 Address healthd denials.
Resolve denials such as:
avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=130 comm="healthd" name="state" dev="sysfs" ino=57 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=130 comm="healthd" name="tty0" dev="tmpfs" ino=5677 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tty_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: Iff0609af924b4e5094be7512646140c3baa97549
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2014-03-11 08:51:42 -04:00

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# healthd seclabel is specified in init.rc since
# it lives in the rootfs and has no unique file type.
type healthd, domain;
allow healthd rootfs:file { read entrypoint };
write_klog(healthd)
# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by healthd.
allow healthd tmpfs:chr_file { read write };
allow healthd self:capability { net_admin mknod };
allow healthd self:capability2 block_suspend;
allow healthd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
binder_use(healthd)
binder_service(healthd)
binder_call(healthd, system_server)
# Write to state file.
# TODO: Split into a separate type?
allow healthd sysfs:file write;
###
### healthd: charger mode
###
allow healthd graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow healthd graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow healthd input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow healthd input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow healthd tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow healthd ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
allow healthd self:process execmem;