platform_system_sepolicy/private/netutils_wrapper.te
Maciej Żenczykowski 15715aea32 much more finegrained bpf selinux privs for networking mainline
Goal is to gain a better handle on who has access to which maps
and to allow (with bpfloader changes to create in one directory
and move into the target directory) per-map selection of
selinux context, while still having reasonable defaults for stuff
pinned directly into the target location.

BPFFS (ie. /sys/fs/bpf) labelling is as follows:
  subdirectory   selinux context      mainline  usecase / usable by
  /              fs_bpf               no (*)    core operating system (ie. platform)
  /net_private   fs_bpf_net_private   yes, T+   network_stack
  /net_shared    fs_bpf_net_shared    yes, T+   network_stack & system_server
  /netd_readonly fs_bpf_netd_readonly yes, T+   network_stack & system_server & r/o to netd
  /netd_shared   fs_bpf_netd_shared   yes, T+   network_stack & system_server & netd [**]
  /tethering     fs_bpf_tethering     yes, S+   network_stack
  /vendor        fs_bpf_vendor        no, T+    vendor

* initial support for bpf was added back in P,
  but things worked differently back then with no bpfloader,
  and instead netd doing stuff by hand,
  bpfloader with pinning into /sys/fs/bpf was (I believe) added in Q
  (and was definitely there in R)

** additionally bpf programs are accesible to netutils_wrapper
   for use by iptables xt_bpf extensions

'mainline yes' currently means shipped by the com.android.tethering apex,
but this is really another case of bad naming, as it's really
the 'networking/connectivity/tethering' apex / mainline module.
Long term the plan is to merge a few other networking mainline modules
into it (and maybe give it a saner name...).

The reason for splitting net_private vs tethering is that:
  S+ must support 4.9+ kernels and S era bpfloader v0.2+
  T+ must support 4.14+ kernels and T beta3 era bpfloader v0.13+

The kernel affects the intelligence of the in-kernel bpf verifier
and the available bpf helper functions.  Older kernels have
a tendency to reject programs that newer kernels allow.

/ && /vendor are not shipped via mainline, so only need to work
with the bpfloader that's part of the core os.

Ignore-AOSP-First: will be cherrypicked from tm-dev to aosp/master

Bug: 218408035
Test: TreeHugger, manually on cuttlefish
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I674866ebe32aca4fc851818c1ffcbec12ac4f7d4
2022-06-22 15:16:07 -07:00

47 lines
1.9 KiB
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typeattribute netutils_wrapper coredomain;
typeattribute netutils_wrapper bpfdomain;
r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, system_file);
# For netutils (ip, iptables, tc)
allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
allow netutils_wrapper system_file:file { execute execute_no_trans };
allow netutils_wrapper proc_net_type:file { open read getattr };
allow netutils_wrapper self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_wrapper self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
# ip utils need everything but ioctl
allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_route_socket ~ioctl;
allow netutils_wrapper self:netlink_xfrm_socket ~ioctl;
# For netutils (ndc) to be able to talk to netd
allow netutils_wrapper netd_service:service_manager find;
allow netutils_wrapper dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
allow netutils_wrapper mdns_service:service_manager find;
binder_use(netutils_wrapper);
binder_call(netutils_wrapper, netd);
# For vendor code that update the iptables rules at runtime. They need to reload
# the whole chain including the xt_bpf rules. They need to access to the pinned
# program when reloading the rule.
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:dir search;
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf fs_bpf_netd_shared }:file read;
allow netutils_wrapper { fs_bpf }:file write;
allow netutils_wrapper bpfloader:bpf prog_run;
# For /data/misc/net access to ndc and ip
r_dir_file(netutils_wrapper, net_data_file)
domain_auto_trans({
domain
-coredomain
-appdomain
}, netutils_wrapper_exec, netutils_wrapper)
# suppress spurious denials
dontaudit netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
dontaudit netutils_wrapper sysfs_type:file read;
# netutils wrapper may only use the following capabilities.
neverallow netutils_wrapper self:global_capability_class_set ~{ net_admin net_raw };